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The Middlemen of Modernity: Local Elites and Agricultural Development in Meiji Japan 
 
Christopher Robin Jamie Craig 
 
This dissertation is a close study of a rice-producing region in the northeastern 
Japanese prefecture of Miyagi from 1890-1912, centered on the leadership of local elites 
over agricultural development, social order, and political management of the countryside 
during a period of revolutionary change. In the context of fundamental transformations to 
the state, economy, and society, landlords and local officials assumed positions as 
intermediaries between village society and the prefectural and national governments, 
becoming the “middlemen of modernity” for rural Japan. Along with the celebrated 
projects of industrialization and the modernization of the military, agricultural 
development occupied a place of importance in the plans of the Meiji state (1868-1912), 
but it failed to attract the same commitment of government finances. With official 
intervention in farming improvement and rural villages limited to moral exhortations, it 
was local elites, not the national government, who assumed responsibility for the 
countryside. Miyagi provided a fertile ground for their activities, demonstrating the 
heightened need for improvement that came with the climactic and economic challenges 
endemic in northeastern Japan. The character of Miyagi leaders evolved over time, with 
changes to the rural economy in the 1870s, the local government system in the 1880s, and 
official interest in the organization of local society at the turn of the century pushing old 
 
elites out and drawing in new figures in their places. Unchanged, however, was the role 
of local actors as the principal architects of rural development. They set the course of 
agricultural improvement, determined its character, and linked farming in new ways with 
the central government. The processes of change often proved disruptive in village 
society, rekindling old conflicts and igniting new rivalries as different actors fought over 
the allocation of the costs and profits of expanded production. In the end, though, elites 
oversaw a transformation of farming and agricultural villages that was complete by the 
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 Although the pursuit of modernity is often described in terms of a 
rejection of farming and rural tradition as remnants of an obsolete past, the modernization 
of agriculture is a central problem demanding the attention of all developing societies. 
The Meiji government (1868-1912), in the midst of the rapid political and economic 
modernization of the 1870s through the 1890s, grew increasingly concerned with the 
problem of agricultural development. Officials had long celebrated the countryside as the 
heart of the nation and the storehouse of moral virtue, but new pressures in the 1880s 
forced a focus on the prosperity of villages and the development of farming. The 
demands of an overwhelmingly agrarian population and economy were made even more 
pressing by the threat of the rural landowning elite. Government revenue depended on the 
land taxes, but the rural landlords who paid it were becoming politically active, 
presenting vocal opposition to the state in the Freedom and Popular Rights Movement 
(Jiyū minken undō). Agricultural improvement and rural prosperity were conceived in 
good part as a means to suppress this opposition and maintain villages as prosperous 
bastions of morality and social peace. At the same time, scarce government funds were 
directed not toward agriculture but toward industry and the military, in part because 
direct intervention in the countryside threatened only to arouse further opposition. The 
solution taken by Meiji officials was to have the local elites themselves act as the agents 
of agricultural modernization and social control. 
Village elites were to employ their wealth and local prominence to act as what I 




notables) and attached to them its hopes for agricultural improvement and a stable 
countryside. In organizing local resources and support to increase farming production, 
willpower and energy were to be the most important characteristics of meibōka, who 
would no longer have the time or inclination to oppose the government. Assuming the 
leadership of villages, they would improve agriculture and ensure a content and 
prosperous countryside. They became the central figures in a system of meibōka-led 
agricultural development that lasted for three decades, from the 1880s until the late 
1900s, and played a crucial role both in strengthening the economy and mobilizing 
villages in the service of national goals.  
Rural society has long been a focus of scholars studying the Meiji period, and 
villages and landlords have figured prominently in the English-language historiography. 
Seminal works have illuminated the experiences of Japanese villages in the transition to 
the modern Japanese state, the roles of local residents and communities in the protest 
movements of the 1870s and 1880s, the diffusion of ideology throughout Japan in the 
1890s and 1900s, and the evolution of the landlord class over the nineteenth and 
twentieth centuries.1 Scholarship in Japanese has likewise produced a dedicated body of 
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 Notable works in English on rural society and agriculture in Meiji Japan include: Ann Waswo, Japanese 
Landlords: The Decline of a Rural Elite (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1977); Roger W. Bowen, 
Rebellion and Democracy in Meiji Japan: A Study of Commoners in the Popular Rights Movement 
(Berkeley: University of California Press, 1980); Neil L Waters, Japan’s Local Pragmatists: The 
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(Berkeley: University of California Press, 1986); Thomas C. Smith, Native Sources of Japanese 
Industrialization, 1750-1920 (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1988); James C. Baxter, The Meiji 
Unification through the Lens of Ishikawa Prefecture, Harvard East Asian Monographs 165 (Cambridge: 




work on local society in the Meiji period with a special focus on village elites. Articles 
and books since the 1980s have explored the role of notables in the transition from 
Tokugawa to Meiji, their relationship with the central government and the burgeoning 
political parties, their place in local government, their interaction with the law, and their 
economic activities.
2
 Both English and Japanese historians have situated rural areas at the 
center of the Meiji story and enriched older narratives of urban modernization, but there 
remain unexplored areas. The northeastern region of country (Tōhoku) is regularly 
identified as exhibiting particular characteristics, sometimes even noted as an exception 
to national norms, but it has yet to be the object of a dedicated study. 
The present work aims to rectify this lacuna. The northeastern prefecture of 
Miyagi presents an ideal site in which to study meibōka and their leadership of 
agricultural development. Miyagi, like the larger Tōhoku region, was known both for the 
dominance of agriculture and for the backwardness of its economy. When Meiji officials 
                                                                                                                                                              
Twentieth-Century Japan : The Emergence of a World Power 3 (Berkeley: University of California Press, 
1995); Edward E. Pratt, Japan’s Protoindustrial Elite: The Economic Foundations of the Gono, 
Harvard East Asian Monographs 179 (Cambridge: Harvard University Asia Center : Distributed by 
Harvard University Press, 1999); and Michael Lewis, Becoming Apart: National Power and Local Politics 
in Toyama, 1868-1945, Harvard East Asian Monographs 192 (Cambridge: Harvard University Asia Center, 
2000). 
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Chiho Seiji Jokyo Shiron (To kyo : Yoshikawa Ko bunkan, 1980); Matsumoto Michiharu, 
“Kindai chihō meibōka no kenkyū: ‘jo’ ni kaete,” Shakai Kagaku, no. 37 (1986): 1–9; Takaku Reinosuke, 
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spoke of rural Japan, they knew that there was nowhere more rural than the Northeast. 
Unlike agricultural regions in central and southwestern Japan, Tōhoku entered the Meiji 
period with its villages largely untouched by the spread of capitalism and even the 
money-based market economy. Economic backwardness meant social advantage for 
landlords, whose treatment as lords by their tenants drew concern from officials and 
social reformers alike, but it also limited their economic activities, making land 
ownership and farming the only profitable enterprises. This combination of a locally 
powerful and entrenched elite and an economy based more exclusively on agriculture 
than elsewhere provided ideal conditions for the development of meibōka and thus offers 
a window through which to examine their activities in leading the modernization of 
farming, not only in Miyagi, but throughout Japan. 
Miyagi possessed particular local conditions that highlight meibōka-led 
development. It was situated at the northernmost limit of wet-paddy rice production at 
that time, giving rice – the staple whose production was the basis for the national 
economy and thus most concerned agricultural officials – an importance that it lacked in 
other parts of the Tōhoku region. These circumstances combined with the lack of 
alternative opportunities for profit to lead to soaring rates of tenancy as land became 
concentrated in the hands of a new class of large landlords during the deflation of the 
1880s and the economic resurgence of the 1890s. While newly prosperous landlords 
abandoned rural life for the comfort of the cities in economically advanced regions, in 
Miyagi they remained in their home villages in close proximity to the agricultural 
production that provided their rent rice. Elites old and new took on a variety of leadership 




their dedication to local service to the "landlord meibōka" whose unsentimental, and 
successful, pursuit of profit earned them a different kind of prominence. To the efforts of 
these local figures to improve agriculture, Miyagi presented a variety of challenges that 
frustrated the plans of national and prefectural agricultural officials. Flooding rivers 
defied efforts at control, crop failures struck with devastating frequency, and fractured 
communities contended with one another for scarce resources, reducing the possibility of 
locally funded improvements and increasingly attracting direct government involvement. 
Between 1880 and 1910, meibōka in Miyagi faced these challenges, transforming 
themselves, their villages, and government policy as they pursued the goal of agricultural 
development. Older elites took up the mantle first, making self-motivated efforts at 
agricultural improvement and the spread of best farming practices and laying the 
foundation for the transformation of agriculture. Some survived the challenges of the 
1880s while others lost out to the new landlords who found opportunity in adversity and 
struggled to achieve social status commensurate with their recently acquired economic 
power.  These "rising meibōka," as I call them, challenged unresponsive authorities and 
accomplished an inversion of leadership, both on the local level, whereby they supplanted 
older elites, and in the relationship with the government, which adapted to accommodate 
their goals as members of newly established agricultural associations. Success came from 
complementary, but not identical, interests in agricultural development shared by 
government and these recently risen local elites – "landlord meibōka" in my terms – that 
allowed them to achieve their own goals and those of officials at the same time. In the 
1900s, landlord meibōka propelled the creation of a new agricultural order, one in which 




But along with their successes came opposition to landlord meibōka and the system they 
had established. Influenced by growing inequality, a lack of systematic improvement, and 
the social and economic threats that loomed after the Russo-Japanese War of 1904-1905, 
officials turned against landlord meibōka, withdrawing the legal backing for their local 
dominance and asserting direct control over key aspects of agricultural improvement by 
the end of the first decade of the twentieth century. 
I begin the study with an examination of the local improvement work of Kamada 
Sannosuke, a landlord and mayor from northern Miyagi who gained nationwide fame in 
the prewar period as “Mayor Straw Sandals.” Kamada took on a central role in the 
reclamation of a wetlands near his home village of Kashimadai in the first decade of the 
twentieth century, fulfilling a dream pursued by three generations of his family. In 
leading the drainage project, Kamada embodied the characteristics of an ideal meibōka. 
Using his family's links with political elites in Tokyo, Kamada was able to attract the 
interest of powerful allies, while his reputation and economic ties in Kashimadai enabled 
him to overcome resistance to the project and navigate the conflicting local interests. He 
played the role of intermediary between local communities and central authorities, the 
role that defined the middlemen of modernity, in an exemplary manner, and the 
prosperity that the reclaimed lands provided for the long-suffering village offered a 
model for the locally-led development at the heart of Meiji-era agricultural policy. 
Chapter two turns to an 1892 dispute over water management in a neighboring 
region in northern Miyagi to illustrate the ways local leadership over agricultural 
development evolved in the context of the economic and political changes of the late 




provision and flood prevention brought forth long-suppressed animosities between the 
two districts of Monō and Tōda and set off a succession of illegal acts that threatened to 
explode into violence in the early 1890s. The dispute saw the emergence of a newly-risen 
class of landlords, who displaced their more respectable, but less affluent, fellows to 
assume positions of leadership on both sides. Here, however, an irreconcilability of 
interests combined with the limits of local resources and an uneven commitment by 
government to make success of the kind later seen in Kashimadai impossible. Left 
holding empty promises for transformative terraforming projects from prefectural 
authorities, Monō and Tōda leaders had little choice but to bury their differences and 
encourage local landlords to proceed with such individual and piecemeal agricultural 
improvements as could be achieved with private funds. 
The third chapter explores the development of the agricultural association 
movement in the late nineteenth century and its place in forging a new rural order that 
saw official support extended to this new class of landlords as the stewards of local 
development. Founded autonomously in the 1870s and 1880s by earlier rural elites 
known for their farming expertise (rōnō), agricultural associations gathered landowning 
farmers into a nationwide network spreading best practices and agricultural technology. 
As new landlords arose, they took control over the associations and used their own places 
in the newly-established National Diet to push for official recognition and support in the 
1890s. Their appeals found a sympathetic audience in the bureaucrats of the Home and 
Agriculture Ministries, who saw the groups as a means to accomplish the modernization 
they sought without requiring the direct involvement of the central government. The 




an opportunity, clearing the way for the passage of a raft of legislation that organized 
agricultural associations nationally, bolstered their power over villages, and backed them 
up with legal force. 
Chapter four traces the consequences of this legal change and the new agricultural 
order it forged. In Miyagi, landlord meibōka used their new legal authority to undertake 
projects of reclamation, land consolidation, and improved cultivation that laid the 
groundwork for future gains in production. These advances, however, were only 
accomplished by means of a strengthening of landlord authority in villages and an 
intensification of the exploitation of tenant farmers and smallholders. Landlords 
leveraged their privileged positions in agricultural associations to press the prefectural 
government for further legislation that backed their visions of farming improvement and 
mobilized official force to ensure compliance with the terms of tenancy contracts. The 
result in Miyagi was the so-called “saber system” of agricultural management, which saw 
police dispatched to rice paddies to enforce improved seeds and methods of planting at 
the point of their swords. These efforts reached a logical conclusion in a set of prefectural 
regulations setting quality standards for tenant rice, a reform that was delayed by two 
years of devastating famine in 1905 and 1906 but quickly instated when yields began to 
recover. 
The final chapter follows the backlash that government and village populations 
launched against landlords and their brand of agricultural improvement. Even as Miyagi 
meibōka consolidated their power over villages, criticism among officials in the central 
government grew increasingly strident. Bureaucrats like Yanagida Kunio attacked the 




their increasing distance from the actual business of agriculture. These complaints 
culminated in the Home Ministry's Local Improvement Movement of 1907 and the 
revision of the agricultural improvement legislation in the years that followed. These 
measures sought out new leaders for villages, erased the legal privileges extended to 
meibōka, and exerted official control over key aspects of farming and land improvement. 
At the same time, tenants in northern Miyagi formed into unions and launched a 
coordinated attack against landlord abuses. They achieved victory across the region in 
1908, forcing the revision of tenancy contracts and a commitment from landlords to share 
in the costs of improved farming. By 1910 a new agricultural order had taken shape, with 
prefectural and national governments taking on an active role in the development of 
farming and extending legal protections over tenant farmers and smallholders. 
In the end, the system of meibōka-led agricultural development made significant progress 
toward achieving its goals. It succeeded in spreading the improved agricultural 
techniques and modern forms of farming that became the basis for dramatic economic 
growth in the 1910s and 1920s. The consolidation of scattered farm plots and the 
introduction of new seed and fertilizers brought Miyagi out of its backwardness and set it 
on the path to agricultural stability and modernity. It also had more ambiguous effects. 
The government's assumption of an active role in the development of agriculture brought 
increased state involvement in village society and contributed to the regimentation of 
daily life in the semi-official organizations that came with it. The tensions between 
landlords and tenants, quieted in Miyagi in 1908, returned to sow conflict and disorder in 
the late 1920s and the 1930s, which saw the fears of officials realized in the development 




industrialized economy and expansionist foreign policy, an era built upon the work of the 






Mayor Straw Sandals: Kamada Sannosuke and the Meibōka Ideal 
 
 One day in 1907, Kamada Sannosuke, a landlord and farmer from northern 
Miyagi, received a telegram.3 It was an urgent message forwarded to him by the Japanese 
envoy in Mexico, where Kamada had been for a year planning the establishment of a 
Japanese farming colony, and it repeated the words of the telegram that had arrived the 
day before. "Trouble with the Shinainuma matter. Awaiting your mediation.”4 The appeal 
came directly from Kamei Eizaburō, the governor of Kamada's home prefecture. The 
drainage of Shinainuma, a wetlands area bordering Kamada's home village of 
Kashimadai, had been an obsession of the Kamada family for three generations, and 
Kamada had set out for Mexico only when he was certain that the work had at last 
progressed to its final phase. Realizing the seriousness of the matter, he dropped what he 
was doing and headed for the Mexican coast, pausing only to get the envoy's agreement 
that he would oversee the colony project in his absence. Arriving at the port to discover 
that he had missed the last passenger ship to Japan, Kamada boarded a Pacific mail 
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 This chapter draws on a number of biographies and biographical material published on Kamada. The most 
prominent and useful of these are: Naikaku, “Miyagiken Shidagun Kashimadai sonchō Kamada Sannosuke 
ranju hōshō kashi no ken,” December 17, 1927, Kōbun zassan: Shōwa ni-nen: dai hachi ken: Naikaku 
hachi: Naikaku hachi (shōdōkyoku roku), National Archives of Japan; Senkyo shukusei renmei, ed., 
Nijūhachinen no waraji sonchō (Tokyo: Senkyo Shukusei Renmei, 1936); Honma Rakukan, Waraji sonchō 
Kamada Sannosuke ō: Yokusan no ijin - Shōwa no Sontoku (Tokyo: Jidaisha, 1942); Matsuda Takeshirō, 
Waraji sonchō (Tokyo: Naka Shoten, 1942); Kōdō Shinbunsha, ed., Ima Sontoku Kamada Sannosuke 
(Okayama: Kōdō Shinbunsha, 1943); Ko Kamada Sannosuke ō shōtokukai, Kamada Sannosuke ōden 
(Kashimadai: Ko Kamada Sannosuke Ō Shōtokukai, 1953); Koide Kōzō, Kamada Sannosuke ō: Waraji 
sonchō no shōgai (Tokyo: Nihon Jichikensestu Undō Honbu, 1961); Kashimadai chōshi hensan iinkai, 
Kashimadai chōshi (Kashimadai: Kashimadaichō, 1994). 
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 The words of the telegram are repeated in nearly every work on Kamada and Shinainuma. For example, 
see Honma Rakukan, Waraji sonchō Kamada Sannosuke ō: Yokusan no ijin - Shōwa no Sontoku, 135. 





carrier bound for Yokohama and settled in to a voyage made uncomfortable by Spartan 
conditions, bitter disappointment, and troubling uncertainty. 
Three years later, he found himself in somber conversation with his mother in the 
family home in Kashimadai. Kamada's return accomplished what Governor Kamei hoped 
for. He smoothed the ruffled feathers of the various parties involved in the drainage of 
Shinainuma, restored local faith in the work and its goals, and set the project on the path 
to completion. Believing his work finished, Kamada had begun to prepare to return to 
Mexico to complete the arrangements for the farming colony. Local matters, however, 
complicated these plans. The village council of Kashimadai had met and unanimously 
chosen Kamada to fill the recently vacated post of mayor, displaying an almost 
unthinkable degree of accord for a group that had seen a decade of acrimonious and 
seemingly intractable hostility. Kamada stood before his mother now, uncertain which 
path to take. On the one hand, he had worked since his youth in service of his home 
village, striving to improve local health and education and, most important, following in 
the footsteps of his father and grandfather in championing the drainage of the Shinainuma 
marshes. On the other hand, he had long dreamed of gaining wider fame as the architect 
of an overseas farming colony, which would deal with the national problems of 
impoverished agricultural villages, expanding population, and uncertain food supply. His 
mother broke the deadlock for him, saying simply, "Someone else could undertake the 
immigration plan, but only you can handle the rebuilding of the village.”5
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What both Governor Kamei and the Kashimadai village council needed was not so 
much the philanthropist who had formulated and led the Mexico colonization project with 
such vigor. As they and Kamada's mother recognized, any number of public-spirited 
individuals in Japan were capable of handling work of that nature, while Kashimadai and 
Shinainuma required a rarer sort of person. The problems demanded someone with an 
intimate knowledge of their problems and the local lay of the land. They demanded 
someone who could be a bridge, both among villagers and between the village and the 
prefectural and national governments. And they demanded someone who was willing to 
give freely of himself, committing fully to the area and its people and making whatever 
personal sacrifices might be required.  
What Kamei and Kashimadai needed was a figure known as a chihō meibōka (local 
notable). Kashimadai's problems, though extreme, were far from unusual in Meiji Japan. 
Towns and villages across the country faced overwhelming challenges in the late 
nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. Cut off from official support and facing new 
pressures from changes to the taxation system and the growth of capitalism, rural 
communities struggled to achieve prosperity and modernize agriculture in line with the 
industries that monopolized the attention of government officials and investors. Yet, as 
rhetoric issuing forth from Tokyo constantly reminded them, they served no less 
important a role in the national drive to power and modernity. Rural land taxes remained 
the primary source of national wealth, farms fed the country, and village youth provided 
the backbone of the imperial army. The health and development of villages was vital to 
the survival of the nation and its quest for a place among the "civilized nations" of the 




leaders who could marshal the resources necessary to improve farms and villages, build 
local support and unity behind development, and lead their communities to prosperity and 
modernity. 
Meiji government leaders recognized these needs and provided an ideological 
construct to answer them: the chihō meibōka. Building on the roles wealthy farmers 
(gōnō) had played in autonomous Tokugawa villages, the architects of the Meiji local 
government system placed the meibōka at the center of the rural order they intended to 
forge. Much as their forebears had done, these new figures would employ their social and 
economic resources to ensure the economic health and stability of their home villages and 
apply themselves fully to the oversight of local administration and the modernization of 
agriculture. They would ensure the survival and prosperity of villages, leaving scarce 
government funds for the national purposes of military and industrial development. 
Taken as a whole, Kamada's life and work do more than illustrate the qualities 
common to meibōka; they present the portrait of a rare example of the type I call "ideal 
meibōka," who matched the vision of local leaders that central bureaucrats had enshrined 
in the local government system. Unquestionably effective as an intermediary, intensely 
focused on his village, and motivated by a personal ethos that conformed closely to that 
of the official overseers of the local government system, Kamada exemplified the best 
hopes that both local farmers and government planners had for meibōka and his 
accomplishments in Kashimadai illustrated what these figures could accomplish. 
Kamada's early efforts supporting schools and doctors, his involvement in the 
Shinainuma drainage project, and the range of reforms and improvements he introduced 




had been called the poorest in Japan at the turn of the century, into one of the most 
affluent rural communities in Miyagi by 1927.6 He helped it to maneuver through the 
turbulence of the early twentieth century, taking Kashimadai from premodern destitution 
to modern prosperity while avoiding the social shocks and political discord that afflicted 
other areas. Kamada's example showed the realization of a meibōka as a middleman of 
modernity, brokering success in a modernizing environment hostile to agricultural 
villages. 
Kamada's efforts propelled him to fame at the national level, and he became a model 
for local leaders and common villagers as Mayor Straw Sandals (Waraji sonchō), a 
sobriquet referring to his eccentrically ascetic manner of dress. He ended his long career 
as an icon, the model for village leaders across the country. But while Kamada's success 
proved the viability of government plans for decentralized development, it also 
highlighted the challenges it faced. While he was far from unique, Kamada and the small 
number of others like him scattered across the country stood out precisely because they 
presented such a stark contrast with local leaders in most villages. Planners in the central 
government held fast to the idea that universally acquirable characteristics of 
volunteerism, self-sacrifice, and willpower, married to the material assets and local 
influence that village elites enjoyed, were the chief factors behind the successful 
rehabilitations of villages like Kashimadai. Kamada's efforts toward the draining of 
Shinainuma and his rise to village mayor, however, demonstrate the contingencies that 
underlay his success. Local circumstances, an unusual degree of government interest, and 
a significant degree of luck combined with direct family connections to figures in the 
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central government to enable Kamada to lead the drainage of Shinainuma and transform 
life in Kashimadai. It was not a confluence that could be counted upon to recur often. 
Kamada Sannosuke was born in 1863 in the village of Kimazuka in north-central 
Sendai domain (later part of the amalgamated village of Kashimadai and currently part of 
the city of Ōsaki, Miyagi). Like meibōka throughout the country, he came from the gōnō 
(rich farmer) class of wealthy agriculturalists and his family enjoyed local prominence 
and respect as the largest landholders in the region.7 The family name was also associated 
with local development. Both his grandfather, Genkō, and his father, Sanji, gained 
renown for their dedication to water control on Shinainuma, a lowland lake that was the 
source of perpetual flooding in the area. Genkō's efforts in this work and in other forms 
of agricultural improvement led to his enshrinement as a local farming deity after his 
death.8
 
Kamada's youth was marked by a focus on education and cultural development. He 
pursued Chinese studies as a child against the background of the new Meiji government's 
political centralization and his family's subsequent social transformation from rural 
samurai (a substratum known only in Miyagi and a few other domains) to landlord-
farmers. After his grandfather's death in 1877, Kamada followed in the footsteps of many 
an elite son in early Meiji, walking the long road to Tokyo and a modern education. He 
geared his studies toward becoming a general in the national army, but was forced to 
change his plans when illness prevented him from passing the entrance exam to officer 
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training school. He turned instead toward law and politics, enrolling in Meiji Law School 
(Meiji hōritsu daigaku, currently Meiji daigaku).  
Tokyo at this time was the site of an event that both Kamada and his subsequent 
biographers saw as foundational to his development. Like many young rural men come to 
the big city for the first time, Kamada quickly fell victim to the lures of urban life. He 
spent his nights in cafés and bars with a new clique of urban sophisticates, developing 
expensive tastes in liquor and women. It was just as he was on the point of forgetting his 
family's work in Shinainuma, or so the chroniclers of his life have it, that Kamada 
reached an important turning point in his life. At a talk on modern ideas of independence 
and self-respect by the celebrated public intellectual Fukuzawa Yukichi, he was reminded 
suddenly of the final instructions his grandfather had given to him and his father from his 
deathbed: "Worry about draining Shinainuma even before you worry about your own 
food and clothing.”9 Kamada repented of his unfilial and wastrel ways and resolved to 
finish his studies and return to Kashimadai to complete the task that his grandfather had 
assigned to him.10
 
Kamada returned to Kashimadai in 1883 at the age of twenty and began the work 
that defined the rest of his life. His father held the post of kochō, village head under the 
system of local government at the time, and Kamada joined him in his work in local 
administration.11 While assisting with village business, he also made personal efforts to 
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improve health care, education, and agriculture in the village. For both Kamada and his 
father, however, the most important work was to fulfill the promise to Genkō to drain 
Shinainuma. 
Shinainuma was a wetlands roughly twenty kilometers northwest of the coastal town 
of Matsushima. A vast reservoir on the Naruse River system, it stretched from the inland 
mountains of central Miyagi to Matsushima and the Pacific Ocean. To human settlement, 
Shinainuma presented a dilemma. The lands surrounding the wetlands were richly fertile, 
with readily available irrigation and great promise for rice production, but Shinainuma 
itself was prone to destructive flooding. Despite this constant danger, residents cultivated 
lands all around the area and fell into a pattern of farming when they could and 
rehabilitating their lands after they were flooded. 
Rulers and residents had long recognized the potential of improvements on 
Shinainuma for increasing agricultural production in the areas surrounding it. In the late 
17th century when the aggressive land reclamation of the first four lords of the Sendai 
domain exhausted the supply of land that could be easily developed in their territory, 
subsequent leaders turned to ambitious drainage projects that involved the mobilization 
of mass numbers of laborers under the supervision of domain authorities.12 These efforts 
resulted in the construction of the Genroku tunnel (Genroku senketsu) in 1693, which 
drained the southern reaches of Shinainuma and reduced the size of the wetlands 
significantly, thus adding a measure of protection against flooding.13
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On the newly opened lands, the cultivation of new fields began in earnest. Even 
reduced, however, flood damage continued to be endemic on the now smaller 
Shinainuma, ruining two out of every three harvests. Still, the fertility of the newly 
opened paddyland was such that farmers could get by even under trying circumstances.14 
As time passed and the Genroku Tunnel fell into disrepair, conditions worsened. Spurred 
by the degradation of the drainage system and the suffering that he saw during the Tempō 
Famine from 1832 to 1836, Kamada's grandfather Genkō became an active proponent of 
further development and drainage of the wetlands.15 He organized collective efforts 
among villagers to maintain and expand existing drainage channels and exhorted domain 
officials to dig new conduits. For these and other efforts, including emergency flood 
control, the provision of relief rice during poor harvest years, and the promotion of 
improved strains of rice, the local Moniwa lords rewarded him with monetary prizes and 
an increase in the family stipend.  
The new central government established after the Imperial Restoration in 1868 
brought about renewed official interest in the improvement of Shinainuma. While 
uncertainties in the immediate aftermath of the change in government led a group of nine 
worried residents of the area to sign an agreement to remain in solidarity for the purpose 
of improving Shinainuma in the face of whatever administrative chaos might come, their 
fears that the wetlands would be forgotten proved unjustified.16 Miyagi governor 
Matsudaira Masanao became an early advocate of work on the wetlands in the 1870s and 
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1880s, and he remained in close communication with the Home and Finance Ministries 
about the potential for government-led drainage. His efforts proved fruitful, securing 
funding from the Finance Ministry for badly needed repairs and improvements to the 
Genroku tunnel and a government-funded survey of further drainage of Shinainuma. In 
1879 the Home Ministry dispatched Cornelis Johannes van Doorn, a Dutch technician 
employed by the Meiji government, to conduct a series of examinations of the wetlands 
to investigate the possibility of draining it. He concluded that this would require elaborate 
construction, elevating costs far beyond any benefits the project promised to yield.17 The 
project was written off as unfeasible and the Home Ministry washed its hands of the 
matter, ending the first period of the Meiji government's involvement in Shinainuma. 
This was the context in which Kamada returned home from Tokyo to assist his 
father. Sanji had been carrying on his own father's work while promoting the 
development of Kashimadai as village head. In this capacity, he oversaw the construction 
of a succession of weirs and canals on the wetlands in continuing efforts to offer local 
farmers a modicum of protection against floods. He also provided a model for his son's 
later activities as a meibōka. His work for local development included supervision of the 
reclamation of new farmland, the planting trees to provide village income for poor relief, 
and the construction of a new building for the Kimazuka Elementary Schoolat his own 
expense after the village council was forced to abandon the project in the wake of 
destructive floods in 1879. For these and other works, the village council presented a total 
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of seven awards to Sanji, once even bestowing on him a village-owned building in a 
show of their appreciation.18
 
With the amalgamation of Kimazuka and five other villages into the new village of 
Kashimadai in 1889, a new mayor was elected and father and son focused their full 
energies on the Shinainuma problem. They worked both alone and in concert with the 
Association of Villages Surrounding Shinainuma (Shinainuma enson kumiai, hereafter 
SEK), which landowners from the villages of Kashimadai, Ōmatsuzawa, Ōtani, 
Kasukawa, and the town of Matsushima formed in 1889, attempting to build both local 
and official support for plans to drain Shinainuma. Kamada also began his political career 
at this time. He rose through local offices in the village and the district assembly, 
eventually becoming the youngest member of the prefectural assembly in 1895. He used 
these positions to further his work and, along with his father and the SEK, experienced 
qualified success over the next decade, gaining the support of reticent local landlords for 
the drainage project and the prefecture's commitment to another survey of the wetlands. 
By the time of Sanji's death in 1898, it appeared that the family dream would become 
reality in the near future. 
A decade of uneven progress on the drainage project followed. High projected costs 
again dissipated government support for the project, prompting the SEK to reform its 
membership in order to ensure full support for the project by excluding communities not 
directly affected by flood damage. It also renamed itself the Shinainuma Flood 
Prevention Association (Shinainuma suigai yobō kumiai, hereafter SSYK). Despite these 
efforts, constant personnel changes in the Miyagi governor's office impeded the search 
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for allies in the prefectural administration and led to further delays and frustrations. 
Kamada entered national politics at this time in order to work from within the central 
government, and was elected twice to the Imperial Diet as a member of the Friends of 
Constitutional Government Party (Rikken Seiyūkai) in 1903 and 1904. While Kamada's 
political career ended in embarrassing defeat in his third campaign after he left the party 
as part of a mass exodus over a political scandal, plans for the drainage of Shinainuma 
moved in more positive directions. The project had gained the full support of the Home 
and Finance Ministries by the end of the Russo-Japanese War in 1905 and cleared the 
hurdles of the Japan Rail Company's and the Imperial House's ownership of parts of the 
wetlands soon afterward. Armed with surveys from the prefecture and the Home Ministry 
and a loan from the Japan Hypothec Bank (Nippon kangyō ginkō), the SSYK hired a 
contractor and prepared to start draining Shinainuma, a work that promised to reduce the 
wetlands to a fraction of its size and reclaim over 1,300 hectares of arable in a 
transformation of the region and its agriculture. 
With work underway, Kamada was free to turn to a matter that had long occupied his 
thoughts: a solution to what he and many others saw as a looming Malthusian crisis. A 
rapidly-expanding population and increasing awareness of the limitations of domestic 
agriculture had long troubled mid-Meiji citizens and officials alike and focused attention 
overseas. For Kamada, this became a personal mission. While he addressed problems 
surrounding agricultural production and food supplies in partnership with prominent 
politician (and future Prime Minister) Katō Takaaki in the Diet, his interest in a Mexican 




recording a visit to Mexico as early as 1901.19 He turned anew to the project in mid-1906, 
creating a limited partnership dedicated to it and gaining the blessings of both Katō and 
governor Kamei.  
Kamada and his group set off from Yokohama in October of 1906, making landfall 
in San Francisco (then still recovering from the devastating earthquake earlier in the 
year), then beore heading south by train.20 Their target was the Ixcuintla area, for which 
an earlier official mission from Japan had signed an abortive lease with the Mexican 
government in 1877.21 At their destination, Kamada discovered a land rich with 
agricultural and industrial potential, offering the promise of three harvests a year as well 
as secondary production in coffee and rubber.22 He found an enthusiastic supporter in the 
chief Japanese diplomat stationed in Mexico, who offered his aid in negotiating with the 
Mexican government. A year of effort by Kamada's group and the envoy yielded 
extensive surveys and promising contacts with the Mexican government, but just when 
the arrangements seemed to be nearing completion, the telegram from governor Kamei 
arrived and Kamada was forced to begin his uncomfortable ride home on the mail boat. 
Kamada returned home in 1908 to find Shinainuma in virtually the same state as 
when he left. In his absence, the tenuous alignment of local support behind the project 
had shattered, and conflict broke out between parties on all sides in the face of delays, 
accidents, and escalating costs. The SSYK had fired the first contractor after a year had 
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passed with no sign of the work starting. The awarding of a new contract failed to restart 
construction and now a personal enmity bordering on hatred divided the new foreman 
and the head of the SSYK. Worse, factions for and against the drainage project had 
formed among both residents and the members of the Shida district assembly.23 Governor 
Kamei's attempts to intervene personally proved fruitless, leading him to conclude that 
only Kamada's return could break the deadlock and get construction back on track. 
Kamada proved the soundness of this decision by rebuilding faith in the project, restoring 
functional relations between its chief parties, and restarting construction. A moment of 
triumph came in October 1908, when Kamada arranged for the imperial train to pause for 
a full minute to allow the young Crown Prince (the future Taishō Emperor) a view of the 
nearly-completed drainage channel. The visit of such a lofty figure, and the official 
interest in the land reclamation that it demonstrated, bolstered local support, quieted 
opposition, and smoothed the way for the project's completion. The prefecture staged a 
massive public ceremony on the 26th of December, 1910 to mark the start of the drainage 
into the new channel, attracting over one thousand local people and singling out Kamada 
for his role in the realization of the project. At the close of the event, technicians removed 
the blocks from the new drainage channel and began the process that would eventually 
erase the Shinainuma swamp from the map. 
During the final year of construction, Kamada had taken on the position of mayor of 
Kashimadai. The village council voted him into office in March of 1909 upon the 
retirement of his beleaguered predecessor Takeda Chikanaga. He went on to hold the 
office for over thirty-seven years, across the wartime era of the 1930s and early 1940s 
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and into the postwar Occupation period. In choosing Kamada for the mayor's seat, the 
Kashimadai village assemblymen showed their respect for his accomplishments in the 
Shinainuma project, but they were not offering him an empty honor. Both government 
and society in the village were in a disastrous state that had grown steadily worse over the 
previous decade. The council needed Kamada to repair the rifts that rent the community 
and restore administrative functionality to the village with an exercise of the same skills 
that he had demonstrated in bringing the drainage project to completion. 
The problems in Kashimadai dated to the formation of the administrative village in 
1889 under the new local government system. Within a year of its amalgamation from six 
existing villages, 203 residents of Ōhasama, Hironaga, and Fukuya (redefined as 
unofficial hamlets [buraku] within Kashimadai) declared an incompatibility of interests 
with the new arrangement and filed a petition with the Kashimadai assembly to allow 
their secession and reformation as a separate village. The assembly accepted their 
reasoning and went further, forwarding a petition of its own to the prefectural 
government that the entire union be dissolved.24 The prefecture rejected the proposal, but 
the years that followed showed little sign of improvement in village unity. Exacerbating 
the divisions the village was its dismal economic condition, caused by the chronic 
flooding of Shinainuma and inundation of neighboring farmland. During the years 
between the foundation of the village and the First World War, major deluges in 1889, 
1890, 1905, 1906, 1907, and 1910 and crop failures in 1910 and 1913 punctuated 
perennial minor floods. The economic cost of this continuous state of disaster gave 
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Kashimadai the title of the poorest village in Miyagi and pushed tenancy rates beyond 
even the explosive growth in tenancy that characterized the rest of northern Miyagi 
prefecture.25 The response to the floods cemented the conflicting interests between the 
areas vulnerable to flooding and those that were safe, with the SEK's imposition of fees 
on each hamlet regardless of whether they suffered from floods drawing especially 
vitriolic ire.  
By the turn of the century, the political culture in the village had grown poisonous, 
devolving into a pattern in which (mostly) verbal attacks on village officials began with 
their elections to office, growing more intense with worsening economic conditions until 
leaders begged retirement on the grounds of ill health.26 Chronic poverty and rising levels 
of debt combined with the persistent and conflicting parochial interests of the hamlets to 
create opposition to any and all in the village administration. Both Konno Raisuke, the 
third mayor who struggled through the difficult conditions of the Russo-Japanese War 
and the famine of 1905-1906 only to be chased out of office in 1907, and Takeda 
Chikanaga, the fourth mayor who won office primarily by ensuring that over half of the 
village assembly was absent on election day, fell to venomous attacks from all corners of 
Kashimadai.27 With administrative dysfunction at new highs following the retirement of 
Takeda, a reform faction emerged in the village assembly that led a push to make 
Kamada mayor in an effort to stem the tide of self-destructive divisiveness. Other than 
assemblyman (and later the first priest of the amalgamated Kashimadai Shrine) Okada 
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Kazumichi, who argued that by selfishly tying Kamada to Kashimadai they were doing a 
disservice both to the man himself and the country as a whole, the council was united 
behind the idea.28 They contrived to meet without Okada and voted Kamada into the 
office of mayor unanimously on March 13, 1909. Kamada's private conversation with his 
mother followed, and he formally accepted the offer before the day was over. 
Kamada took office the next day, summoning a representative from each house in 
the village and presenting his ambitious program of reforms to them. He began with a 
challenge: 
 
As everyone knows, our village is mired in the depths of poverty. This makes it 
impossible for us to expect the easy life that other villages enjoy. We cannot get by 
with normal levels of perseverance and by standing together shoulder to shoulder. 
So we don't say tomorrow; we say today, here, and now, we have to rehabilitate 
ourselves and undertake a complete reformation. That is our most urgent business. 
Therefore, there is village business that we will postpone or cancel and other 
matters that we will have to consolidate. But it remains to be seen whether or not 
you will listen to what I say.29
 
 
In response to enthusiastic agreement and declarations of resoluteness from the 
assembled villagers, Kamada outlined his plans for streamlining the village 
administration, reducing costs, and restoring village ownership over lands held by outside 
landlords. In the weeks and months that followed, he introduced a series of programs to 
accomplish these goals and Kashimadai began the long and ultimately successful drive 
from poverty into a new era of prosperity. 
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Even as Kamada charged ahead with his plans to reform the administration and 
economy of the village, Kashimadai found new challenges arising from its improved 
conditions. The first group of settlers who came to live on and work the newly reclaimed 
lands in Kashimadai arrived in 1909. Eighteen houses in total, they came across the 
mountains from the Yamagata village of Nagatoro and together rented from the SSYK a 
patch of land in the southern part of the Kashimadai. As both mayor and a member of the 
SSYK, Kamada worked to ensure the survival of the new settlers during the harsh 
conditions of their first year and to integrate them into the village community. More 
newcomers followed over the next decade, lured by greatly reduced rents for the first 
three years of tenantship and the promise of full title to the lands they cultivated when the 
loan that the SSYK had taken out from the government was repaid.30 By 1923, the efforts 
of both the newcomers and Kamada had begun to reap dividends, and the widespread 
ownership of land, houses, and livestock among settlers attested to the contrast of their 
earlier hardscrabble existence.31 In commemoration of this improvement and of Kamada's 
role in it, the descendants of the first group from Yamagata raised a stone monument to 
the mayor on the sixtieth anniversary of the completion of the drainage of Shinainuma in 
1970, praising Kamada's "excellent leadership" as a "father" of the settler community and 
his "dream for the reclamation of a new piece of the world.”32
 
Nor were improvements in living conditions confined to the newer residents of 
Kashimadai. Under Kamada's leadership, the village gradually took on the form that he 
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had outlined in his initial speech as mayor. By 1927 Kashimadai little resembled the 
desperately poor and hopelessly divided village it had been when Kamada took office. 
Villagers  made marked progress on debt repayment and the repatriation of village 
farmland, with 66% of paddyland and 84% of fields now owned within the village.33 
Efforts to reduce tax defaulting met with similar success, and the village, once notorious 
for its delinquency, now stood as an untarnished model of timely tax payment. Little sign 
remained of the constant clashes, hamlet parochialism, and dysfunctional administration 
that had crippled the village at the turn of the century. Kashimadai was now a prosperous 
and unified village with a government whose effectiveness attracted nationwide attention. 
The success of Kamada’s reforms brought him awards and recognition from the 
central government, and the combination of these with the eccentricities of his 
appearance and lifestyle made him an object of interest among journalists and 
biographers. As Kashimadai grew more stable and prosperous, Kamada began to make 
speaking tours across the country, his opinion prized as that of an "expert farmer" 
(tokunō). He became a celebrity, his trademark patchwork suit and rustic footwear 
earning him the nickname of Mayor Straw Sandals (Waraji sonchō). Political, military, 
and cultural elites sought meetings with him and his name was known around the 
country. Through all of this, the commitment that he had made in his mother's kitchen on 
the eve of taking office continued to hold him in his village. He remained first and 
foremost a man of Kashimadai. 
Kamada's position as mayor survived the end of the war, but soon afterward 
changing political circumstances worked against him. On November 30, 1946 he was 
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forced to step down in the first stage of the purge of officials by the authorities of the 
American Occupation.34 After having been elected and reelected no less than ten times 
over nearly four decades, he entered into retirement. Even without official position, he 
remained a familiar figure in Kashimadai in his twilight years, doling out fatherly 
wisdom and living a life of model asceticism. He died on May 3, 1950, one year before 
the village linked to his name ceased to exist and became the town of Kashimadai. The 
memories of both Kamada and the village lived on, however, in the various awards, 
statues, and monuments dedicated to him in the Shinainuma area. Nor did he disappear 
from popular memory. Publishers and government agencies continued to produce 
biographies of Mayor Straw Sandals, often invoking his name in efforts to rebuild 
villages or restore supposedly lost moral values. In Miyagi his memory proved even 
stronger, with both Kashimadai and the statue of Kamada that stands in the center of 
town remaining regular stops on school field trips to the present day.  
In his activities surrounding the drainage of Shinainuma and as mayor of 
Kashimadai, Kamada embodied the characteristics that defined the meibōka. His efficacy 
in his role as intermediary, his unwavering commitment to the village, and his personal 
motivation mark him as a model of the type. No less exemplary were the results of his 
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efforts. Like meibōka across the country, Kamada played a key role in overseeing the 
economic, social, and ideological development of his village. He stepped forward during 
a period of acute difficulty for agricultural villages, employing a range of assets – some 
of which he had inherited from the previous age and some which were newly available to 
him – to blunt the adversity that the village faced, to integrate it into the national 
administrative system, and to secure its prosperous future. While others did similar work, 
Kamada's success stands out as unusual. He was, in fact, an "ideal meibōka." 
Central to the definition of meibōka and their function was the local government 
system (chihō jichi seido) that the Home Ministry instituted at the end of the 1880s. The 
system assigned the meibōka an important role in village administration and 
development, but it did so in a way that substituted informal expectations for formal 
structural integration. In the initial forms of the system, these expectations were largely 
couched in political terms and related to central government fears about the Freedom and 
Popular Rights Movement (Jiyū minken undō) and the spread of activist politics in rural 
villages. Yamagata Aritomo, the architect of the system and the Home Minister at the 
time of its establishment, explained that it would be "people with local meibō (renown)" 
who would take up local administrative offices and, in doing so, redirect both their own 
and their fellow villagers' attentions away from politics on the national stage.35 This 
stated political purpose was to be fulfilled in intentionally apolitical ways. Yamagata 
envisioned meibōka engaging in administrative and other expressly non-political 
activities in order to prevent the politicization of the villages. These meibōka were to 
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distract themselves from politics by working for their communities, which included 
distracting the other members of their community in the same way. The involvement of 
meibōka in agricultural improvement was to serve a similar purpose. Acting as a check 
on radicalism through the economic benefits it offered, the improvement of farming also 
promised to distract village elites from political activities by focusing their concentration 
on farming.   
Although the isolation of landlords and wealthy villagers from disruptive political 
activities and their ensconcing in local government offices preoccupied Yamagata and 
other Home Ministry planners, the need to maintain order among the wider village 
population soon made clear the greater importance of the economic and developmental 
roles that the meibōka would have to play. Another of the major goals of the local 
government system was to relieve the central government of financial responsibility for 
village administration and development. This goal created the gap in local administration 
that Yamagata and his advisers predicted would draw local elites to employ their own 
resources and energies as local leaders. At the same time, however, it left a space in the 
development of the local economy and the village as a whole that demanded to be filled. 
Their function as the shepherds of village development required meibōka to be local 
figures. From the beginning, they were intended to provide a counterbalance to the 
expanding numbers of absentee landlords that were appearing in villages in the last 
decades of the nineteenth century. Officials were quick to cast the blame for rural 
poverty, social turmoil, moral decay, and a host of other village ills on non-resident 
landlords, whom they accused of extracting wealth and leaving nothing in return. Outside 




incompatible with official visions of self-sufficient villages. While these visions often 
appeared unrealistically hopeful, they approached impossibility in cases where outside 
landlords monopolized the profits of local farming. The spread of absenteeism from 
economically advanced to later developing regions gave this aspect of meibōka 
increasing importance in the 1890s and 1900s. They were to be the glue holding together 
villages, remaining in place as residents to fulfill their social role as elites and ensuring 
that local resources remained local. 
Chronic economic distress in agricultural villages, growing pressure for the 
expansion of agricultural production by the Agriculture and Commerce Ministry, and the 
failure of elites in many areas to shepherd the development of their villages in the 1890s 
and 1900s led to a reconsideration of priorities. Economic stewardship was given 
precedence over administrative matters in the hierarchy of hopes attached to the meibōka. 
The increase in the number of economically "distressed villages" (nanson) during the 
Sino-Japanese (1894-1895) and Russo-Japanese (1904-1905) Wars was of great concern 
for both the Home Ministry, which worried about the implications of economic distress 
on village stability, and the Agriculture and Commerce Ministry, which sought 
agricultural improvement and the stabilization and increase of agricultural production. 
Officials in both ministries placed much of the blame for the state of these villages on the 
failures of those who should have been meibōka, clarifying the heretofore implicit 
economic role they ascribed to them. In 1899, Yamagata Aritomo made explicit reference 
to this function, declaring that initial expectations about who would naturally guide 




necessarily what we call the meibōka in a district.”36 Criticisms of this type grew more 
severe over the decade that followed. 
The needs that the system of local government had given rise to in villages ensured 
that village residents brought forth their own list of hopes and expectations which 
contributed to the evolving definition of meibōka. Cut off for the most part from funding 
from the central and prefectural governments, villages were forced to assume 
responsibility for their own upkeep and administration. The villages were already under 
pressure at this time; the shaky recovery from a decade of recession combined with the 
ongoing commercialization of farming and growing concerns about the food supply to 
create a period of intense demand for increased agricultural development. Both external 
market forces, which were wreaking havoc on the economic health of villages, and 
increasingly strident calls from the Agriculture and Commerce Ministry impelled villages 
to improve agricultural infrastructure and methods of production, to explore new crops 
and forms of cultivation, and to adapt farming to face the challenges that threatened 
village prosperity. With almost no direct government support, however, these efforts 
required local actors with the personal resources and dedication to tackle them. Villages 
needed their meibōka. 
Kamada Sannosuke demonstrated the three characteristics of the meibōka and 
employed them in a way that satisfied the expectations of both the ministries of the 
central government and the residents of Kashimadai. His accomplishments, however, 
depended on aspects of his own life and background and the circumstances in which he 
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found himself that bolstered these characteristics and increased their efficacy. It was not a 
recipe for success that could easily be reproduced by others elsewhere. 
The first of the qualities defining the ideal meibōka described both the position that 
they needed to occupy and the primary function they filled. They were above all 
intermediaries: middlemen between the village and the prefectural and national 
governments. Their effectiveness in this role depended on the twin qualities of familiarity 
and influence. Personal connections with and stature among officials and villagers 
complemented an intimate knowledge of the landscapes – physical, social, and 
administrative – of the village community, on the one hand, and the labyrinthine 
structures of prefectural and national government on the other. This familiarity enabled 
meibōka to exercise influence in both directions, soliciting policy and funding from the 
government and pushing government-friendly reform in the village. At the same time, 
meibōka employed these qualities in making connections between groups and individuals 
in each of the two spheres in which they operated. They brokered cooperation and 
coordination between government agencies separated by administrative or jurisdictional 
distance and organized collective efforts and groups within the village and local area. 
Kamada's accomplishments in Kashimadai, from his earliest efforts at his father's 
side through his work on Shinainuma and his nearly four decades as mayor, owed their 
success to his efficacy as an intermediary. Whether between villagers and the central 
government, between hamlets, or between government agencies, his web of contacts and 
knowledge of the situations on the local scene and in the upper reaches of the government 
allowed him to marshal resources, forge solidarities, and garner official approval. 




figure, and toward the people of which he enjoyed the influence that came with such 
familiarity. These qualities provided a valuable and otherwise unattainable conduit into 
the village for officials on the outside looking in. At the same time, Kamada enjoyed 
extensive contacts in the prefectural and central governments and had a keen 
understanding of how government functioned, two qualities that greatly benefitted his 
village. Governor Kamei called Kamada back from Mexico to use these qualities to quell 
opposition to the Shinainuma drainage project, and the Kashimadai village assembly 
begged him to stay in order to use them to help the village develop and prosper. His 
abilities as an intermediary led him to success in both of these endeavors. He was a 
consummate middleman.  
Kamada's ability to reach out and bridge the gap between the village and figures in 
the national government made possible his most dramatic successes in the drainage of 
Shinainuma. These mediating activities became a fixture of the numerous biographies of 
Kamada, which commonly describe him "as an advocate [who was]...always running 
back and forth to the prefectural government or to the national government using his own 
resources and forgetting even to sleep or eat.”37 He often engaged in these efforts with 
others involved in the project. His father introduced him to the potential advantage of 
networking with government officials when they began to pressure the prefectural and 
central governments for a new survey of Shinainuma and funding for a comprehensive 
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drainage plan in the 1890s. From the turn of the century, the younger Kamada worked in 
concert with two landlords from neighboring villages and fellow members of the 
SEK/SSYK, first achieving success in winning over the prefectural government to the 
cause, then turning their attentions to the national government when a transfer brought in 
a new governor who had no interest in the drainage project.  
Personal relationships with individuals possessing power and influence in the wider 
worlds of government and finance were of central importance to Kamada's ability to 
function as an intermediary. Kamada's entrée to these relationships was the reputation 
and position of his family in the Kashimadai area. Adding to the status they enjoyed as 
the largest landlords in the village, the work his grandfather and father did on Shinainuma 
impressed local authorities and led to ever closer relations with the local lords, the 
Moniwa, of whom they were vassals. This relationship in turn made possible contacts 
within the prefectural government, who then served to build connections with the 
national government, and contributed to the political advancement that undergirded 
Kamada's efforts. In the prefectural assembly, his family's long history of work on 
Shinainuma became the basis both for his own election and for a close friendship with 
Ichiriki Kenjirō, the founder and owner of the influential Kahoku shinpō (Kahoku 
newspaper) who took a lasting interest in the development of Kashimadai. Kamada's 
election to the national Diet introduced him to people at the center of the political world. 
While serving in the national assembly, Kamada became close to fellow Rikken seiyūkai 
members Ozaki Yukio and Katō Takaaki. This latter relationship proved to be of 
enduring significance when Katō later became an active supporter of the drainage of 




Among the contacts most important to Kamada's work on the Shinainuma project 
was his relationship with the elder statesman Matsukata Masayoshi (1835-1924). The 
factors that made it possible for Kamada to meet and gain the support of so elevated a 
figure in the central government were the history of his family's involvement in 
Shinainuma, the relationship he and his father had built with the prefectural government, 
and the limited size and tightly-knit structure of the central government in the Meiji 
period. Upon learning that it would be necessary to secure funds from the Japan 
Hypothec Bank to have any hope of completing the drainage project, Kamada recalled 
that his father had been introduced to Matsukata by the first governor of Miyagi, 
Matsudaira Masanao, in the 1880s and resolved to approach the elder statesman himself. 
His persistence won him a series of face-to-face meetings in Tokyo, where two fortunate 
developments ensued. First, Matsukata remembered the work of Kamada's father fondly 
and remained impressed and enthusiastic about the drainage of Shinainuma. Second, and 
more important, it happened that two of Matsukata's sons-in-law held positions of 
responsibility in the loan section of the Hypothec Bank. The appropriate wheels were 
soon greased, and one of the relations, Kawakami Naonosuke, became a close friend and 
enthusiastic proponent of Kamada's work. Impressed with Kamada's pestering of the 
venerable Matsukata—he expressed joyful amazement that Kamada had actually "hassled 
the old man" into action — Kawakami stayed at Kamada's house while surveying the 
area and pushed aggressively for the bank to approve the SSYK's loan application.38 
When the approval came through, Kawakami feted Kamada at no less a venue than the 
fabled Western-style hall, the Rokumeikan, where he gathered luminaries from Tokyo 
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and told one and all of his own and his father-in-law's unabashed delight at having been 
able to assist in the project.39
 
Similar factors were at work in the relationship that Kamada enjoyed with Miyagi 
governor Onoda Motohiro (1848-1919), a partnership that demonstrated Kamada's ability 
to make lasting personal connections with figures in the government. Onoda had 
experience with both Shinainuma and the Kamada family prior to his appointment to the 
governorship of Miyagi in 1900. One result of Kamada's father's appeals to Matsukata in 
the 1880s had been an official survey into the establishment of a national penitentiary in 
the region that would provide prisoner labor to complete the drainage work, a survey 
which Onoda, then a police superintendent attached to the Home Ministry, was assigned 
to lead. While his role in this abortive venture undoubtedly contributed to his later 
interest in the project, Kamada's personal appeals and his family's long connection with 
the marshland were the key factors that brought the new governor onboard as an 
enthusiastic proponent.40 Onoda joined forces with Kamada in efforts to mediate between 
Tokyo and Shinainuma on the project, assigning Kamada the task of bringing local 
residents and the mayors from villages on connected waterways on board and 
volunteering to use his own connections to appeal to the Home and Imperial Household 
Ministries. Before this arrangement could produce results, however, Onoda was 
transferred to Kagawa and a new governor who proved unsympathetic to the problem 
took his place in the prefectural office.  








The outcome of Onoda's transfer and the subsequent development (or lack thereof) 
of the Shinainuma project demonstrated two things. First, it showed the idiosyncrasies 
that characterized governmental decision-making and the importance of individual 
personalities in determining the directions government funding would take. The newly-
installed Governor Munakata illustrated this randomness when, distracted by growing 
international tensions with Russia and uninterested in the prosaic matter of land 
reclamation, he canceled Onoda's plans and gave no indication that he would do anything 
to move the drainage project forward. Second, it highlighted Kamada's ability to make 
impersonal and distant matters of administration personal and direct to officials who were 
involved with them. Onoda his personal investment in the project in the farewell letter he 
sent upon his transfer, declaring "I have moved away from my sentiments as an official 
and am giving my support, so please complete [the Shinainuma project] without fail.”41 
The former governor's continuing interest in the project even when his official duties lay 
far away demonstrated the truth of his words. He remained in active correspondence with 
Kamada concerning the project right through to its conclusion, playing a part in brokering 
the transfer of the loan money from Tokyo and offering his heartfelt congratulations to 
Kamada when construction finally got underway. Thus Kamada as an individual and 
unofficial actor proved at least as significant as the official and highly-placed Munakata. 
He effectively countered the new governor's apathy, ensuring that the persistent and 
unchanging needs of Kashimadai would continue to draw government attention, no 
matter what passing crises might distract the attention of the prefectural government, 






while at the same time appealing to the personal sentiments of interested officials to 
ensure a commitment that went beyond the prosaic completion of their duties. 
In no case was Kamada able to combine his ability to win the support of influential 
individuals with the connections that he had inherited from his family's place in the local 
order to greater effect than in his relationship with the imperial master of horse, Fujinami 
Kototada. This relationship developed soon after the transfer of Munakata and the 
appointment of a new governor, Tanabe Teruzane, who showed a greater interest in the 
drainage of Shinainuma than his predecessor and reaffirmed the prefecture's commitment 
to its success. Learning that a portion of the marshlands was in fact an imperial 
possession, Tanabe took it upon himself to travel to Tokyo to plead for assistance in 
securing its sale to the SSYK. These attempts yielded little in the way of results, 
however, and it was only upon discovering that the former lords of the 
Shinainuma/Kashimadai area, the Moniwa family, had close ties with the Fujinami 
family that he spied any hope for a resolution to the stalemate. Tanabe went to Kamada 
and urged him to win over the horse master as an ally to the project that could promote 
the sale from inside the Imperial Household. Using a reference provided by his family's 
former lords, Kamada did just that, the tales of his forefathers' never-ending efforts to 
tame Shinainuma proving once again the key to converting high officials to the cause. 
This success brought with it a double victory, clearing the way for the SSYK to purchase 
the imperial land on May 14, 1906 and creating a lasting dedication to the project in 
Fujinami. 
The second of these victories provided the means to save the project when a crisis in 




recurrence of flooding in the summer of 1908 forced further revisions to the plans for the 
new drainage channels that again sent projected costs soaring. Officials in the central 
government now recognized the project as being of national importance, accepting the 
promise of future rents as collateral for an additional bond issue without complaint, but 
frustration at delays and skepticism over the project's viability again took hold among 
residents and put the future of the project in question. Reading in a newspaper that the 
crown prince would be making a tour of historical sites in Tōhoku later in the year, 
Kamada found his opportunity to shore up support for the project and usher it through to 
its completion. He again approached Fujinami, who by this time was known as a devoted 
backer of the drainage project, and asked about the possibility of having a chamberlain 
attached to the tour make an official visit to the Shinainuma construction site in order add  
imperial luster to the work and cement local faith in it.42 Fujinami and Kamada continued 
to sketch out the arrangements for the visit even as the imperial train carrying the crown 
prince began to crisscross the northeastern prefectures. When the entourage arrived at 
Morioka in neighboring Iwate prefecture, Fujinami sent word to Kamada to come with all 
haste, as a "once-in-a-lifetime chance" was awaiting him.43 Kamada caught up with the 
group to find that his lobbying had succeeded beyond his hopes, and he rushed back 
down to Kashimadai to spread the word that the train carrying the prince himself would 
be making a special stop to allow the young man to survey the drainage channel. At 3:40 
in the afternoon on the third of October, 1908, the train made its scheduled stop and the 
future Taishō emperor spent a full minute admiring the construction from the window of 
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his car. The purpose of the visit as a means to regain the support of the fickle villagers 
was made clear with the delivery of the prince's message to the people of the Shinainuma 
region: "This is a work for the whole country (tenka), so complete the construction 
without discouragement until it is done.”44
 
The two episodes with Fujinami show an inversion of the role that was commonly 
ascribed to meibōka. Intermediary activities were not limited to the binary choices of 
either forging connections to higher authorities in order to communicate the interests of 
the village or exercising their influences in their home communities to transmit 
government policy and accomplish government goals. Kamada's involvement in the 
imperial sale and the princely visit show the role to have been more complicated. In the 
earlier episode, Kamada's efforts bridged a gap between separate parts of the central 
government. Governor Onoda, a prefectural governor enjoying a lofty position in the 
bureaucracy of the central government, charged Kamada explicitly with this mission 
when his own efforts to secure the agreement of the Imperial House to sell its possessions 
in Shinainuma failed. It was Kamada, using familial connections that were artifacts of a 
governmental system four decades gone, who was able to prod the Imperial Household 
into movement, fulfilling the hopes of the now personally-invested governor as much as 
those of himself and his community. The visit of the Crown Prince displayed an even 
more arresting reversal of roles. Rather than exercising his local influence, gathering up 
the support of villagers, and mobilizing it to fulfill plans of the prefectural or central 
governments, Kamada arranged for a personal visit by no less a figure than the future 
emperor in order to consolidate local support behind a local project. 






The nature of the relationships of which Kamada made such effective use also points 
to the limits of this particular asset of meibōka, as well as the particular importance the 
position of Kamada's family held. The Tokugawa order was not yet so remote a past 
during the quest to drain Shinainuma as it would soon become and Kamada's connections 
to his family's former lords played a crucial role in opening doors to officials in higher 
positions. The house of Moniwa stood as the bridge between Kamada's and his father's 
relationships with several of the prefectural governors as well as between each of them 
and Matsukata and Fujinami. The latter case in particular stands out as something that 
would have been impossible in later years, based on friendships across a great distance 
between a member of the court (Fujinami) and a former chief retainer of a defunct 
domain (Moniwa). At the same time, the relationship between the houses of Kamada and 
Moniwa was not something that was possible in many other places. Only in a prefecture 
like Miyagi, where the domain that had preceded it featured an unusual integration of 
samurai in village society, were connections of this type possible in a rural area. As the 
scion of a samurai house of high position serving under a local lord, Kamada was born 
into a web of connections that extended from the village to the highest levels of the 
central government. 
The shape that this wider web of connections assumed during Kamada's time was 
also particular to the era. To the centrality and exclusivity of the small core group of elder 
statesman (genrō) during the Meiji period must go much of the credit for Kamada's 
successes. That Matsukata held membership in this group made possible both the 
familiarity he shared with a number of Miyagi governors and the nepotistic connections 




of the Crown Prince happening at a later date. The increasingly ritualized treatment of the 
imperial family and the remoteness at which they were kept from the Japanese populace 
in subsequent years would have made an unplanned stop at a local construction project 
impossible.45
 
On the local level, the most significant role that Kamada played was that of 
intermediary between individuals and groups who had, or believed that they had, 
conflicting interests. His ascension to the office of mayor institutionalized this function, 
but interacting with villagers, understanding their individual difficulties and helping them 
find individual solutions to their problems had been a central aspect of Kamada's 
activities since his return from Tokyo. Descriptions of his activities in concert with his 
father in the 1880s and early 1890s tell how he "went one day to a village to the west, the 
next to a village to the south with lunchbox in hand and using his own money to visit the 
concerned offices and yūryokusha (local power brokers) and strive to win them over.”46 
These efforts were very personal in nature, with Kamada using his position as a fellow 
landlord and combining appeals to logic and long-term economic interest with his own 
passion and dedication for the drainage problem to bring around the plan's opponents. 
The strategy brought qualified success, building enough support to move the project 
forward from the mid-1890s onward, even if its fragility and incompleteness saw it 
buckle repeatedly under the stresses of increased costs and punishing floods in the first 
decade of the twentieth century. Kamada also had to bridge gaps between residents and 
leaders of different communities within the same local area. As a member of the 
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SEK/SSYK, he performed similar individual visits to opponents to the project in all of 
the four villages and one town that were represented in the organization and, when plans 
for the drainage began to come together, he made personal appeals to the leaders of all 
the communities connected to waterways that would be affected by the Shinainuma 
project. When Kamada was called back to Kashimadai from Mexico, it was for much the 
same purpose. With governor Kamei unable to break the local deadlock, Kamada again 
built bridges in the local community, visiting and revisiting the naysayers, many of whom 
had received his personal attentions in the previous decade. The divisions that cleft the 
community also split the district assembly, but Kamada once more proved his ability to 
reach out to the broader local area and soon built enough support to get the project 
underway again. 
In meeting with the wealthy and influential opponents to the drainage project, 
Kamada illustrated the difference between the yūryokusha he was courting and meibōka 
like himself. While the two terms are often treated as interchangeable, the machinations 
at work behind the Shinainuma draining reveal important differences between them. 
Wealth and influence within and beyond their home communities were attributes of both 
types of figure, but these qualities were definitive of yūryokusha, which literally meant 
"power holder," while Kamada's activities in pursuing local development conformed to 
the performative definition of meibōka. Many yūryokusha may have been able to do what 
Kamada did, but it was the fact that he did do it that made him a meibōka as outlined in 
the plans of the central government. 
Mediation between local residents was also a fundamental aspect of Kamada's duties 




Kashimadai beginning in 1908 brought with it fresh need for Kamada's mediation to 
ensure the survival of both the new residents and of the fragile unity he had so recently 
built in the village community. Despite a year of harsh conditions that might have seen 
villagers turn on one another under normal conditions, Kamada's personal appeal was 
enough to push the long-term residents of Kashimadai to support their new neighbors by 
purchasing the eggs and vegetables the settlers were selling to support themselves 
through their initial seasons in their new home. This helped the new villagers to survive 
and eventually thrive as members of the Kashimadai community, ingratiating Kamada 
with the new group and adding to his local reputation and influence.47 Less dramatic 
efforts along the same lines became a standard part of Kamada's duties as mayor. He built 
links and resolved conflicts between local people in convincing wealthy residents of the 
town to establish a Respect for the Elderly Association, in heading up the local youth and 
agricultural organizations, and in organizing village-wide sendoffs for departing 
residents.48
 
What allowed Kamada to mediate effectively between individuals on the local level 
was the influence that he personally wielded. With its roots in his family's position in the 
local social order, this influence was perpetually self-strengthening, each exercise making 
it stronger and more effective. Early in his career, this phenomenon allowed his work in 
building local support for the early surveys of Shinainuma to become the basis for his 
election to the prefectural and national assemblies. The success that Kamada later 
experienced in winning over to the Shinainuma drainage movement the landlords who 
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had opposed it also gave a sheen to Kamada and the causes that he championed and 
weakened the case of any who would stand against him. This success strengthened 
Kamada in the continuing battles against the opponents to the project who reemerged 
with each fresh round of difficulties and deserves much of the credit for Kamada's 
effective reforms of Kashimadai as mayor.  
The second defining quality of the meibōka is spelled out in the full version of their 
name, chihō meibōka (local notable). They had a deep connection to a particular locality, 
related in part to the nature of the meibōka as individual and unofficial actors and to the 
kind of communities to which they belonged. They relied upon their own resources to 
support them in their work, using private funds to pay for travel expenses, public works 
in the village, and the myriad of other costs that they incurred. While nearly all came 
from locally wealthy families, this wealth had limits that made work beyond the village 
borders difficult, if not impossible. The social resources that were so important to the 
meibōka were equally finite. The personal connections and influence that men like 
Kamada enjoyed on the local level were focused largely on their places of residence and 
the communities of which they and their families had long been members. The shared 
interests that bound these communities together defined their shape and size and placed 
limits on the geographic scope of local action. At the same time, the attachment of 
meibōka to their villages was a matter of will and personal dedication, a key factor when 
their activities as intermediaries took them beyond the village into the worlds of national 
politics and business. They could act in larger arenas, but these actions were invariably 
connected to and in service of their home areas. Whether chasing down political and 




on issues related to rural communities, the locality always remained at the center of the 
activities and identity of the meibōka. 
In his lifetime commitment to Kashimadai and the central place of the village in all 
his activities subsequent to assuming the office of Kashimadai mayor, Kamada was the 
embodiment of the local consciousness of every meibōka. This commitment was fixed in 
the dramatic conversation that he had with his mother when he had stood at a crossroads 
in his life. At that moment, prompted by her measured words, he had an epiphany. He 
remembered both where he was from and that where he was from was the most important 
thing about him. 
Not only was Kamada a local man, as all meibōka needed to be, but he was a man of 
the right kind of locality. His loyalties, identification, and goals were not focused on 
Kimazuka, the village-cum-hamlet in which he was born, nor were they centered on 
Shinainuma, despite the years of work that he put into its drainage. Kamada's home was 
Kashimadai, the amalgamated village formed with the institution of the Local 
Government System in 1889. This was a crucial distinction since it meant the difference 
between one's efforts acting in support of the system or in opposition to it. The 
amalgamated towns and villages (chōson) formed under the purview of the new system 
held a central place in the structure of what the state called local self-government (chihō 
jichi), replacing identification with and loyalty toward "organic," or natural, hamlets with 
a more centralized membership in the new administrative village. 
Kamada expressed his new loyalty in his aggressive moves to dismantle the hamlets 
upon taking office as Kashimadai's mayor. Before his investiture, Kamada had not been 




Kimazuka consisting of nearly six and a half hectares of farmland valued at over 2,000 
yen.49 His attitude changed dramatically the following year. After receiving enthusiastic 
support from the Kashimadai residents he had assembled for his initial prescription of 
tough love on his first day as mayor, Kamada outlined four major policy goals: the 
amalgamation of village schools, the amalgamation of village shrines, the consolidation 
of the assets of the hamlets and their transfer to the village, and the reduction and 
eventual elimination of personal debt among villagers. Three of the four objectives 
clearly aimed at subsuming the hamlets under the new amalgamated village. The reasons 
justifying each varied. The consolidation of hamlet assets under village control was the 
most prosaic and straightforward, because mismanagement and squandering of these 
assets made it necessary for the rational village administration under Kamada to assume 
control of them in the village interest. Ideological considerations joined these economic 
motives in the plans to amalgamate the village shrines and schools. The five hamlet-
based schools that Kashimadai supported clearly represented a drain on village resources, 
but Kamada explained that the harm that they did went far beyond their financial cost, 
giving rise to the "hamlet-style thinking" that had paralyzed both government and reform 
efforts in the village for so long through their pernicious influence in "early childhood.”50 
Shrines similarly had both obvious and hidden costs. A total of 14 shrines dotted the 
village landscape, the smallest of which reportedly served only nine people.51 Yet the 
ideological influence of this overabundance was every bit as destructive as the burden it 
placed on village finances. In addition to promoting the same hamlet-based parochialism 
                                                     
49
 Kashimadai chōshi hensan iinkai, Kashimadai chōshi, 291. 
50
 Kashimadai shōgakkō, Wa Ga Sonshi (Kashimadai: Kashimadai shōgakkō, 1936), 37. 
51




as the schools, the disrepair into which the hamlets had allowed these sites to fall had left 
them as near ruins, used as often as shelter for vagrants or as gambling dens for criminals 
as places of worship or prayer.  
More important than the individual justifications of the three policy goals was the 
fact that all represented an unreserved attack on the bastions of the hamlet in Kashimadai. 
Nor were these his only acts of aggression against the formerly autonomous villages. To 
eliminate any trace of hamlets from the village administration, Kamada rezoned 
Kashimadai into sixty new administrative districts and placed each under the supervision 
of a member of a centralized standing committee who transmitted village policy and 
oversaw tax payment. These actions, as well as his attacks on hamlet schools and shrines, 
dovetailed with the prefectural government's efforts to use the reorganization of farmland 
(kōchi seiri) as a means of wiping out the stubbornly resilient defunct localities.52 
Although hamlets in many areas survived the various attacks leveled at them, the 
measures that Kamada took eliminated the bases for their existence in Kashimadai. 
Rezoning Kashimadai into new administrative districts and creating new productive 
associations, he left hamlets without function in the village, effectively closing the book 
on them.53  
This assault did not mean that Kamada was oblivious to the fact that there were 
rational bases for the existence of hamlets. Kamada's criticism of the divisiveness and 
conflict that the hamlets brought about in Kashimadai acknowledged the geographically-
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specific interests that informed their makeup and the fact that these interests could be 
mutually exclusive. Still, he gave little concern to these legitimate bases for alternate 
unities and aimed unwaveringly at destroying the identification with hamlets among 
villagers and creating a universal identification with the village. After stating in his 
application to the prefectural government for the closure of hamlet schools that 
topographic realities split the village into two parts, he concluded that the creation of one 
central school would correct this and "through moving and rebuilding schools and 
planning the unification of education, [the village could] plan to harmonize feelings while 
at the same time reducing expenses and looking forward to the development of self-
government.”54 No matter how rational the binding interests in a hamlet may have been, 
Kamada's goal was the erasure of any identification with it and the transference of 
resident loyalty from the hamlet to the village. 
Although his economic arguments and the fact that the new administrative village 
was an administrative reality that none could escape certainly went some distance to 
justify his assault on hamlets, it was no coincidence that the destruction of these units was 
also a central part of the Local Improvement Movement (Chihō kairyō undō) that the 
Home Ministry was leading at just this time. Far more official campaign than movement, 
it used programs of moral reform, administrative rationalization, and exhortations toward 
delinquent local elites to revive the fortunes of ailing villages. Officials involved in 
campaigns like the Local Improvement Movement showed their unreserved appreciation 
for the success of Kamada's efforts, which stood out in contrast with partial or complete 
failures in most areas. In the brief biography of Kamada written as a part of the mayor's 
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nomination for the central government's Medal with Blue Ribbon in 1927, Miyagi 
governor Ushizuka Toratarō praised the mayor's concerted efforts to "eliminate the idea 
of the hamlet" in Kashimadai.55 This was an idea that both the Home Ministry and the 
prefectural government had demonstrated a clear interest in eliminating. Officials reviled 
the continuing existence of hamlets, condemning them for leaching loyalty from official 
administrative districts, for impeding development through their maintenance of 
"undeveloped" common lands, and for standing in the way of the rational reorganization 
of farmland.56 They rewarded Kamada's success and held him up as a model for other 
local leaders to follow in erasing the traces of their own hamlets. 
While Kamada decried the parochial interests with which hamlets threatened the 
unity of Kashimadai, the way in which he conceived of Kashimadai and its relationships 
with other villages was vulnerable to much the same charge. His dismantling of the 
hamlets tore apart the often rational collective interests that bound them together and 
replaced them with a unity based on the village. Kamada's Kashimadai was conceived as 
a single collective unit, in which interests, resources, and hardships were to be shared in 
common by all. Kamada had already seen the fragility and fallacy of solidarities of this 
type in the complaints that the inclusion of localities untroubled by flooding in the SEK 
had brought forth, but he was determined to eliminate divisions within the village and 
build an unshakeable unity. This all-encompassing bond, however, stopped short at the 
village boundaries. Addressing villagers on his first day as mayor, Kamada made clear 
the divisions separating Kashimadai from other communities. "Our village is poor, so we 
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can't imitate the people from other villages. If we imitate rich villagers, we can't catch up 
to others no matter how many years we spend, so we absolutely have to take one step 
down from others and work.”57 The same nature- and interest-based solidarities that 
couldn't be allowed to stand in the way of collective unity inside the village were the 
basis of the village's separation from communities outside. As the ideologically 
heterodox influence of hamlets had bound their residents to parochial interests and set 
them in contest with one another, so too did Kashimadai's unity end at the edge of the 
village, beyond which lay an endless succession of rival communities. 
This alienation allowed Kamada to use Kashimadai's community solidarity as a 
strategic resource in the interests of the village, and as the means of engaging with and 
defending against hostile outside markets. He transformed the village into a collective 
economic actor, in part through his activities to expand agricultural production. In his 
role in the village agricultural association he encouraged the sharing of tools, seeds and 
other means of improvement, which was the major function of similar associations in 
villages across the country. Much less common, was the annual program he established to 
have an exemplary farmer leave the village to search out and bring back improved means 
of production to share with one and all. This ensured that the collective economic entity 
which was Kamada's Kashimadai stayed abreast of best agricultural practices and rising 
market opportunities, even prompting the genesis of the artisanal brooms that became 
Kashimadai's signature product.58 Kamada's efforts to build village assets and develop 
self-sufficiency also enforced the economic collectivity of the village. He imposed an 
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annual program of tree-planting on the hamlets that had contributed fewer assets to the 
amalgamated village, which became the collectively-held property of all and made 
possible the communal production of timber and charcoal. In a way not dissimilar to 
import-substitution, these measures satisfied local demand and prevented the bleeding of 
village resources in the purchase of commercial equivalents in the market. 
In service of his goal of unity in Kashimadai, Kamada took measures to ensure that 
village identity was central to its residents and that the organic connections that it 
engendered persisted regardless of the distance that villagers might put between 
themselves and their home. He kept in close contact with villagers whose educational 
success took them out of the village to jobs in the cities, arranging widely-attended 
sendoff parties for every middle-school graduate whose employment took them to the 
Tokyo-Yokohama area. He ensured that these migrants retained a clear memory of their 
true home while they were away, setting up frequent meetings between them and sending 
their former teachers to the capital for regular visits.59 The community bonds that 
Kamada helped forge in his role as mayor extended far beyond the physical borders of 
the village. 
In the same way as Kamada ensured that Kashimadai natives who moved away 
remembered where they were from, he never lost sight of the centrality of Kashimadai to 
his own identity, even when he rose to national fame as Mayor Straw Sandals. His 
speeches and other activities on the national stage in his famous persona represented a 
different type of activity from the Mexican project that had nearly led him to turn his 
back on his home. In that earlier project, Kamada had been attempting to serve the nation 
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as a whole. Kashimadai would theoretically have derived some benefit from it, as would 
all agricultural villages in Japan, but it was in no way specifically geared toward his 
village in particular. The lone dissenter against the nomination of Kamada as mayor in 
the Kashimadai village assembly realized this and noted that Kamada could have served 
loftier goals as the energetic servant of the nation who had led the charge for an overseas 
farming colony. 
While Kamada's chosen course represented his acceptance of his mother's advice that 
one could serve the village or the country, but not both, the fame that he gained as Mayor 
Straw Sandals exposed the mutual exclusivity of the local and the national as a fallacy. 
As Mayor Straw Sandals, Kamada's every action related implicitly to Kashimadai and his 
work there. His meetings with high officials often took place in government offices in 
Tokyo and Kyoto, but these were always undertaken in service to Kashimadai and its 
needs. As improvements were accomplished and economic success began to take root in 
Kashimadai, Kamada had less call to solicit support from government figures. At the 
same time, this success spread the fame of Mayor Straw Sandals and led officials and 
others to call on him for advice and aid. Beginning with Home Ministry events dedicated 
to the Local Improvement Movement in the 1910s, Kamada began decades of speeches at 
public meetings and conferences, with his success in Kashimadai's reconstruction 
marking him as an expert and creating a demand for his wisdom.  
Kamada's work in the village led to a series of prominent awards that saw his star 
rise ever higher and contributed to his becoming a household name. The biographical 
materials attached to the Home Ministry records for his 1927 medal deal exclusively with 




stage on which he operated.60 His Mexican project is not even mentioned in these 
documents, as it was unrelated to the award and incompatible with the vision of the local 
hero that it was intended to annoint. Although they did not omit Mexican episode, the 
popular biographies and articles on Kamada's life that began to appear in the 1930s 
followed the lead of the award materials in making Kashimadai central to the Kamada 
story. A 1936 Asahi Shimbun article made explicit the hierarchy of his accomplishments, 
stating that, while Kamada had been a parliamentarian earlier, "the point at which he hid 
himself away in Kashimadai" was the beginning of a much more significant section of his 
life.61 Kamada's work in Kashimadai was also responsible for his participation in high-
level advisory bodies later in his life. In 1941, he was invited to the prime minister's 
house as an exemplary farmer, on the strength of his agricultural work in his home 
village.62
 
Voluntary work and personal initiative together represent the third defining 
characteristic of the meibōka. With neither central funding nor much explicit planning for 
development under the new local government system of 1888-1890, there was an acute 
need for the meibōka to be self-starting individuals who would proceed without direction 
or support. At the same time, these active individuals were in a better position than 
distant officials to plan improvements for their villages. They had a direct understanding 
of local conditions, populations, and problems. To deal with the challenges facing the 
villages, the meibōka could deepen their knowledge of local circumstances, craft 
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strategies to deal with them, and implement plans on their own initiative and with support 
they provided themselves or personally solicited. Their sense of mission and the forms 
that their efforts took demonstrated their internalization of the self-help brand of 
development put forth by government ministries. The work of meibōka was presented as 
unified in intent and purpose, differing only according to local conditions and the verve 
of local leaders. With this clearly formed ideological basis for their work and the need to 
involve their neighbors in order to ensure its continuing effectiveness, the meibōka 
worked to inculcate their ideology and ethics among the wider village population. In 
areas with the most successful meibōka, other villagers also internalized the rhetoric of 
the Home Ministry and other government ideologues and pursued goals in line with them. 
In these cases, the meibōka were able to spread their self-initiative among their 
neighbors, creating a cooperative and government-friendly ethos of development. 
The initiative and voluntary spirit that Kamada demonstrated through his decades of 
work in Shinainuma and Kashimadai are the final qualities that mark him as an "ideal 
meibōka." He dedicated himself to dealing actively with problems and pursuing 
improvements and development in the village. Taking orders from no one but himself, he 
joined his family's generations-long offensive against the Shinainuma swampland, 
pushed early development in health and educational facilities, and redoubled all these 
efforts and more as mayor of Kashimadai. While Kamada undertook these works of his 
own volition, he did so informed by a set of principles that conformed closely to the goals 
of officials in the Home and Agriculture Ministries. This marked his initiative as 





A spirit of personally motivated elite responsibility for their villages and neighbors 
was a key element of the Local Government System that the Home Ministry introduced 
in 1888. It was also the source of the greatest disappointment for the bureaucrats who had 
planned and established the system. This disappointment first emerged when it became 
apparent in the years after the Sino-Japanese War of 1894-95 that the landlords and 
moneylenders who represented the top echelon of village society were not naturally 
falling into their prescribed roles as champions of local development. Criticisms of this 
failure from Home and Agriculture officials were echoed in the dissatisfaction of village 
residents, who, mired in poverty, had experienced disappointment of a rather more 
concrete nature. The Home Ministry addressed the cause of their woes directly in the 
Local Improvement Movement of 1908, holding up "self-initiative" (jihatsusei) and 
"volunteerism" (tokushi) as the traits local leaders needed in order to guide villages 
through to prosperity and stability.63 These were precisely the attributes that elites had 
been expected to demonstrate in their evolution into meibōka twenty years before and 
they still represented a key element of the local government system. Despite their 
failures, the hopes of officials remained with the landlords and villagers of wealth and 
status. While some in the government advocated official backing of middle-level farmers 
(chūnō) for the positions of local stewards, there remained a strong belief among planners 
that it was only the wealthy and prominent who had the economic and moral wherewithal 
to oversee the development of the villages.64
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The existence of ideal meibōka like Kamada in some villages led to solving the 
problems that concerned officials and villagers alike and demonstrated that the vision of 
the Local Government System had not failed everywhere. Leaders had emerged from 
among the economic and social elites and taken it upon themselves to improve economic 
and social conditions. The Home Ministry recognized these figures at the turn of the 
century, designating three villages whose mayors had championed successful programs to 
push them from poverty to prosperity as Japan's Model Villages (Mohanson).65 The 
exclusivity of this honor suggests the rarity of the levels of commitment of these model 
meibōka, while many others were fulfilling similar functions to lesser degrees in villages 
across the country. These less well known figures, as well as "ideal meibōka" like 
Kamada and the other model mayors, were realizing the Home Ministry's original hopes 
for the local self-government system (chihō jichisei). 
The most important aspect of meibōka initiatives was the ideology that guided the 
forms they took in practice. In much the same way that their loyalty had to be to the right 
kind of locality, the actions meibōka took under their own volition had to be in service of 
the right ethos. For characteristics of activeness, self-motivation and volunteerism could 
as easily be turned toward anti-government purposes as they could to the rebuilding of 
villages, a fact that had driven the creation of the Local Government System in the first 
place. It was as important that meibōka promoted development in a spirit that conformed 
with the goals of the Home and Agriculture Ministries as it was that they did so at all.  
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Kamada had the right ethos. The work that he did in the villages, the reforms he 
enacted, the organizations he created, the economic plans he formulated, and the moral 
development he cultivated in villagers were all in perfect accord with the goals and 
ideology of the Home Ministry and the central government. On his own initiative, he 
pursued village self-sufficiency, the centralization of the community, economic 
rehabilitation, and the reform of village morality. These measures were designed to 
realize, and did in fact produce, a model of the economically and socially stable, 
apolitical, and orderly village that officials had dreamed of. 
Kamada's displays of initiative in service of local needs and development started 
early in his career. While assisting his father on the early stages of the Shinainuma 
drainage project, Kamada purchased and distributed vaccine among villagers in response 
to an outbreak of smallpox in 1885. He followed up on this activity the next year, when 
he paid a doctor from Tochigi to relocate to Kashimadai and furnished him with a fully 
equipped clinic in the village.66 At the same time, he began his first forays into the 
village's education system. In 1885, he opened a night school and taught classes to the 
young men of the village.67 A decade later, he again responded to adversity brought about 
by natural disaster, hiring an agricultural trainer to teach improved techniques to farmers 
whose harvests had been devastated by successive floods.68 These activities, as well as 
his concurrent efforts on behalf of the drainage project, showed Kamada to be a 
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personally motivated actor who was willing to employ his own resources to promote the 
development of the village. 
While Kamada demonstrated his initiative in a variety of ways in the years before 
1909, his acceptance of the office of mayor marked the point from which his self-
motivated service to the village would define every aspect of his life. Biographies recount 
the precise moment when Kamada underwent the metamorphosis from elite sophisticate 
to Mayor Straw Sandals (waraji sonchō).69 Upon hearing the enthusiastic support from 
the assembled villagers for his first speech outlining his plans as mayor, Kamada, until 
that point known for his Western-style haircut, handlebar mustache, and dapper Western 
dress, abandoned these signs of a wealthy, vain, and worldly member of the elite for a 
shaved head, a hairless upper lip, a simple cotton suit, and the straw sandals (waraji) that 
became his trademark. These changes were more than aesthetic, representing a visible 
departure from the roles of landlord and gōnō (wealthy farmers) of earlier Meiji years. 
Gathering together the tenant farmers indebted to his house, he returned their promissory 
notes and the ownership of their lands with the statement that he was making a gift and 
with the understanding that he was entering office with no personal creditor-debtor 
relations with the people he would serve. By his second day as mayor, Kamada had 
completed the recrafting of his image. The abandonment of his lands was meant to 
represent his dedication to the village, his garb and grooming signaled his ethos of self-
sacrifice, and his crude footwear served as an emblem of his personal asceticism. In his 
new guise, he set out to remake the village and to instill in its residents a reflection of his 
own transformation and initiative. 
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Village self-sufficiency was central to both the Local Government System and 
Kamada's work in Kashimadai. He took pains to ensure that the village did not need to 
rely on government funds (which were unlikely to come in any case) for relief or to make 
up for shortages. Initially, Kamada turned to his personal assets when possible. His 1908 
donation of land to Kimazuka and his return of his former tenants' lands to their original 
landholders the following year are two examples of Kamada's efforts to contribute to 
village prosperity through his private property. Even more strikingly, from 1909 to 1918, 
he made up for all shortfalls in the village government outside rapidly-escalating (and 
government-ordered) education costs from his own pocket. The contrast with elites in 
other villages went beyond a simple demonstration of Kamada's charitable nature. 
Elsewhere, the opportunities presented by the centralization of power under the Local 
Government System led leaders to impose an ever-increasing burden on the poorer 
members of their communities while using their positions in the village administration to 
free themselves from any potential drain on their own resources. Although these actions 
created a self-sufficiency that removed the need for government support, they also led to 
official criticisms of failed meibōka for the poverty and potential for disorder that their 
measures engendered.70 Official disappointment in this abdication of personal 
responsibility highlighted the ideal nature of Kamada's efforts toward self-sufficiency. 
Since Kamada's personal assets were limited, he sought to create of a culture of 
collective independence as an enduring basis for self-sufficiency in Kashimadai. Kamada 
promoted moral instrucution in the village education program and in the groups that he 
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led. In the village youth association, Kamada pursued the ideological goal of the 
"inculcation of a character of unity and community spirit" (kyōdō itchi no seishin oyobi 
kōmin jichigokoro no junchi), changes that would make villagers active participants in 
the village's self-sufficiency.71 He began by driving out hamlet divisiveness through 
village centralization and then followed with new organizations and education programs, 
most of these in concert with demands from the state. These efforts made Kamada's 
concrete programs for the reconstruction of the village possible. The collective ownership 
and maintenance of the forests that Kamada planted and the development and sustainable 
use of the charcoal and timber industries that came from it relied upon this spirit of 
collective identity and independence. 
Although self-sufficiency was a central focus of both Kamata and government 
officials, the mayor demonstrated a clear affinity for the aims and methods favored by the 
Home Ministry and the prefectural government. The first of the prefectural goals was in 
response to chronic crop failures, floods, and other disasters in Miyagi in the middle of 
the first decade of the twentieth century and aimed at transferring responsibility for 
disaster relief from the prefecture to the village government. Kamada's focus on self-
sufficiency accorded with this goal, as did his push for collective support groups and his 
own habit of personally providing relief to victims of disaster. The second goal of the 
prefectural government was to create local groups to promote school attendance and the 
timely payment of taxes, groups that Kamada organized in Kashimadai. Finally, Miyagi 
officials oriented the Local Improvement Movement to work within the education system 
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to instill in residents the values of independence, cooperation, and public service, all 
cornerstones of Kamada's mayoral initiatives. 
While Kamada reformed Kashimadai at the same time and along the same lines as 
the Local Improvement Movement, his work also presaged the Agriculture Ministry's 
Agricultural Economic Rehabilitation Movement (Nōsangyō keizai kōsei undō) of the 
1930s.72 The latter movement represented a doubling down on the goals of the earlier 
movement in a tacit admission of official dissasatisfaction with its results. It consisted of 
a set of policies, already familiar in Kashimadai, aimed at building community solidarity 
for self-sufficiency, rationalizing home economics, and improving agriculture. Even in its 
particulars, the Agricultural Economic Rehabilitation Movement bore similarities to 
Kamada's reforms. It called for the formation of sub-village level action committees and 
associations devoted to local production, both initiatives that Kamada had earlier 
instituted in Kashimadai. These similarities demonstrate the degree to which Kamada had 
from an early point internalized the Agriculture Ministry's goals of increased production 
and a rationalized village economy. He became a model of the initiative that officials 
wanted to see in local leaders and that they tried to reproduce throughout the country by 
means of the Agricultural Economic Improvement Movement. 
Kamada's integration of moral guidelines into the economic improvement of 
Kashimadai was another point of accord with the ideological program of the Home 
Ministry. Kamada braided his fourth overarching goal of eliminating debt in the village, a 
goal that served concrete economic purposes, with prominent threads of morality that cast 
debt repayment as a nearly-sacred duty. Along the same lines, his rezoning of the village, 
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which cemented centralized control, was couched in terms that made the rebuilding of the 
character of village residents as important as the rebuilding of the administrative 
structure.73 Kamada's amalgamations of schools and shrines had a similar double 
character, presenting the visages of economic and administrative purpose on the one side 
and moral development in the form of the building of unity and public spirit on the other. 
Other aspects of Kamada's reforms were more purely moral in character, with only a 
tangential relationship to the village economy. Early in his mayorship, Kamada created a 
statement of village plans (sonze) for his administration that outlined the two categories 
of material and moral improvement. As a means toward these goals, Kamada instituted a 
detailed village code that reflected his interest in moral development. Of the 22 articles in 
the code, 14 are explicitly moral in character, restricting or prohibiting activities that 
Kamada labels as immoral. These include dishonesty, infidelity, sloth, unfilial behavior, 
and indulgence in vice. Five articles are dedicated to restricting the consumption of 
alcohol, which mixed economic concerns with moral exhortation.74 While the emphasis 
that he placed on ideas of loyalty, frugality and diligence, and religious piety reflected the 
orthodoxies of the Tokugawa order as much as they did contemporary official 
pronouncements, this concern with village morals again linked Kamada's programs with 
the ideological initiatives of the Home Ministry. Brought together in a meeting to plan 
strategies for the Local Improvement Movement, the Miyagi Council of Town and 
Village Mayors in 1908 agreed to measures to reduce leisure time, suppress drinking and 
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gambling, and promote hard work and frugality that sounded exactly like Kashimadai's 
rules.75
 
Kamada employed three basic techniques in sowing the seeds of morality in the 
village: rules and admonitions, education, and personal example. The instructions 
dictating moral behavior and injunctions against immorality that appeared in the Village 
Code were also a prominent part of Kamada's Guidebook to Village Revival (Kōson no 
shiori).76 This broadsheet, which he published in April of each year and distributed to 
every house in the village, presented a heavy dose of morality in its homilies, advice, and 
anecdotes. Between edifying quotations from the Meiji Emperor, it trumpeted the virtues 
of good conduct ("always be moderate, start with small good deeds"), diligence ("if you 
hold every moment dear, you can contribute to the world"), and persistence ("all success 
is in persistence. You must persevere in all things"). Nor were the parts of the guidebook 
dedicated to so-called material improvement free from moralizing. Sections giving advice 
on food, clothing, and housing reminded villagers that these were for bodily strength, 
protection, and shelter from rain, respectively, and should never become objects of 
luxury.77 The guidebook remained close both to Tokugawa and Home Ministry orthodox 
moralities in its emphasis on the moral duty of taxes, and included a farming calendar in 
which tax payment due dates were given as much prominence as dates for planting and 
harvesting. 
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In line with widespread belief in the Meiji and Taishō years, Kamada held education 
to be the primary means of instilling morality in the people of Kashimadai. He had 
acknowledged the role of childhood education in the social reproduction of hamlet 
parochialism in his first speeches as mayor and proved eager to exploit the opportunities 
for indoctrination that it presented. With the active assistance of Kashimadai Elementary 
School principal Ōuchi Hikojirō, Kamada promoted the Education Ministry's curriculum 
of moral education that placed classes devoted to sincerity, hard work, and unity and 
cooperation alongside more prosaic lessons.78 These themes were drawn directly from the 
teachings of the Tokugawa-era agrarian ideologue Ninomiya Sontoku; Kamada worked 
with Ōuchi to integrate the teachings of the famous farmer-philosopher into the school 
program. The prominence of Sontoku's thought in both the school and in Kamada's Youth 
Association anticipated the Hōtokukai agrarian societies, which promoted the same 
teachings and represented one of the three village groups that the Home Ministry 
installed in villages across the country as part of the Local Improvement Movement.79
 
Perhaps the most resonant means of moral instruction was Kamada's own example. 
After he became mayor, his personal and private lives merged and he became a living 
lesson for the people of the village. He made clear the respective roles that he and the 
villagers would play in his initial report as mayor to the prefecture: "I will become an 
example for villagers. The pressing business of this village is to reform the thinking of 
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the villagers.”80 Kamada's every action offered a new pedagogical opportunity, with his 
grand gestures of giving up his tenant lands and refusing the mayor's salary exemplifying 
the ethics of self-sacrifice and dedication with more force than printed homilies or 
classroom lectures could ever do. Kamada's unwavering dedication to these ideas made 
his daily routine a device for village edification. This routine, which took on the quality 
of legend, highlighted the moral lessons he held to be most important. His well-known 
habits of waking between 3:30 and 4:00 AM, working the entire day with only minimal 
rest for spartan meals, dressing so shabbily that he was often confused with minor clerks 
in the village office, and giving personal attention to his own fields and silkworms 
presented examples of the qualities of diligence and frugality that were so central to both 
his own and the Home Ministry's moral teachings. Civic-mindedness informed his daily 
sweeping of the village main street, piousness his cold water ablutions, and patriotism his 
genuflections toward the Imperial Palace. But his daily routine added additional force to 
his example by also making it clear that he was more than a regular farmer: he was the 
father of the village. He held court each morning from his doorstep, mediating disputes, 
giving advice, and even aiding police investigations.81 In the afternoons, he set out on 
tours of the village's farms, where he offered advice on production and efficiency, and its 
houses, where he lectured the wives and mothers of the village on economizing and 
household management. Kamada was not first among equals; his was an example to 
follow in pursuit of an ideal. 
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Much as in his building of a wider culture of self-sufficiency, Kamada's moral 
programs had the explicit purpose of inculcating in residents a moral compass that would 
guide them beyond the explicit rules that restricted their behavior. This was an effort to 
promote a local, moral version of the self-reliance (jihatsusei) that the Home Ministry 
encouraged in meibōka and that Kamada himself embodied. With proper morals and 
comprehensive ideology thus internalized, village residents could then pursue their 
economic and developmental efforts in the community. The reason that many of the goals 
that Kamada and the Home Ministry shared could be transmitted so readily to the 
villagers of Kashimadai was because it was clearly in their interests to pursue them. The 
simple fact remained that residents of many, if not most, other villages did not internalize 
these values as thoroughly as did the villagers of Kashimadai, even though it would have 
served their interests to do so. In Kashimadai, villagers were willing to go along with 
prescriptions for frugality and economic rationalization as long as they were attached to 
Kamada and his program for rebuilding the village. In part, this was due to Kamada's 
dedication to making every sacrifice and experiencing every hardship that he demanded 
of residents, but the concrete economic benefits that his programs produced undoubtedly 
provided an even more compelling reason for compliance. Villagers accepted these 
material benefits eagerly, unconcerned about the accompanying morality. 
By 1927, Kashimadai bore little resemblance to its former self. The village that had 
stood out as the most impoverished in Miyagi prefecture at the turn of the century shone 
at the end of Kamada's second decade as mayor as one of its most prosperous. Kamada 
had accomplished his initial policy goals of the reduction of debt and the repatriation of 




region. The productive capacity of Kashimadai had also been transformed. Extensive 
improvements on local waterways continued after the completion of the drainage of 
Shinainuma, reducing the danger of flooding and allowing the rich farmlands of the 
former marsh to produce at their full potential. Social changes in the village were as 
dramatic as its economic transformation. Kashimadai stood out as an island of order in 
the stormy social seas of northern Miyagi villages. With internal divisiveness among 
residents suppressed and their economic stability secure, Kashimadai enjoyed a solid 
foundation that protected it against the disruptions that shook neighboring communities. 
While the Rice Riots of 1918 spread to other villages and tenant-landlord conflicts 
erupted and swept across the region on several occasions in the 1920s and 1930s, 
Kashimadai remained insulated from these disturbances. Its success brought the village 
fame. Held up by government ministries and popular media alike, Kashimadai became a 
model for the emulation of impoverished communities across the country. 
Kashimadai's remarkable turnaround owed much to the material basis for prosperity 
that had lain submerged in the waters and grasses of Shinainuma. Without the richly 
fertile soil that served as both the engine for economic growth in the village there is no 
doubt that the change in Kashimadai's fortunes would have been considerably less 
dramatic. Kamada Sannosuke, however, played an equally key role. Until the opening 
years of the twentieth century, the fertility of Shinainuma was little more than the faintest 
of potentialities. Kamada's efforts in the SSYK made this potential a reality. By building 
recognition of the hidden promise of the wetlands among local residents and distant 
government officials alike, by organizing support for drainage and eliminating opposition 




prefectural and central governments, Kamada was key in unleashing the productive 
bounty locked in Shinainuma and harnessing it to work for the benefit of Kashimadai.  
He played a similar role in the realization of the latent promise that government 
institutions held for Kashimadai and its development. The material, organizational, and 
technical resources that were concentrated in prefectural and national capitals represented 
a potential means of transformation and development for villages everywhere. But the 
sheer number of hard-pressed agricultural communities and the remoteness of prefectural 
and national offices created barriers as daunting as the waters of Shinainuma. Here again 
it was Kamada's activities that made the resources of the government available to 
Kashimadai. Using his family's name and contacts and the relationships developed 
through his political activities, he solicited support with a personal tenacity that was often 
the key to winning over his influential targets. The official planning, approval, and bank 
loans that flowed into Kashimadai as a result provided the fuel for the transformation of 
the village. 
While the array of advantages that Kamada enjoyed made his successes as a meibōka 
unusual, other local elites took on similar positions and pursued similar ends in villages 
across the prefecture and the nation. The local government system had created a space 
that had to be filled, even when local leaders had far poorer resources to rely upon than 
Mayor Straw Sandals. Like Kamada, these meibōka led the charge to modernity in their 
villages, but weaknesses, both material and personal, combined with political and 
environmental complications, persistent economic difficulties, and the opportunism of 
wealthy residents to give development a different character than in Kashimadai. While 




many more of them, and for an understanding of the dramatic development that occurred 
in northern Miyagi during the decades surrounding the turn of the century, it is necessary 






Inverting Authority: Hydrological Conflict and the Transformation 
of Local Leadership 
 
 An act of rebellion occurred on the 15
th
 of June, 1893. Suzuki Suminosuke, the 
prefectural official in charge of the northern Miyagi district of Tōda, appeared at the 
station overseeing the Meiji sluice, a dam that controlled the flow of water outward from 
Nabire Lake. The officer in charge of the station, located in the neighboring district of 
Monō, must have greeted his visitor with some confusion. For over a year, water 
organizations in Monō and Tōda had been embroiled in an increasingly bitter conflict 
over the lake and the dam, conflict that had nearly exploded into violence only weeks 
before and left the two districts in a situation of tense hostility. Throughout the clash and 
in spite of the passions it aroused, Suzuki had proven himself a force for moderation, 
which may have put the Monō custodian's mind at ease. Today, however, the district 
chief was on a secret mission that belied his earlier equanimity. Under the cover of 
routine maintenance, he borrowed the keys from the office and removed the locks 
securing the seven gates of the dam. Replacing them with a second set whose only key 
was in Tōda, he locked the gates in the open position and let the lake drain out through 
the sluice. The following day prefectural officials, alarmed that one of their colleagues 
would engage in such illegal and potentially disruptive activity, demanded that he return 
the key to Monō, but Suzuki refused. What his nonplussed superiors in the prefectural 
government did not know was that prior to his act of sabotage, a council of Tōda 
residents had called Suzuki to a meeting where they criticized him roundly for his lack of 




district chief prove his loyalties to his home region and bring the divisive dam under 
Tōda control once and for all. The admonition proved decisive. Local popular pressure 
trumped official responsibility, turning the administrative order upside down and 
bringing the situation to an impasse. 
Suzuki's act of rebellion marked the high point of the Entō Incident, a clash between 
Monō and Tōda over water rights that began in July of 1892 and continued for eighteen 
months before ending in a prefecture-brokered amelioration agreement in January of 
1894.82 At the heart of the dispute was the sluice that had spurred Suzuki's insurrection 
and the lake that it protected. Lake Nabire and the Meiji sluice were the center of the 
region's water system and stood as the physical manifestation of the irreconcilable water 
interests that divided Tōda and Monō. Seeing opportunity in the social and political 
changes that swept across rural Japan at the end of the nineteenth century, upstream Tōda 
residents sought to tear down the generations-old hydrological order that irrigated 
downstream regions in Monō at the cost of almost certain flooding for their upstream 
neighbors. Farmers in Monō rose in opposition, defending the system that provided 
unstable but vital supplies of irrigation water to farming communities in the dry interior 
of the district. On the cusp of a new era in local administration and with everything to 
lose, the two districts entered into a conflict whose increasingly audacious episodes 
captured the attention of Miyagi residents and officials and eventually forced a revision 
of the water order in their northern prefecture. 
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Though focused on specific local needs, the Entō conflict shines light on the 
processes that lay behind the era of meibōka-led agricultural improvement in northern 
Miyagi and illustrates its beginnings in one region. The institution of a new system of 
local government and a shift in the central government's policies toward water use and 
agriculture combined with ongoing technological development to open paths for new 
actors to pursue new modes of development. A new group of landlords rose from the 
economic hard times of the 1880s and, spurred by their increasing economic dominance 
and their exclusion from village leadership, they took the first steps to fill the spaces left 
vacant by fading early Meiji village elites and uncommitted government planners, and 
take charge of agricultural development. These landlords represented another type of 
meibōka, similar to ideal meibōka like Kamada in their intermediary function and 
stewardship over local agricultural development, but with marked differences from 
Mayor Straw Sandals. Defined by their social ambitions, fierce localism, and contentious 
relationship with government officials, the leading figures of the Entō conflict 
represented what I call "rising meibōka." While Kamada came from a family of 
established elites and could draw on the social position established by his father and 
grandfather, the newly-minted landlords in Monō and Tōda had economic resources but 
remained cut off from local offices and elevated village status. Administrative shakeups 
and the need for agricultural development in the 1890s presented them with the means to 
improve their situation. Suzuki's rebellion at the Meiji sluice was one result of their 
efforts, a model of the subversion of official institutions that rising meibōka went on to 




prefectural officials and the ministries of the central government for rising landlords at 
the end of the century, setting the stage for the next stage in meibōka development. 
While the changes of the 1880s and 1890s provoked an explosion in Monō and Tōda, 
they produced quieter but similar developments throughout northern Miyagi. Other areas 
avoided open conflict, but the factors that set communities against one another in the 
Entō dispute were at work in villages across the prefecture: a central government anxious 
to pay for improvement with official recognition rather than money; rising landlords 
hungry for both growth and authority; and an agricultural system desperately in need of 
fundamental improvement. The emergence of rising meibōka and their charge for 
agricultural development was the response to these factors. 
The Entō conflict was a product of the hydrological structure of the Monō-Tōda 
region. The area had long played host to a local iteration of the timeless battle between 
humans and their environment, but here it divided the population and set people against 
one another. The two adjacent districts were located in north-central Miyagi roughly 
fifteen kilometers inland from the port city of Ishinomaki. Nabire Lake lay just west of 
the district boundary in Tōda and unraveled into a series of waterways that extended 
eastwards into Monō. The most important was the Uki River, which flowed northeast 
from the lake through the Meiji sluice on its way to drain into the Eai River. In the stretch 
between the lake and the dam, the Uki branched off into canals delivering irrigation water 
directly to a number of Monō villages and feeding the Hirobuchi Reservoir, which 
supplied others. While this system provided vital water supplies in these areas, Nabire 
Lake was the object of intense resentment in Tōda. The sluice kept water levels on the 




and devastating fields and homes in the Tōda villages of Nangō and Wakuya with vicious 
regularity. Farmers in these areas fixed their attention and hopes on the Aoki River, 
which ran through Nangō to feed the lake; the Jō River, which drained it to the 
southwest; and the sluice. They dreamed of linking the first two, destroying the last, and 
erasing Nabire Lake from the landscape. 
Although the prominence of lakes and rivers gave a natural façade to the conflicting 
interests of the two districts, it was human intervention in the environment that made 
water use along the Monō-Tōda boundary so desperate a contest. Advantage flowed 
downstream like water and the position of the districts inland and upstream had cast them 
in the role of sacrificial victims to the stability of communities in the lower reaches of the 
rivers during the Tokugawa period. In order to protect Sendai's chief rice port of 
Ishinomaki from flooding, domain officials in the seventeenth century ordered the 
construction of artificial narrows on the Kitakami River at Wabuchi in eastern Monō, an 
area just downstream of the point where the Eai River merged with its larger sibling and 
well upstream of the shipping hub. While this alteration caused some increased flooding 
around the Wabuchi area, it had a more pronounced effect upstream. Choking off the 
water flow, the Wabuchi narrows redirected high waters to the upstream regions of the 
Eai River in Tōda and the Hasama River in the northern district of Tome. Regularly 
inundating existing farmlands in these areas, the effect of the terraforming work at 
Wabuchi in the longer term exercised a more pernicious influence. It transformed vast 
areas in Tōda and Tome into flood plains, rendering acres of land that would otherwise 
have been forest commons unexploitable and depriving farmers of an important free 




hands of wealthy residents.83 This was not an unforeseen result. For domain planners, the 
flood protection that the narrows offered to Ishinomaki, as imperfect as it was, more than 
offset the opportunity costs that they consciously imposed on the upstream communities. 
While both Tōda and Monō suffered in the quest to protect Ishinomaki (however 
unequal their suffering may have been), efforts to alter the waterways within the districts 
created further disparity and set the interests of each against the other. Again, it was 
riparian improvements under the Sendai domain that determined the balance of interests 
in the region. From 1662 to 1665, the two guardians of the young lord in Wakuya 
oversaw the creation of the Hirobuchi reservoir (then called Ōzutsumi) as part of a plan 
to open over a thousand hectares of new farmland in northern Monō.84 After the work 
was completed and the domain's offer of farmland had begun to attract settlers, however, 
it became clear that the water supply was insufficient and technicians embarked on 
further work to link the reservoir to Nabire Lake and the plentiful waters of the Eai 
river.85 Domainal technicians dug the irrigation canals from the Uki River to the 
reservoir, installed a stone sluice, and established the hydrological order that defined 
agricultural life in the region for over two hundred years. 
Both the narrowing of the Kitakami and the connection of Nabire Lake to the 
Hirobuchi reservoir reflected the resignation that guided agricultural improvement in 
northern Miyagi during the Tokugawa period. At the heart of this way of thinking was the 
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understanding that nature imposed fundamental limitations on the potential for 
agricultural production and that, while it could reposition disadvantage, human effort 
could do nothing to eliminate it. Accordingly, planners created a hierarchy of acceptable 
vulnerability that privileged Ishinomaki above all other areas and Monō above Tōda. In 
the mid-nineteenth century, domainal administrators demonstrated their continuing 
commitment to this scheme and acceptance of its costs. They first ruled against a Tōda 
request to dredge the Jō River (which would have lowered levels on Nabire Lake) as a 
means to protect newly-reclaimed farmland around Nangō and then put an end to a 
prominent Tōda farmer's energetic campaign to carve a system of canals that would 
remove the lake's source entirely.86 The former decision in particular, defeating a plan in 
which the Wakuya lord himself had a personal stake, demonstrated the guiding power of 
the belief among domain planners in the inevitability of disparity.87  
In the context of this developmental ethic, their inferior status relative to Ishinomaki, 
and the irreconcilability of their interests, Tōda and Monō became competitors in a zero-
sum game. Marginal prosperity in Monō equaled flooding in Tōda and an escape from 
bare self-sufficiency in Tōda meant drought in Monō. Farmers in both districts knew that 
the drainage of Nabire Lake and the reclamation of its land as arable could be 
accomplished just as clearly as they knew that the successful defense of one district's 
interests meant unavoidable damage to the other. The stakes could not be higher for 
either side and, if one were to win, the other must lose.  
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The unequal system of water use that surrounded Nabire Lake survived the 
dislocations of the end of the shogunate and the establishment of the Meiji government. 
Instabilities that these changes introduced into the administrative realities governing 
aspects of that system, however, augured the shakeup that would come and lead directly 
to the Entō conflict.  
In the Tokugawa period, the lord in Wakuya had authority over the water control 
devices on the Uki River, which consisted of a moving wooden gate to prevent reverse 
flooding from the Eai River into Nabire Lake and a fixed stone sluice that stored 
irrigation water for Monō villages while allowing flood-level waters to flow over it. With 
the dismantling of the shogunal-domainal structure in the first years of the Meiji period, 
control over these installations devolved to the communities whose interests they served. 
Lacking the domainal finances needed for maintenance and suffering a series of costly 
floods in the 1870s and 1880s, the Tōda guardians of the reverse floodgate allowed it first 
to rot into disrepair and then to wash away completely in 1889.88 Suzuki Suminosuke, the 
district head of Tōda and the man in charge of the wrecked gate approached his Monō 
counterpart, Miyazawa Chikahiro, with a plan for the two districts to cooperate in 
financing the construction of a new sluice that would incorporate the functions of both 
the lost floodgate and the still-functioning stone sluice, which it would replace. After 
Suzuki agreed to pay for seventy percent of the work, a condition upon which an alliance 
of Monō villages insisted, Miyazawa gave his approval to the plan.89 Suzuki agreed to 
additional stipulations that his district would neither pursue projects to create new 
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drainage channels on the lake nor allow the water levels on the lake to fall below their 
Tokugawa-era height. Prefectural technicians began surveying the waterways in 
preparation for construction in 1890. 
With the results of the survey came the complication that would eventually push the 
two districts to open conflict. Prefectural technicians announced that the original plans 
for the amalgamated sluice, which detailed a simple reconstruction of the existing stone 
dam in brick with the addition of the reverse floodgate, were unfeasible and that 
fundamental changes would be necessary. The Uki River posed a significant threat of 
silting, a danger that could only be avoided, they claimed, by replacing the fixed gates of 
the earlier sluice with seven moving gates that could be opened and closed. Miyazawa 
balked at this development and Suzuki was only able to bring him back on board by 
promising to give Monō complete control over the operation of the gates.90 Together, the 
two district heads produced a set of guidelines based on the former water use customs 
that kept the gates locked shut during the spring and summer, to be opened only in case 
of flooding.91 With rules in place and both districts seemingly in agreement, work began 
in earnest and the Meiji sluice was completed in mid-1890. 
The motives of Suzuki in continuing to press for the construction of the dam after the 
change in its design and in agreeing to the terms that Miyazawa imposed are difficult to 
discern. The changes to the water order that came with the Meiji sluice seemed decidedly 
contrary to Tōda's interests. Having already given up any plans to carve new drainage 
channels from the lake, the control that Suzuki gave Monō over the new sluice 
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guaranteed that even the unsatisfactory amount of drainage that the old dam allowed 
would worsen. The high waters that had flowed automatically through the fixed gates of 
the old dam now had to be released manually by a guardian whose undisguised interest 
was in keeping water levels in the lake high, making it a task in which no one would 
expect him to be excessively diligent.92 Tensions between the districts increased every 
time the gates had to be opened, with Tōda residents accusing the gatekeeper of dragging 
his heels and the resentment that Monō residents felt in response making them 
increasingly reluctant to open the gates at all.93 Toda's circumstances grew worse as 
animosity between the two districts worsened.  
While it is possible that he was blindsided by the prefecture's changes to the design 
of the dam or simply caught in a momentary lapse of reasoning, both the persistent 
attempts by Tōda leaders to get control over the sluice in previous years and Suzuki's 
own subsequent actions leading up to the Entō conflict suggest instead that the district 
head saw the new dam as an opportunity to change the water order in the region. Tōda 
efforts to gain control over the sluice on the Uki River got an early start in the late 1870s. 
Farmers in the areas that later became Nangō and Wakuya formed the laboriously named 
Babayachi and Lower Nine Villages Joint Alliance (Babayachimuraikakyūkamura heigō 
kumiai) and began work toward the twin goals of restoring the Aoki River and taking 
control of dams at Nabire Lake and two other locations.94 Although the group 
experienced little success in either endeavor, its successor organization, to which Suzuki 
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was named head, took on these same objectives and continued to pursue them before and 
during the Entō conflict. In line with these efforts, Suzuki also moved to undermine the 
sluice agreement almost as soon as he signed it. After the sluice was completed, 
Miyazawa had to file a formal complaint with the prefecture to get Suzuki to hand over 
the keys to its gates as promised, leading to an atmosphere of distrust that saw both Monō 
and Tōda build watchtowers to keep the sluice under observation.95 Whether his 
acceptance of the Meiji sluice agreement had been a miscalculation or a ruse, it was clear 
that Suzuki was going to be less than meticulous in observing its terms. 
Changes in the administrative, social, and technological contexts in which Monō and 
Tōda found themselves in the early 1890s played as significant a part as the new dam in 
the eruption of the Entō conflict and influenced the course and character of the dispute. 
The 1880s brought a broad spectrum of changes to rural areas, stacking reimaginings of 
local government on top of important developments in the evolution of economic and 
social realities in agricultural villages. Together, these transformations destabilized the 
upper echelons of village society, weakening structures of control and leadership and 
inviting new leaders to step forward and remake relations both between communities and 
with governmental authorities.  
The end of the 1880s and beginning of the 1890s witnessed administrative changes 
in rural areas more revolutionary than any since the establishment of the Meiji state. At 
their center was the new system of local government established between 1888-1890. The 
"three new laws" (sanshinpō) that defined this system wiped thousands of villages 
(mura/sonraku) from the administrative map, banishing them into shadowy half-existence 
                                                     
95




as hamlets (buraku) and subsuming them within the new, larger towns and villages 
(chōson). The communities that lined up against one another in the Entō conflict were the 
products of this system. The village of Nangō and town of Wakuya in Tōda and the 
Monō villages of Takagi, Akai, Kita, Hirobuchi, and Sue all came into existence in 1889, 
fusions of formerly distinct villages. In these new "administrative villages," former 
village assemblies and other village-based groups were demoted to unofficial 
organizations, hollowing out the bases for power and influence of many village elites in a 
concerted plan to bring local areas more tightly under the power of the Home Ministry.96 
Lacking elites with the staying power of Kamada and his father, leadership in these new 
villages was up for grabs. 
The administrative villages became the new organizational basis for local 
associations, particularly those formed for flood control and water use, giving shape to 
the groups of actors that faced off against one another in Monō and Tōda. Following up 
on the Three New Laws, the Water Use Association Ordinance of June, 1890 aimed at 
aligning irrigation organizations with the new system. While the law placed these groups 
under authority of the new villages where possible, the nature and size of water systems 
often made this impractical, if not outright impossible. In some cases, river systems laced 
with smaller tributaries produced associations covering limited areas that were often 
indistinguishable from the hamlets that the Three New Laws aimed at eradicating.97 Here 
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water groups provided an official means for the continuation of the hamlet organizations, 
preserving roles for dispossessed village elites and working contrary to the goals of the 
new system of local government. More commonly, and with a greater impact on rural 
society, a number of separate villages shared interests in a single river system. In these 
cases, cross-village water associations were created that included as members all 
landowners whose holdings were directly connected to the waterway in question.98  
Two water associations that crossed village lines formed around Nabire Lake soon 
after the passage of the association ordinance. The first of these was the Monō-based 
Hirobuchi Reservoir General Irrigation Association (Hirobuchi ōtameike futsū suiri 
kumiai, hereafter HOFSK), approved in April of 1891, which represented the towns and 
villages that drew irrigation water through canals from Nabire Lake and the Uki River, 
including parts of Fukaya, Hirobuchi, Akai, Sue, Kita, Kamada, and Nakatsuyama in 
Monō and Hebita and Ishinomaki in the neighboring district of Oshika. Tōda followed 
soon after with the organization of the Meiji Sluice Flood Damage Protection Association 
(Meiji suimon suigai yobō kumiai, hereafter MSSYK), a group whose name proclaimed 
its confrontational goals.99 Including the Tōda communities of Nangō and Wakuya, as 
well as parts of the Monō villages of Ono and Fukaya, the MSSYK covered a vast area 
that straddled the boundary between the two districts (gun).100 As in similar groups 
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everywhere, both the HOFSK and the MSSYK were nominally headed by their 
respective district heads; however, when the two groups soon took over the central roles 
in the Entō conflict, the empty nature of these new district positions and the autonomy of 
the landlords that made up the organizations' officers and their rank-and-file members 
became apparent. 
The revolutionary administrative changes that produced the new villages and the 
water associations were imposed on top of socioeconomic developments that had 
transformed northern Miyagi villages in the preceding years. The 1880s and 1890s saw 
the rise of a new class of landlords who attained economic preeminence. The hardships 
that afflicted agricultural villages were the means of their ascent. The economic recession 
of the late 1870s and the Matsukata deflationary policies of the 1880s exacted a fearsome 
toll on Miyagi farmers, dispossessing middling owner-cultivators of their lands and 
undercutting the bases of wealth and property that had supported village elites. Flooding 
and bad weather compounded these problems in northern Miyagi, imposing costs that 
hard-pressed farmers could ill afford. While many suffered disaster, others discovered 
opportunity. Some landowners were better able to weather the storms, both figurative and 
literal, of the 1870s and 1880s and found themselves in a position to profit from the 
misfortune of their neighbors. Buying up land that banks had repossessed, these farmers 
became the "great landlords" (ōjinushi) who went on to lead the charge for agricultural 
improvement that took place from the 1890s to the 1910s. Despite their gains, however, 
these new economic elites found themselves shut out of positions of social and 
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administrative leadership in their villages, which remained occupied by the former elites, 
however impoverished they had become. 
In dismantling the hamlets and creating a new platform for leadership in the 
administrative villages, the local government system presented new landlords with the 
opportunity to make the social gains that had thus far eluded them. For hamlet elites, 
most of whom based their local prominence on family wealth and reputation dating back 
to the Tokugawa period and modest gains in landholding in the early Meiji years, 
leadership positions had been a way to maintain their local status and prestige even as 
adverse conditions sapped their actual economic power. The imposition of the new 
villages eliminated these secure posts at the same time that they reduced the total number 
of official positions up for grabs. In newly-formed villages like Nangō, where there had 
been six village assemblies, six mayors, and six sets of all the various offices that went 
along with them, only a single set of positions replaced what had been lost. This left little 
place for long-standing local families who had camouflaged their growing weakness with 
the sheen of local office.  
The Kubo family of Neriushi provides an example of the difficulties that the 1880s 
and 1890s in general, and the new local government system in particular, presented to 
early Meiji village elites in Miyagi. Based on its status as counselors to the Wakuya lord 
in the Tokugawa period, the Kubo house experienced success in modest land 
accumulation in the early years of Meiji and rose to the top of Neriushi's economic world 
as the largest landlord in the village. The head of the family quickly translated this 




creating and heading a high-profile local political society designed to defend village 
interests in the context of changing prefectural administration.101
 
The focus of the family on the local village, however, introduced weaknesses to both 
its economic and political positions and eventually proved the undoing of its fortunes. 
Where Kamada Sannosuke's father was able to parlay his family's links to the local lord 
into wider political authority, taking on the cross-hamlet office of kochō, the Kubo house 
never exceeded the boundaries of their home village. Kubo offices, landholdings, and 
moneylending were confined to Neriushi, tying economic transactions to the political and 
social responsibilities that the family bore in its community. As a result, it found itself 
compelled by its position in the village to continue to lend money at low interest rates to 
its tenants and neighbors, even as its own economic difficulties forced it to borrow at 
high interest in order to do so.102 The family's land accumulation stagnated, as much a 
victim of the Kubo's limiting of their holdings to their home village as it was to the 
punishing economic environment of the 1880s, while the more widespread landholdings 
of other houses with less to lose socially matched and then surpassed them. The Kubo 
patriarch retained control over the administrative structure of Neriushi during this 
decline, but the folding of the village into Nangō in 1889 removed this remnant of his lost 
power.103 With the family no longer hidden behind administrative positions, the fall of the 
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Kubo house unfolded in the 1890s and 1900s for all to see. Barely weathering a legal 
challenge at the turn of the century that consumed the last of the family's dwindling social 
and economic resources, the patriarch pulled up stakes in the 1910s and moved the family 
to Hokkaidō to start anew.104 
The Suzuki and Noda houses, both of whom rose to the top of economic and social 
life in Nangō at the beginning of the twentieth century, provide a revealing contrast to the 
Kubo family. Starting as poor farmers and minor samurai, respectively, both the Suzuki 
and the Noda families parlayed success as merchants and farmers into significant land 
accumulation in the 1880s and 1890s. Despite their economic flourishing, these rising 
landlords remained at the start of the Entō conflict as far removed from the offices of the 
new administrative village as they had been from those of the defunct hamlet. A lack of 
social capital accounted in part for this situation. Unprotected by the reputation and status 
that sheltered the occupants of village offices, Suzuki Naoji was formally ostracized from 
Neriushi for five years in 1888 after backing the wrong side in a dispute over fishing 
rights. Evidence of his low social position, Suzuki's penalty was the harshest suffered in 
the outcome of the conflict, in stark contrast with his more respected colleagues who 
were allowed to make a formal apology to Kubo Gengo and rejoin village life.105  
Even when they successfully dodged the difficulties that afflicted Suzuki, newly-
risen landlords in the 1880s and 1890s often preferred to avoid service in village 
administration. Noda Saiji, who had continued his father's accumulation of land – which 
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would eventually make his house the second largest landowners in the prefecture – 
shunned village service in Neriushi and concentrated on building the family's fortunes.106 
Although he became the second mayor of Nangō in 1893 (a position from which he 
played a role of some significance in the Entō conflict), he accepted the office only 
reluctantly, resigned in a matter of months, and held only minor village posts through the 
beginning of the twentieth century.107 He justified his avoidance of village service and his 
earlier non-participation in the Freedom and Popular Rights Movement (a virtual 
prerequisite for Nangō's mid-Meiji leaders, including Kubo Gengo and the village's first 
mayor, Abe Kumanosuke) on the grounds that he was an only son who bore sole 
responsibility for the family's fortunes.108 While the lack of siblings may have been 
unusual among rising landlord families, the prioritization of interests was not. Though 
they went on to take control over village administrations at the beginning of the twentieth 
century, most chose to concentrate on private economic pursuits in the 1890s.  
In contrast, these landlords found the new water associations to be more closely 
aligned with their interests than local government. The expansive memberships of these 
cross-village groups enabled the first official recognition of landlords outside the 
confines of their home villages. While the nature of village administration under both the 
old and new local government systems prevented landlords with dispersed holdings from 
participating in public life in villages other than the one in which they lived, the official 
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recognition that the Water Use Association Ordinance gave water groups, as well as the 
landlords who belonged to them and elected their leaders, a formally-recognized 
existence that granted them the legal right to fund themselves from local taxes.109 They 
became de facto landlord unions, enjoying the full sanction of the government and 
invested with collective authority over water rights. Along with this new power and 
legitimation, water groups freed landlords from the social obstructions they had faced in 
their home villages. The associations were as divorced from the hamlets as they were 
from the new villages, shaking the control of the older class of village elites over water 
and opening a field for rising landlords to make their mark independent of their social 
betters who had often held them back.110 Finally, water associations were neatly aligned 
with the economic interests of landlords. Having few avenues for profit other than by 
increasing agricultural production on the lands they farmed themselves and those they let 
out to tenants, landlords coveted tighter control over waterways. The associations and 
their authority over rivers provided a means for landowners to increase their profits 
through improvement. The Entō conflict was born of one such early improvement, 
presaging the two decades of concerted, and much more successful, agricultural 
improvement that Miyagi landlords went on to pursue. 
Technological development and changing popular understandings of the 
relationships between nature, technology, and the state provided the context for the 
outbreak of hostilities between Monō and Tōda. Science and technology quickly became 
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two of the most celebrated aspects of the new Meiji era. Trumpeted by Fukuzawa 
Yukichi and a cohort of new public intellectuals, rendered tangible by the first generation 
of successful industrialists, and embedded throughout the country in railway projects and 
military bases, the promise of modern technology seized the attention of people 
everywhere. With the new age came new ideas. The conception of natural limits to the 
potential of human endeavor weakened as faith in man's ability to direct and control 
nature took hold.111 This philosophical shift instilled a new assertiveness in Miyagi 
farmers toward their interactions with the natural environment. For Tōda residents, the 
new potential for human control over nature invalidated the system of distributive 
disadvantage that demanded the sacrifice of their interests for those of Monō and 
Ishinomaki. They rejected the long-held stamp of inferiority, embracing instead a set of 
rising expectations that envisioned, if not a complete remaking of the water order in the 
two districts, at least a reworking of the system to meet their long-neglected needs.  
The application of new technology to water control and riparian improvements in the 
first decades of the Meiji period stoked faith in its potential to reorder nature. The 
hydrologic expertise of the Netherlands was especially prized, and Dutch technicians 
took on positions of leadership in a series of well-publicized, government-funded river 
improvement projects in the 1870s and 1880s.112 The high regard government planners 
held for Dutch technicians took concrete form in northern Miyagi in 1879 when 
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celebrated engineer Cornelis Johannes van Doorn added to his efforts across the country 
a series of surveys on the waterways surrounding Shinainuma in the district of Shida. 
Inspired by this and a continuing faith in Dutch engineers on the part of the national 
government, Tōda resident Azumi Jintarō (who became a key player in the Entō conflict) 
solicited prefectural support for and used his own resources to fund Western science-
based surveys in 1881 and 1882 on waterways in the area that would later become the 
new village of Nangō.113 Although these investigations did not lead directly to 
improvement projects, it was clear from an early point that figures in Tōda saw in 
technological developments a potential solution to their age-old water problems. 
While the new technology of the Meiji period offered a means of improvement in 
many areas, a technological fix that would satisfy all parties in Monō and Tōda was 
unlikely. While terraforming efforts could improve water supplies and help to resolve 
competing claims over a single water source, these were not the issues in the region.114 
The dispute between Monō and Tōda hinged on the question of whether or not a single 
water source should be allowed to continue to exist. It was a problem rooted in earlier 
human transformations of the natural environment and the political decisions that 
informed them. Despite the advances since the fall of the shogunate, the scale of the work 
that would be required to meet the needs of both districts placed it beyond the 
imaginations of the leaders of the conflict. Rising expectations based on new methods of 
water control and terraforming led Monō and Tōda residents to believe that they could 
improve the situations in their home areas, but they created no firm belief in a fix that 
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would be beneficial for all. The construction of district-operated watchhouses on each 
side of the Meiji sluice after its construction in 1890 showed that, if Tōda and Monō 
residents had faith in the possibility of progress through technology, that same trust 
extended neither to the unlimited potential of that progress nor to the goodwill of their 
neighbors. 
The hopes surrounding the promise of new technology were tied to evolving 
government policies on riparian works. Beginning in 1868 with the appointment of an 
official in charge of water use nationwide charged with "bring(ing) happiness to the 
people," the Meiji government placed an early emphasis on water management.115 Its 
approach to rivers in the first decades of its existence, however, took a one-sided view of 
the role of the state in riparian improvement. Eschewing calls across the country for flood 
control, the proto-Home Ministry of Ōkubo Toshimichi defined the government interest 
in rivers solely as their potential as a transportation network that would obviate the need 
for expensive rail.116 National funding and planning went to so-called deep water 
improvements aimed at deepening major rivers to remake them as arteries in a system 
connecting markets across the country, while villages asking for help against flooding 
were told that dams, weirs, and other high water construction were the responsibility of 
localities.117  
 Changes in government leadership and policy goals brought with them tentative 
moves toward flood control in the years leading up to the Entō conflict. Ōkubo's 
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assassination in 1878 took the riparian transportation network off the government agenda 
temporarily and introduced a new focus on rail.118 This did not lead immediately to 
policies promising relief to flood-plagued communities. Recession and austerity measures 
inhibited government support of flood control projects, even worsening the prospects of 
such work in 1880 with a tax law revision that eliminated existing opportunities for 
villages to apply for funding from the central government.119 New hope came only with 
Yamagata Aritomo's assumption of the office of Home Minister in 1883. Reviving the 
plans for the river transportation network, he also acknowledged the importance of flood 
control and inaugurated a new program through which prefectures could apply directly 
for central government support for their projects.120 Additional pressure for national 
funding of flood control came with the opening of the Imperial Diet in 1890. The 
landlords from rural areas all over the country who took up Diet seats quickly made water 
management a key political issue, criticizing the focus on deepening projects and calling 
for the government to take responsibility for flood control.121 Despite the promise of these 
developments, the situation remained uncertain for major river projects at the beginning 
of the Entō conflict, with flood control improvements still cast as "the problem of each 
region.”122 At the same time, the construction of the Meiji sluice as the third major water 
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infrastructure project since the fall of the shogunate built the hope in northern Miyagi that 
a new era in riparian improvement was coming.123
 
The construction of the Meiji sluice, in concert with the social, economic, and 
administrative transformations that villages underwent during the 1870s and 1880s, thus 
left water usage in Monō and Tōda in a flammable state. A bold proposal from Tōda's 
MSSYK, however, put the spark to the tinder. Excited at the news that engineers had 
declared the draining of the lake possible and predicted it would result in improved flood 
protection and new lands for reclamation, the group quickly drafted concrete plans and 
announced a conference of influential parties (yūshi no kyōgikai) to be held in Sendai on 
the fourteenth of July. Leading the meeting were the most prominent members of the 
MYSSK, including Tōda landlords, the mayors of Nangō and Wakuya, as well as Fukaya 
landlord and Monō prefectural assembly hopeful Yamoto Heidayū. The leaders of the 
MSSYK did not limit attendance to those likely to support their plans. In a significant 
miscalculation they also invited Fukaya mayor, Endō Imagorō, to the event and proposed 
that he not only accept the lake-draining project, but pay for related improvements on the 
Jō River to ensure the smooth completion of the drainage.124 
Endō's response was swift. After flatly refusing the proposal, he returned to Monō to 
organize resistance to Tōda's plans. The mayor proceeded methodically, first convening a 
"prominent people's congress" (omodatte kaigi) that called for a Fukaya assembly vote, 
then presiding over the village administrative body as it produced a resolution of 
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"absolute opposition" (danzen hantai).125 A wider anti-Tōda movement flared in Monō, 
fueling the victories of fiercely partisan Monō candidates in the Miyagi prefectural 
elections in the summer of 1892 and effectively ending the political ambitions of 
MSSYK member Yamoto. In August, a group of delegates selected by the Fukaya 
assembly went to Sendai, where they received the backing of Miyagi governor Funakoshi 
Mamoru and his pledge to protect the status quo on water use in the region. 
These initial stages of the conflict were orderly, but they showed the early leadership 
of the newly prominent landlords. The conference that Tōda leaders held in Sendai 
illustrated the importance of unofficial and semi-official actors and hinted at the inactive 
role that prefectural officials went on to assume in the later stages of the fight. The name 
of the gathering expressed its orientation, with the word "yūshi" pulling double duty in 
describing personal interest in the matter as the prerequisite for inclusion while at the 
same time making reference to "yūshisha," a term for "men of influence" who worked in 
the interests of their communities. Both Tōda's yūshi and the "prominent people" 
gathered in Fukaya resembled the locally influential resident whose support was sought 
by Kamada Sannosuke for the Shinainuma project. There, as in Tōda and Monō, they 
were figures who existed at a distance from the prefectural government. While mayors 
and village officials took their places in the Tōda meeting, Suzuki Suminosuke, district 
head and nominal chief of the MSSYK did not.  
More tellingly, landlords who held minor or no official positions played important 
parts in this and subsequent meetings. Azumi Jinjirō, a Nangō landlord who held the 
minor office of ward head (kuchō), presented the drainage proposal to the surprised 






mayor of Fukaya at the concerned parties conference, while Yamoto Heidayū, holding no 
official position in his home village, attempted to convince him to go against the interests 
of the majority of his fellow villagers.126 A similar group of landlords led Monō's 
response. Who precisely attended the Fukaya "Prominent People's Congress" cannot be 
known, but there is little doubt that both that group and the village assembly that met in 
its wake were composed of local landlords. Clearer are the identities of the leaders of the 
wider "anti-Tōda movement" that spread in Monō in the fall of 1892. Bolstered by the 
governor's promise of support and the success of anti-Tōda candidates Fukaya's Endō 
(Imagorō) and Kanomata's Itō Taizō in the prefectural assembly election, Monō landlords 
Endō Ryōkichi and Saitō Jintarō began their significant involvement in the conflict by 
holding mass meetings in September to select a committee to again visit the prefectural 
office in Sendai and request a formal injunction against Tōda's plans.127 
The motivating forces in the various groups further illustrated the dominance of 
unofficial over official leadership. The Fukaya Congress, an ad hoc meeting of residents 
in an unofficial capacity, was the first response in Monō to the announcement of the 
MSSYK's plans for Nabire Lake, and its resolution to elicit a condemnation of the 
scheme by the village assembly testifies to the role of unofficial action in eliciting a 
response from the men in office. Both the mission of the representatives chosen by the 
Fukaya assembly and that of the group selected at the September meeting of Endō and 
Saitō to gain the governor's explicit condemnation of the Tōda plan followed a similar 
pattern. Village-based groups of various levels of official status prodded the top 
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bureaucrat in the prefectural government into action. Suzuki's later act of insubordination 
with the locks on the Meiji sluice in response to the demands of Tōda residents was 
simply a logical progression from these early activities. 
Stymied in their appeal to Fukaya's leaders and facing the danger of a hostile 
prefectural administration, Tōda actors turned to direct and illegal action in the autumn of 
1892. Two weeks after governor Funakoshi's declaration of his support for Monō in the 
brewing conflict and two days after Endō's and Saitō's mass meeting, the MSSYK held a 
general assembly to formulate their strategy for the rest of the year. Ignoring the lack of 
official sanction and the danger of legal backlash, the meeting produced resolutions to 
deepen the Aoki River and seize control over the Meiji sluice.128 Suzuki Suminosuke, as 
both district head and nominal leader of the water group, registered his firm opposition to 
the plans, urging moderation and respect for legal processes. While it eventually accepted 
his entreaties to abandon plans to steal the key to the dam's sluice gates, the MSSYK 
membership roundly voted down his motion to forestall the river improvements.129 A 
meeting of the Wakuya town assembly soon followed, cementing the rejection of the 
district chief's line and resolving to dig a new drainage canal from the northern banks of 
Nabire Lake at Sangenyashiki. Tōda would respond to official condemnation with 
unofficial and direct action, the complaints of Suzuki be damned. 
The MSSYK's dismissal of Suzuki's advice, which in the context of his position as 
leader of the organization might better be read as orders, reveals his marginal place in the 
organization he was supposed to head. But if he was not in charge of the group or of the 
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other actors on the Tōda side of the conflict, who was? It was not the elites of the early 
Meiji period who had been displaced by the new local government system. The hamlet-
based elite houses of Nangō played limited parts in the conflict or stood to the side as it 
progressed. In contrast, those who had managed to secure places for themselves in the 
new administrative villages took on important leadership roles. The mayors of Nangō and 
Wakuya each championed direct action that defied the orders of the district chief, 
destabilizing the local order and pushing the conflict toward violence. 
While, despite their degree of autonomy, mayors could be considered tied to the 
larger administrative structure, the same was not true of the many important figures in the 
Entō conflict who occupied only minor village offices or held no official position at all. 
In Monō, mayors and prefectural assemblymen may have taken the lead against Tōda's 
drainage scheme, but it was village clerks, ward heads, postal officials, and teachers who 
provided the most energetic leadership in the active phases of the conflict.130 In part, the 
prominence of men of this type as leaders related to the need for action that went beyond 
the boundaries of the strictly legal. Officially mandated organizations like water 
associations could hardly lead the charge in illegal activities. Landlords with local 
prestige but little or no official authority instead took on this role on both sides of the 
conflict, successfully mobilizing their neighbors and pushing forward the interests of 
their districts with force. In so doing, they also made themselves vulnerable to legal 
retribution. It was leaders from the rising landlord class with minor or no official 
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positions in the village administration who went on to face arrest and prosecution for 
their roles in unsanctioned river works.131  
Tōda farmers went forward with their plans for the Aoki River and the 
Sangenyashiki canal in the fall and winter of 1892. After inclement weather forced delays 
in October and November, Nangō's mayor led workers in damming the Deki River 
upstream of Nabire Lake in order to begin excavations to connect it directly to the Aoki 
River draining from the lake. Startled Monō observers, hurriedly dispatched at the first 
indications of activity, reported a massive workforce who had rendered the source of the 
lake "as dry as a road."132 Both sides petitioned the prefectural governor to intervene on 
their behalf in the weeks that followed, citing the damage promised by either the 
destruction of the lake or its continued existence as requiring official action. In response 
the prefecture offered silence, effectively backing the Monō-friendly status quo, but 
doing nothing explicitly to deter the aggressive moves of the Tōda side. 
The lack of official response invited direct and illegal action from both Tōda and 
Monō, leading to a series of incidents and arrests in the winter of 1892 and the spring of 
1893. To surreptitious Tōda attempts to dig new drainage channels from Nabire Lake, 
Monō responded with legal gambits and sabotage campaigns that resulted in the arrests of 
leaders Endō Ryōkichi and Saitō Jintarō.133 A flurry of lawsuits between officials in the 
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two districts followed in the spring of 1893. As of the beginning of April, both district 
heads, the water associations, village officials, and the leaders of the unauthorized 
dredging and refilling were all embroiled in legal wrangling. As the first blossoms of 
spring brought color to the landscape, enraged residents on both sides of the district line 
waited in states of nervous tension for legal resolution.  
In Tōda, the tension broke on the third of May, when the Sendai local court acquitted 
Monō leaders Saitō and Endō of all charges. While the local officials leading the MSSYK 
filed formal appeals, Tōda residents rejected legal means of resolution and took to direct 
action en masse. Farmers from Wakuya and Nangō gathered at the Meiji sluice, ignoring 
police demands that they disperse and threatening violence. While cooler heads 
eventually prevailed at the sluice, leading to the peaceful dispersal of the assembled 
farmers, a small group led by a minor Wakuya official struck at the Monō watchtower, 
seizing the keys to the flood gates and claiming a Tōda victory. The beleaguered district 
chief Suzuki was able to prevail upon the raiders to return the keys, but the next day the 
mayor of Nangō defied his orders and led another group to complete the work cutting off 
the water supply to Nabire Lake.134 In the face of legal paralysis and government 
inaction, the threat of violence between the two districts grew increasingly likely. 
The ineffectiveness of the legal response to the worsening conflict and the inability 
of the court system to hand down verdicts that did anything but reaffirm an amorphous 
commitment to the failing status quo provided both the impetus and the means for 
landlords and minor officials to take roles of leadership in the increasingly radicalized 
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conflict. In settling the cases surrounding the Monō-Tōda conflict, Miyagi judges based 
their decisions entirely on customary use and precedent. Actions like the excavation of 
the canal at Sangenyashiki were condemned as against "customary practice" (jūrai no 
kankō), making it impossible for Tōda to effect any legal change in a system whose entire 
purpose was to preserve the order in its current form.135 Where legal and official means 
failed, however, Tōda actors found that illegal and unofficial actions could paradoxically 
succeed. In the face of illegally undertaken works presented as faits accomplis, courts 
accepted the status quo as a moving target and scrambled to hand down verdicts that 
exonerated the people who conducted the work and left such transformations they had 
accomplished as they were. The status quo that courts were dedicated to defending 
amounted to whatever conditions existed at the time of trial. This flexible conservatism 
encouraged leaders on both sides to take direct action to force the changes that they 
wanted, confident that the courts would back them up in the end. In this context, the only 
rational response for actors in Tōda or Monō was to escalate the conflict and aggressively 
pursue their interests before their opponents could. By the spring of 1893, empty threats 
of legal penalties no longer acted as an effective deterrent and the situation veered 
dangerously toward anarchy.  
It was with the region in this state that Suzuki found himself forced into the key-
stealing gambit, finally provoking the prefectural authorities to mediate a resolution 
between the two districts. Dissatisfaction ran high in Tōda after the standoff at the sluice 
and the forced return of the keys to the floodgates. Frustrated farmers organized a 
                                                     
135
 Sunaga Shigemitsu, Kindai Nihon no jinushi to nōmin, 151. Significantly, the offense against customary 
practice was considered a more compelling charge than the fact that the Tōda side had completely broken 




conference of Tōda residents (Tōda gunmin kyōgi) at the beginning of June, where they 
demanded that Suzuki seize the key to the sluice gates. This confrontation completed the 
pattern of the inversion of leadership that began with the mayors of Nangō and Wakuya 
flouting the district chief's calls for moderation and continued in the taking of center 
stage by non- and minor officials like the Tōda key thief and the Monō saboteurs. It also 
proved the means to bring the prefecture into the conflict in search of a solution. More 
surprising than simple insubordination, the fact that Suzuki had followed the will of the 
assembled residents rather than his duty as an administrator put the lie to the notion that 
he was a bureaucrat who would put service to the prefecture (and hence to the central 
government) ahead of local interests, a revelation underlined by his refusal to return the 
key to the officials sent out to admonish him after his crime. 
The long road to resolution and reconciliation began with Miyagi Governor 
Funakoshi admonishing the district heads of both Monō and Tōda and convening a 
special meeting in Sendai of the district officials, mayors, and prefectural assembly 
members involved in the conflict. The ineffectiveness of this gathering, in which the 
governor stressed the need for the two districts to work together to formulate a solution 
that would work for both, became clear almost immediately. Only days after the meeting, 
new lawsuits were filed by both sides, killing the promise of a quick end to the legal 
struggles. When Suzuki, bound for a meeting with the governor in Sendai, was forced to 
turn back to his home district to deal with reports of another group of farmers again 
threatening violence, the prefecture finally decided to adopt a new approach.136
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The governor organized a second series of meetings for July 20-23 aimed at restoring 
order and resolving the fundamental problems that afflicted the region. Unlike the first 
meeting, the guest list this time included all the concerned parties from the two districts, 
whether they held official positions or not, and brought four respected prefectural 
mediators to hear their cases and resolve their differences.137 Mediator Hayakawa 
Tomohiro summarized the conclusions at the end of the conference, noting that "what is 
at the root of the conflict between the two districts are the problems caused by the fact 
that Tōda is worried about the drainage of damaging water and Monō is concerned about 
the lack of a water supply. These alone are the roots of the current situation.”138 The 
problems were declared to be purely geographic in nature, unrelated to failings in 
administration and governance, and could only be solved by more concerted human 
intervention in the natural environment. 
Accordingly, a follow-up meeting in mid-August marked the first move down the 
path toward a concrete proposal that pledged the use of the prefecture's resources to end 
the disparities preventing harmony in the region. After abortive suggestions of a return to 
the status quo, quickly shouted down by Tōda representatives, the prefectural mediators 
agreed to deliberate about a Tōda-produced plan calling for the draining of Nabire Lake 
and a new water source for Monō. By the end of autumn, 1893, the last of the lawsuits 
had been thrown out, the prefecture had taken direct control of the Meiji sluice, and 
technicians had completed extensive surveys of the region. On December 3-5, 
representatives of the affected towns and villages received the prefecture's draft 
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resolution agreement outlining the plans for a prefecture-led remodeling of the local 
water system. 
Proposal in hand, the representatives at the December conference returned home to 
have their town and village assemblies vote on it. Governor Funakoshi followed hard on 
their tail, conducting a two-day goodwill tour in mid-December that included an evening 
with the mayor of Wakuya, who remained deeply unsatisfied with the new proposal, and 
meetings with the influential citizens (yūshi) on each side.139 Villages across Monō signed 
off on the agreement over the course of November, but its treatment of the Sangenyashiki 
canal and omission of the Aoki River issue made their Tōda counterparts leery. Finally, at 
a special session on January 13, the MSSYK withdrew its opposition to the agreement 
and abandoned all plans for a legal challenge. A large group of representatives from 
Tōda, Monō and Oshika met in Sendai on January 17 and signed a conciliation document 
(chōtei riyūsho) and a treaty (jōyakusho), ending the two-year conflict. 
While the inclusion of the team of prefectural mediators at the second round of 
summer meetings in Sendai has been credited as the key to a solution to the Entō conflict, 
equally important was the invitation of the various unofficial and semi-official actors who 
had taken roles of leadership during the recent months of radicalization.140 Alongside 
mediators and mayors, the July meetings included prefectural assemblymen, minor local 
officials, and men with no official positions at all.141 The August meetings opened the 
meetings even further, adding more minor officials from Tōda. In the face of a failure of 
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local administration, the prefecture had little choice but to include all those who exercised 
practical influence if it were to have any hope of resolving the conflict and restoring 
order. 
The agreement that terminated the Entō conflict promised to put an end to the 
disparities that made the interests of the districts irreconcilable. It included concrete plans 
to recreate the waterways around the Monō-Tōda boundary, introducing improvements 
that would benefit all connected areas. Its stipulations included: prefectural planning and 
funds for a new irrigation canal to Monō from a water source in the northwest of the 
prefecture within the next two years, with provisional rules in place to ensure the water 
supply in the meantime; the preservation of the Sangenyashiki canal in its buried state; 
the continuation of prefectural control over the Meiji sluice until the time came to drain 
Nabire Lake (at which point the dam would no longer be necessary); and a promise that 
the prefecture would commit to such construction as would prove necessary to solve any 
further water problems as they arose.142 Tōda's objections concerning the Aoki river and 
the Sangenyashiki canal aside, the resolution promised benefits to all and seemed to 
herald a sea change in the prefecture's involvement in local development. 
The long-term significance of the conflict and its resolution were twofold. First, it 
confirmed the official recognition of landlords outside the context of the formal local 
administrative system and demonstrated the importance that the prefectural government 
(and by extension, the national government) attached to them. The inclusion of so many 
individuals from the edges, or completely outside, of village government in the mediation 
conferences and as signers of the final settlement documents conferred a formal role on 
                                                     
142




people without formal positions. It represented an extension of the wider official 
recognition that had come with the water association law, showing clear connections 
between the memberships of the Monō and Tōda associations and the signatories, who 
were identified as belonging to one group or another in the documents. These people did 
not, however, take part in the resolution process only as members of water associations. 
Conducting surveys in September of 1893, a prefectural official noted his official 
meetings with "Entō committee members" (Entō jiken iin) in both districts, making no 
reference to the MSSYK or the HOFSK.143  
Government officials also gave implicit approval to the unofficial, and even illegal, 
actions taken during the conflict. The contracts declared a general amnesty, forgiving all 
improprieties even as they promised to fulfill the goals in the service of which they had 
been committed. Not stopping at simply excusing unofficial activities, the prefecture 
went on to endorse them. The mediation document noted the incompatibility of legal 
guidelines and water disputes, stating "conflicts over water use are not something which 
can be satisfied simply by the sole means of applying legal restraints and demanding the 
rights of oneself and others while putting aside the suffering of others.”144 This was at 
once an appeal for cooperation in place of narrow parochialism and an admonition to 
local areas to resolve their problems themselves without relying upon, or even turning to, 
law or formal government. 
The second significance of the conflict and its outcome lies in the change that it 
signaled for the shape of future agricultural improvement in Miyagi. This shape was not, 
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however, the one outlined so carefully in the reconciliation agreement that restored order 
to the region. The ink on the documents signed in January, 1894 was scarcely dry when 
Governor Funakoshi handed his office over to Katsumata Minoru, late of Ehime 
prefecture. Technicians began preliminary survey work on the waterways, but the new 
prefectural head had little interest in the project and rising tensions on the Asian continent 
diverted what waning attention it might still have commanded.145 With the outbreak of 
war with China in the summer of 1894 and the tremendous costs associated with it, water 
infrastructure in northern Miyagi seemed a minor issue indeed. Improvement plans were 
shelved and by the time peace was concluded the following year, it had become clear that 
the prefecture would not be making good on its promises. 
While the plan contained in the mediated settlement would have transformed the 
water order in the region, the actual outcome augured changes that were considerably 
wider in their significance. The failure of the agreement was not the mechanism that 
brought these changes; it served rather as a barometer identifying the site of action in 
agricultural improvement and suggesting the shape of its development in the years to 
follow. If bureaucrats in the prefectural administration (and by extension, their superiors 
in the Home Ministry) had demonstrated a new interest in improving farming and a 
willingness to consider fundamental changes to age-old systems of land and water use, 
they had also revealed that they could not be counted upon to be the agents of these 
transformations. Figures within the villages would have to step forward and lead any 
efforts that were to find form in reality. This reaffirmation of local responsibility also had 
implications for the size of any potential projects. While a multi-tiered drainage operation 
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that involved the construction of a canal stretching dozens of kilometers through 
mountainous terrain was at least theoretically possible when backed by government 
funding, it was far beyond the means of any village, particularly those that would require 
such extensive work.146 Improvement would have to be home-grown and modest in scale. 
Piecemeal work would be the rule. 
The Entō conflict did not identify the village figures who would lead these stunted 
improvement efforts, but it provided significant hints, at least of who they would not be. 
Their power waning and their positions under siege in the new local government system, 
the elites of the early and mid-Meiji periods were of limited significance during the 
conflict and there was little cause to believe that they would prove any more important to 
local development from that time forward. Other candidates appeared more promising. 
Distinguishing themselves during the dispute were local officials, advocating for their 
villages' interests from mayoral offices, and the new class of recently risen landlords, 
generally holding positions no higher than the lower reaches of village officialdom. In the 
course of the conflict, they had assumed the roles of rising meibōka leading the drive for 
local development. 
In the end, the drainage of Nabire Lake, the carving of a new irrigation canal to 
Monō, and the fundamental transformation of the water use system in the region would 
have to wait for more than thirty years until a new government commitment to 
development emerged in the 1920s. In the meantime, it was up to local figures to lead 
more modest, if more realistic, efforts. Sporadic minor conflicts flared up in region 
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during the 1890s, never threatening to approach Entō incident levels of seriousness but 
serving as a constant reminder of local dissatisfaction. A spate of intense flooding in 
1897 inflicted heavy damage in Monō, Tōda, and Oshika, prompting a series of meetings 
between the three districts aimed at solving their water problems. Stalled for months over 
the usual conflicts, the district representatives eventually agreed to shelve any plans for 
fundamental alterations to the current order and instead to focus on what improvements 
were possible within their own district boundaries. Pledging to avoid inter-district strife, 
the region began the twentieth century in atomized self-reliance. 
While the Entō conflict failed to bring about the infrastructural improvements that 
farmers in Monō and Tōda sought, it marked social changes with important implications 
for the development of agriculture and farming villages in the years that followed. The 
emergence of the rising meibōka in the context of the transformation of villages and their 
administrative structures proved far more influential than the abortive promises of 
mercurial prefectural leaders. Unlike figures like Mayor Straw Sandals, whose 
effectiveness relied upon the continuity of elite social status and connections with higher 
officials across space and time, rising meibōka were transitional figures, marking a point 
in the development of a more enduring form of local leader. They were a product of 
economic and social change, as well as the opportunities and challenges that came with 
political change and technological development. Defined as much by the weakness that 
drove them to illegal action in conflicts like the Entō struggle as they were by the 
growing wealth and social ambition that placed them at the heads of their villages, their 
chief function was to clear the decks for the next period of agricultural development. As 




1890s, rising meibōka stood ready to consolidate their local authority and begin an 
aggressive push to mobilize the resources of the central government to accomplish their 
developmental goals. They went on to complete their climb in the 1890s and stood as a 
new breed of landlord meibōka at the end of the century. 
The resolution of the Entō conflict left behind compelling questions that demanded 
answers. Agricultural development was clearly both needed and possible, but who would 
lead it? Rumblings from within the Home and Agriculture and Commerce Ministries 
betrayed government interest in increasing agricultural production and enriching poor 
villages, but what would they do to promote these goals? New technologies were 
emerging that offered the means to solve age-old problems of farming and production, 
but how would they come to the villages and in whose interests would they be used? 
Northern Miyagi found itself in a liminal moment, faced with clear evidence of the 
ending of the old order, but only vague suggestions of the shape of the new. These 
suggestions took concrete form in the late 1890s with the growth of farming associations 






A Harvest of Knowledge and Ambition: Rōnō and the Rise of 
Agricultural Associations 
 
 In January of 1897, members of local farming groups (nōkai) from all over Japan 
gathered at the Yayoi Hall in Tokyo's Shiba Park for the fourth general meeting of the 
Zenkoku nōjikai (National Agricultural Association).147 Over 200 representatives in total 
had been elected by local members to attend the event, and they spent the next three days 
discussing the resolutions passed at local industrial meetings over the previous year, 
lamenting the deplorable state of villages, and planning for the future of their 
organization. The Zenkoku nōjikai was of relatively recent pedigree, having broken off 
from the Dai Nihon nōkai (Greater Japan Agricultural Association) two years earlier in a 
split that was less than amicable. The meeting highlighted the differences of the new 
group from the old. On the one hand, the assembled representatives revisited concerns 
about the failures of wealthy farmers to promote agricultural development, a role 
assigned to them in the planning of the local government system (chihō jichi seido), that 
had long been as common a topic in the Dai Nihon nōkai as among Home Ministry 
bureaucrats in the central government. Alongside old chestnuts like this, however, were 
features pointing to the new directions taken by the Zenkoku nōjikai and its affiliated 
local groups. The composition of the association was one such departure. Here the 
growing influence of the newly-risen landlords was apparent, as the assembled ranks of 
regional nōkai branch representatives, elected and dispatched by their home 
                                                     
147





organizations, represented a change from the mass of self-selected local yūshisha (men of 
influence) and rōnō had peopled the meetings before the split.148  
More important than the meeting's roster, however, was its vision of a new role for 
the central government in promoting the development of agriculture. Picking up on the 
relatively modest proposal at the previous year's meeting that the central government 
begin providing funding for the prizes at local nōkai agricultural product exhibitions, the 
1897 assembly presented an expanded roster of proposals for official support of farming 
improvement. Resolutions called for direct government funding for the establishment and 
maintenance of local agricultural lecture halls and experimentation stations and indirect 
support for improvement through an immediate reduction of the registration tax for new 
paddyland.149 Alongside financial commitments, the assembled members also 
demonstrated a keen interest in legal change. Joining the perennial push for the passage 
of an Agricultural Association Law (Nōkaihō), which the Dai Nihon nōkai had been 
promoting since the beginning of the decade, was a proposal for an Arable Land 
Reorganization Law (Kōchi seirihō). This law would provide an official apparatus to 
structure and support the ongoing efforts of landlords to consolidate scattered paddies, 
open up new farmland, and seize and develop the commons that had been the collective 
property of villages rendered defunct by the local government system of 1890. 
Produced by a group that, whatever its ambitions, lay outside the lines of official 
patronage and advocating changes that appeared to be no more than modest alterations to 
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the existing order, the 1897 Zenkoku nōjikai resolutions might seem unlikely harbingers 
of revolutionary transformation. The government funding that represented the chief 
interest of the members was limited in scope and appeared neither unreasonable nor 
unexpected in the context of the vocal support for local agricultural improvement 
regularly proclaimed by the Home and Agriculture and Commerce Ministries. The legal 
proposals similarly resonated with the professed goals and activities of the central 
government. Official promotion of agricultural associations had been a policy since the 
late 1880s and the government had also made efforts to encourage reordering of farmland 
to allow improved cultivation techniques and eliminate the last vestiges of the old village 
land tenure system. 
Yet, for all their seeming innocuousness, the Zenkoku nōjikai resolutions represented 
a change with implications that went far beyond publicly-funded experimentation stations 
or government prizes at farming exhibitions. In fact, they proposed a fundamental 
rewriting of the relationship between the central government and farming populations and 
the roles of each in agriculture and its "development." The preponderance of new 
attendees at the meeting pointed to the roots of this systemic challenge. The landlords 
making up the local agricultural organizations whose coordination was a primary goal of 
the Zenkoku nōjikai were the rising meibōka of the 1890s, and the 1897 resolutions 
reflected their increasing confidence and success in promoting their interests as an 
economic class. Having improved their positions on the local stage, they now sought to 
reorder their relations with the national government. 
 The government's policy toward agriculture and rural areas in the late nineteenth 




self-sufficiency, early Meiji officials limited their involvement in the countryside to the 
maintenance of order, the conscription of soldiers, the hands-off promotion of education, 
and the extraction of taxes for military and industrial development. Rural populations 
were cut off from direct government support, motivated by their straitened circumstances 
to produce the agricultural growth that both they and the state needed. The 1897 
resolutions struck at the central pillars of this structure, proposing an extension of 
government protection over a portion of the farming population and the direct 
involvement of government in agriculture. The landlord-farmers that government 
officials had designated meibōka and to whom they had entrusted rural administration 
and development were to be the beneficiaries of this expanded embrace. No longer local 
figures upon whose financial and social resources central planners relied in their plans to 
promote the development of rural areas and agricultural improvement on the cheap, 
meibōka aimed at becoming the object of government funding, which they would employ 
to oversee the development of their villages. 
Yet the meibōka who sought the support of the central government were not the 
same rural figures around whom officials had built their plans for local self-government 
(chihō jichi) in the 1880s. The new direction outlined by the Zenkoku nōjikai represented 
the culmination of two decades of meibōka-led agricultural improvement, but it also 
reflected the evolution of the figures that served in the roles of leadership. Two distinct 
types of meibōka, each serving as middlemen of modernity, were instrumental in bringing 
about the changes to agriculture, farming organizations, and official involvement in rural 
villages that set the stage for the group's proposal. In the first stage of these 




ranks of the earlier village elites and linked with farming experts from an earlier era, rōnō 
meibōka represented continuity with Tokugawa period villages and agriculture. During 
the 1880s, these farmers advanced the development of agriculture by spreading 
indigenous best practices, providing an alternative to misguided government plans for the 
modernization of farming, building confidence among officials that rural elites held the 
knowledge for successful improvement, and laying the foundation for future agricultural 
development. 
The second type of meibōka shaping the changes leading to the 1897 proposal were 
the landlord-meibōka who made up the local agricultural associations (nōkai) that spread 
across the country in the 1890s. They were the next stage in evolution of the rising 
meibōka, who had supplanted the village elites of the 1880s economically, but still lacked 
their social status and administrative authority. Agricultural associations served the 
related functions of bringing together these landowning farmers into an effective lobby 
group, attracting the attention of key officials in the Home and Agricultural and 
Commerce Ministries, and providing rising meibōka with the means to organize and 
assert themselves on the local and national stages. They were islands of stability in 
villages unbalanced by the social, economic, and administrative disruptions that enabled 
rising meibōka to complete their ascent to the top of village society. 
The Zenkoku nōjikai failed to realize its goals in 1897, but the transformation that it 
sought was not long in coming. A burst of legislation at the close of the nineteenth 
century saw changes to agricultural and rural policy that confirmed landlord-meibōka in 
positions of singular advantage in their home villages and shaped the course of 




series of laws, officially-recognized organizations, and government financial support, but 
it represented an even more significant departure from the status quo than these 
expansive measures indicate. An end had come to the government's treatment of the rural 
population as a single mass, left on its own to negotiate the treacherous ground of 
expanding capitalism as well as the natural and other challenges faced by farming 
villages. Village elites stood poised to enter the new century backed by new sources of 
government funding and authority born of legal change. 
Historians of Meiji Japan have long recognized that legal changes at the end of the 
nineteenth century marked an important shift in the central government's involvement in 
the villages. Appreciation of their significance has not, however, led to a single accepted 
understanding of their meaning. In the 1960s and 1970s, scholars concerned with local 
autonomy and self-government saw in these changes the roots of government oppression 
and the hobbling of true local autonomy.150 The new legislation marked a fresh effort to 
assert government authority over the villages, one that ran directly counter to the lip 
service that officials paid to village autonomy in the system of local self-government 
(chihō jichi) they had introduced a decade earlier. More important than the actual content 
of the laws was the fact of the strengthening of government authority in the village. New 
agricultural programs, organizations, and financial and legal support for landlord-
meibōka were seen as little more than window dressing for a tightening of the state grip 
on village government and society. 
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In the 1980s, a new direction in scholarship challenged this interpretation. Rejecting 
the one-sided portrayal of agency by earlier scholars, Sasaki Yutaka led the charge to 
rescue villagers from the passive roles to which they had been assigned.151 In his view, 
villagers, particularly village elites, had embraced the legal changes at the end of the 
nineteenth century, finding in them a means to further local autonomy. The village plans 
(chōsonze) that both active and retired bureaucrats championed in the 1890s were taken 
as evidence of the earnest official interest in real local autonomy. Drafted within villages 
and aiming directly at what village leaders identified as the interests of their 
communities, these plans formed part of a larger cooperative effort by villagers and 
officials that culminated in the legal and policy changes at the decade's end.152 The new 
laws, far from being an imposition of the government's power on villages, were in fact 
based on ideas that had originated in the villages themselves. 
Although in opposition with one another, these views share a common problem. 
Prevalent in both Sasaki's understanding and the earlier scholarship he rejected is the 
portrayal of village populations as undifferentiated wholes, integral units that either 
pushed through changes that served their shared interests or fell victim to the creeping 
expansion of government authority. Scholars disagreed about the relationship between 
the central government and these monolithic villages, but they gave little thought to the 
diversity of interests and actors that existed within the villages. Their reductive approach 
produced predictably reductive conclusions. The vastly different effects that the laws and 
directives had on different strata of village society disappear into the blurry mass of 
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generalization, as does any hint of the distinctive, and often opposing, interests of these 
groups. Landlords, smallholders, and tenant farmers seem to stand as one in anonymity, 
subsumed under the categories of farmer or villager. 
Ironically, this undifferentiated view of village society resembles nothing so closely 
as the Meiji government's treatment of rural communities that was ended by the legal 
changes at the end of the century. The various systems of local government subjected 
villagers rich and poor to equal measures of exploitation and neglect. Still, if the 
government was reductive in its extraction of taxes and its leaving of villages to sink or 
swim on their own merits, however, it showed a greater appreciation for the 
heterogeneous nature of village society than either of the recent groups of scholars 
debating the legacy of the turn-of-the-century legal change. Acute awareness of divisions 
between village social strata lay at the heart of official plans for meibōka stewardship of 
local administration and development. Planners in the Home Ministry were explicit in 
identifying the wealth of meibōka as the means of freeing them from the baser wants of 
their poorer neighbors and the source of the resources needed to fulfill the role of local 
leaders. 
In contrast to the conflicting views of earlier historians, I argue in this chapter that 
the change in the government's approach to farming villages at the end of the nineteenth 
century marked the beginning of a new relationship between government and meibōka 
and ushered in a new period of meibōka-led agricultural development now backed by 
material support and legal empowerment. This interpretation recognizes the value in each 
of the two opposing historiographical views of the shifts in rural administration. The legal 




took the indirect form of increasingly formalized support mechanisms for the meibōka 
and their organizations, rather than the exercise of direct control over the economic 
fortunes of the villages. At the same time, in leaving village administration and the 
planning of agricultural development and all types of improvement efforts to meibōka, 
the government did indeed allow for a kind of autonomous self-government. This, 
however, is better understood as a compromised continuation of the cost-free approach to 
local government that had informed central visions of village administration since the 
beginning of the Meiji period. What was new at this point was use of government 
resources to strengthen one group within villages, whom government planners hoped 
would use their power to improve villages and agriculture in particular ways. This 
empowerment weakened the rest of the rural population, cementing the power of the now 
risen landlord-meibōka and opening for them a new period of opportunity. 
Official policy toward rural Japan in the early Meiji period provided little in the way 
of concrete benefits to agricultural villages. While rural communities as the soul of the 
nation and font of morality occupied a central place in the ideological pronouncements of 
the Home Ministry, in practice the central government maintained an extractive 
relationship with villages, seeing them as a source of tax money, a locus of compulsory 
education, and a supply of bodies to be drafted into military service.153 To the extent that 
rural populations and agricultural development figured into official plans, they did so at 
the nexus of government interest in domestic stability and national security. Economic 
development was the key to both of these goals, but the situation the country faced, its 
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limited resources, and the nature of the social dislocations that resulted from the changes 
after the Restoration focused efforts toward it in particular directions.  
A chief concern of the Meiji government, and one that intersected with agriculture 
and rural Japan, was the problem of the samurai. The abolition of the Tokugawa domains, 
feudal stipends, and samurai status left tens of thousands of former warriors unemployed. 
Officials turned to farming as a means of finding livelihoods for ex-samurai, but the plans 
they enacted consumed scarce resources and produced mixed results. Before the 
establishment of the Agriculture and Commerce Ministry in 1881, a key aspect of 
agriculture policy was the promotion of large-scale farms which could provide relief 
work for samurai.154 When these plans proved abortive, officials turned toward the 
cultivation of undeveloped lands, again with qualified success. The new ministry's efforts 
to promote the opening of new farmland in Tōhoku and Hokkaidō in the 1880s struggled 
to find an audience among the former warriors the project was intended to aid, and those 
who did show interest often found the opportunity to cut and run with a quick profit more 
appealing than life as a farmer.155  
Samurai relief programs did not represent the only official interest in agricultural 
development in the 1870s and 1880s, but other government programs often offered 
limited benefits to farmers. Silk and other textiles, as Japan's most valuable exports in the 
late nineteenth century, figured large in the plans for rural areas. Government funds 
provided for the famous Tomioka Silk Mill, as well as more modest efforts that offered 
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machinery to privately owned textile plants in Miyagi and other regions.156 Less 
emblematically modern plans were also enacted in textile sector. One such project 
designed to spur native wool production and protect domestic industry ended in failure 
when the sheep imported by the central government succumbed as a group to a deadly 
parasite.157
 
The second type of early Meiji official initiative aimed directly at the improvement 
of agriculture and the promotion of textiles, but did so at a physical distance from the 
villages. Far from the rural areas in whose name they were purportedly undertaken, 
government plans for agricultural development centered on the testing of foreign crops 
and tools at facilities in Tokyo and other urban centers. The inspiration for these plans 
was also remote from rural Japan, coming, like the models for factories, mines, and 
military forces, from Western Europe and North America. Much as the future of industry 
was thought to lie in turbine-driven machinery, the future of farming, according to Ōkubo 
Toshimichi (1830-1878), the central figure in the early Meiji government, and his Home 
Ministry, lay in large-scale farms plowed by draught animals and planted with crops 
developed and proven outside of Japan. Model farms and agricultural testing centers were 
established at Komaba and other places in the greater Tokyo region in the 1870s and 
began investigations into the suitability of foreign products and techniques for Japanese 
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farms in pursuit of Ōkubo's decree to "draw upon the best in the farming methods of the 
countries of the West" (taisei shoshū no hō o sanshakushi).158 Rice was brought in for 
testing from Southeast Asia, Europe, and the United States; European and American 
draught animals and tools were examined; and technicians were dispatched to study 
foreign farming in situ.159  
The Japanese farmers who were to put into practice the new modes of agriculture 
figured into government plans as the passive recipients of the knowledge officials and the 
technicians they sponsored generated. The practical agricultural knowledge that villagers 
had acquired over generations was considered a dead end and the adoption of foreign 
methods of farming an essential means of achieving the modernization of agriculture. 
Teachers of Western techniques were dispatched from Tokyo across the country in the 
early 1880s and held lectures and gave demonstrations to farmers in their home 
villages.160 The government also loaned out equipment and draft animals to prefectural 
planners, who used them to establish model farms and made them available to local 
groups of farmers proposing major land reclamation projects.161  
The provision of equipment did not, however, represent a solid financial 
commitment on the part of the government for the support of either villages or 
agriculture; in fact, it was more nearly the opposite. Tamari Kizō, a teacher at the 
Komaba Agricultural School and a researcher dispatched to America at the time of the 
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programs, later remembered them as having been designed "to bring forth an enterprising 
spirit" among the local populations who made use of them.162 The central government 
was in effect declaring the directions in which it wished to see agriculture progress and 
leaving its realization on the ground to local hands and local resources. 
While officials attempted to carve a new path for Japanese agriculture, efforts on the 
parts of independent farmers, autonomously organized agricultural associations, and local 
governments continued seamlessly from the Edo period and offered a counterpoint to the 
largely ineffectual plans of the government. As they did around Shinainuma and Lake 
Nabire in Miyagi prefecture, early Meiji farmers across the country showed a keen 
interest in expanding their productive capacities and the profitability of their agricultural 
activities. The same sense of new possibility that drove the quests for industrial and urban 
modernization also permeated the countryside, combining with the new pressures and 
opportunities that came with the commercialization of agriculture to spur a flurry of 
improvement activities. 
Efforts by farmers to improve agriculture in early Meiji differed from government 
programs in three chief respects: they were undertaken on individual or local community 
bases without wider organization; they sought to build on existing practices, rather than 
emulating foreign farming; and they often proved effective. It was in this context that the 
figure of the rōnō (experienced farmer) rose to prominence. Possessed of detailed local 
knowledge where central officials chased after the universal and the foreign; embedded in 
farming communities, rather than handing down directives from central offices; and 
building on techniques with proven effectiveness, rōnō offered a distinct contrast to the 
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high-handed official planners of the new agriculture. Their efforts in the 1870s and 1880s 
laid the foundation for the transformation of agriculture at the end of the 19
th
 century and 
made the figure of the experienced, self-motivated, and locally-renowned promoter of 
best practices central to official schemes of agricultural modernization in the decades that 
followed. 
In a number of regions, rōnō attacked the problem of agricultural improvement with 
a canniness and vigor that successfully expanded farming production. The enduring 
agricultural "development" experienced in the first decades of the Meiji period came for 
the most part from the work of these rōnō and their compatriots in villages across the 
country who implemented and spread their ideas. Drawing on lifetimes of experience as 
farmers, rōnō approached the improvement of agriculture practically, seeking out means 
of increasing production that did not impose onerous new demands on financial resources 
or labor. Success in this quest brought them nationwide attention. In the 1870s in Gunma 
prefecture, rōnō Funatsu Denjibē (1832-1898) sought out the best means of cultivating 
rice and potatoes and the most effective uses of fertilizers in his native Gunma, 
publishing these in pamphlets along with advice on storage and sericulture.163 These 
efforts won him fame among farmers who adopted his techniques, and an invitation to 
enter officialdom as an educator. Nakamura Naozō (1819-1882) in Nara prefecture, 
Ishikawa Rikinosuke (1845-1915) in Akita prefecture, and Nara Senji (1822-1892) in 
Kagawa prefecture all pursued practical improvements to farming techniques and gained 
similar renown for their work educating farmers all over the country.  
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Supporting these figures was a network of local farmers who, if they lacked the 
technical knowledge or the financial wherewithal to commit time and fields to 
experimentation, played a crucial role in providing the social infrastructure that made 
possible the circulation of the ideas of the more famous rōnō. These men organized 
agricultural discussion meetings, purchased and shared farming pamphlets, promoted the 
implementation of improved cultivation methods, and invited their celebrated cousins to 
present lectures and answer questions. Outside government oversight and with no formal 
coordinating body, these webs of farming innovators, promoters, and students spread 
agricultural best practices across the country, helping local farming populations to adjust 
to the changing market realities of the new era and laying the foundation for the flurry of 
organization and centralization that came at the end of the century. 
The successes of early Meiji rōnō, both in practical agricultural research and in the 
dissemination of best practices, drew the attention of officials. The attraction of these 
figures and their agricultural work was obvious. Self-motivated and funded, they 
embodied the virtues that hopeful planners in the central government associated with 
local leaders and seemed to point the way to the self-sufficient countryside envisioned by 
the perpetually cash-strapped government. The autonomous nature of their activities also 
allowed the government, accused of excessive interference by Freedom and Popular 
Rights Activists, to remain at a healthy distance from villages even as the increases in 
farming yields and improvement of village finances they sought came to fruition. Most 
important, rōnō-led improvement offered concrete results. Even the chief architect of the 
foundering program of agricultural Westernization, Ōkubo Toshimichi, expressed 




specialists heading up the government's initiatives, pleading in exasperation to Tomioka 
Silk Mill chief Hayami Kensō in 1877 "I want to improve national agriculture further. Is 
there no one skilled in practical farming?”164
 
There were in fact practically skilled farmers available, and Hayami's answer pointed 
Ōkubo toward the rōnō. Hayami endorsed fellow Gunma resident Funatsu Denjibē, 
whose pamphlets and speeches, which often put advice about farming, fertilizing, and 
harvesting in the forms of easy-to-understand songs, had already earned him fame in his 
native region and were starting to spread beyond the prefecture's borders.165 This 
recommendation served as the first step in a decade of increasing official interaction with 
and dependence upon rōnō as the central and prefectural governments integrated their 
teachings, methods, and persons into agricultural policy. A decade before Yamagata 
Aritomo named meibōka explicitly in his plans for the system of local government, their 
experience, knowledge, and renown placed rōnō in the roles of middlemen between 
farming villages and government building bridges to modernity for farming communities. 
Agricultural policy shifted to integrate rōnō meibōka and their work in the 1880s, 
beginning with the publication of their names and addresses to encourage sharing and 
network building and quickly moving on to more direct means.166 Their discoveries and 
refined techniques made the most obvious and immediate target for central and 
prefectural planners, and officially-backed tests of these innovations were conducted on 
the national and prefectural levels. Prefectural governments in Ishikawa and Fukushima 
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each conducted a series of tests in the 1880s designed to shine the light of "scientific 
principles of the wider world" (seken no gakuri) on the rice selection methods discovered 
by Hayashi Enri, a former official from Fukoka prefecture who took up farming and 
agricultural experimentation in his retirement to become a quasi-rōnō.167 If the tone of the 
goals sounded dismissive of local farmers and native development, the results did not. 
The tests in both prefectures found Hayashi's techniques to yield results superior to other 
methods, prompting prefectural governments in Tochigi and elsewhere to conduct their 
own tests. To help ensure that rōnō continued their productive activities in research, 
officials also offered rewards. Kagawa's Nara Senji, a pioneer in the improvement of rice 
seeds and cultivation, filled both the display space of his small home and his wallet with 
a litany of honors that ran the gamut from minor awards from local exhibitions in the 
prefectures of Chiba and Akita, through more prestigious laurels at the newly-inaugurated 
nationwide meetings of the Dai Nihon nōkai in Tokyo, culminating in his receiving the 
Imperial Medal with Green Ribbon in 1892.168 The plaudits accompanying the medal, 
which celebrated Nara's personal funding of his improvement work, suggest that the 
awards were still based on the government's hopes for self-motivated and financially 
independent local elites, but the not-insignificant monetary prizes that were attached to it 
and the other awards hinted at a new recognition of the necessity of providing additional 
motivation through public funds. 
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Government officials also sought to integrate rōnō and their work more directly into 
agricultural policy and official initiatives. Disquiet at government interference in local 
matters was on the rise in the 1880s, however, and concerned authorities were anxious to 
avoid heavy-handed intrusions into agriculture.169 Instead, they pursued ways of either 
bringing successful rōnō into the government as advisors to agricultural offices and 
educators at official institutions or by making use of the name rōnō had made for 
themselves. The earliest move in the former direction came when Ōkubo convinced 
Funatsu to take a position as a technician and a teacher at the Home Ministry's Komaba 
Agricultural Research Station in 1878. The agricultural pioneer spent eight years at the 
facility, proving his techniques superior to the German farming methods that the school 
had concentrated on up to that time and contributing to the development of official policy 
both materially and by means of his reputation among farmers.170 Fully integrated into 
official agricultural posts, he moved on to the Agriculture and Commerce Ministry after 
leaving Komaba and worked there until his death in 1898.  
Further government effort went into promoting the work of rōnō as travelling 
educators. In a program based on systems of travelling farming instruction in France and 
Germany, government officials gave their encouragement and limited degrees of support 
to rōnō to continue their tours of the countryside and the dissemination of their 
improvements.171 Prefectural administrations went their national counterparts one better, 
moving to put the practical skills and experience of rōnō to work directly for local 
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development. The Chiba prefectural government invited Nara Senji to act as a travelling 
instructor to help villagers improve rice quality, and Akita officials had Ishikawa 
Rikinosuke continue his earlier work as a touring educator after he was brought into the 
prefectural administration.172 Authorities in Miyagi and Akita demonstrated the local 
interest in proven native methods by seeking out former central official Hida Rōichi, not 
for the research in Western agricultural methods he conducted in the Home Ministry, but 
for his experience with advanced Kyūshū farming techniques in his earlier life as a 
farmer and village headman in Ōita.173 
While there remained, at the very least, pockets of resistance to movements away 
from early plans for Western-styled, science-based modernization of agriculture, calls for 
the abandoning of these plans in favor of small-scale farms and practical improvement 
began to come from central officials in the 1880s.174 The most important and energetic 
early advocate for fundamental change in agricultural policy was Maeda Masana (1850-
1921). A colorful figure influential both within and outside of the government, Maeda's 
career followed a circuitous path through the intersection of agricultural development and 
official policy in the late 19
th
 and early 20
th
 centuries. As a director in the Agriculture and 
Commerce Ministry, Maeda echoed Ōkubo's late-career concerns about the impracticality 
of the direction of agricultural policy. He expressed his frustration with the meager 
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efforts and poor results of the promotion of Western-style farming in 1884, declaring 
"Now the necessary testing is not trivial work like the cultivation of foreign fruit trees or 
the production of tin cans. In the future, the purpose [of industrial policy] can be nothing 
other than devising a new form of Japanese agriculture.”175 While at first glance his call 
for a "new form" of agriculture might not seem all that far from the sentiments behind the 
push for large-scale foreign farming, the fact that Maeda was seeking a new form of 
specifically Japanese agriculture was important. He had seen the effectiveness of the 
improved rōnō techniques that had moved northeast across the country via agricultural 
discussion societies, whose virtues became all the more apparent when contrasted with 
the disappointing results of the "trivial work" that Maeda lamented.176
 
Maeda laid out his vision for the government role in agricultural development in his 
1884 Kōgyō iken (Advice for the Encouragement of Industry).177 Comprised of thirty 
volumes, this series outlined a plan for economic development that emphasized native 
agriculture and existing modes of traditional production as the means of creating a firm 
basis for future industrial development and raising the national standard of living. 
Lamenting the debased condition of the countryside and the scant hope for its 
improvement under present policies, Maeda singled out for blame the financial austerity 
of the Matsukata Deflation and a wrongheaded and tunnel-visioned focus on modern 
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industry.178 To counteract the baleful influence of these factors, Maeda called for a new 
focus on native forms of agricultural production for the market and a more active role for 
the government in promoting it.  
While representing a change in approach in its concern for farmers and its focus on 
Japanese farming, Kōgyō iken is inconsistent and non-committal in advocating any 
concrete fundamental change to official policy. Even were it not for the fact that, like 
Matsukata Masayoshi himself, Maeda held the reestablishment of fiscal stability as a 
prerequisite that had to be met before government funds could be applied directly toward 
industrial promotion, he continued to see the problems with agricultural production and 
rural prosperity as coming from failings in the work ethic of farmers.179 A chief concern 
was finding the means to cultivate the "willingness" (kokoro, also translatable as "spirit") 
of farmers to use their labor to shore up the economic basis of the government in the rural 
regions - what Kōgyō iken characterized as improving villages and developing 
agriculture.180 This willingness held a privileged place over the other ingredients of 
economic production, contributing 50% to its effectiveness, while relevant laws and 
capital provided only 40% and 10%, respectively.181 The ethos of self-sufficiency and 
independent motivation that made rōnō and other meibōka key to government plans 
remained central to Maeda's new direction. 
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Kōgyō iken's author attached the same importance to independent improvement 
efforts as did other policy makers, but Maeda had less faith in the capacity of natural 
forces to foster villagers who would undertake them. Early Meiji statesman Iwakura 
Tomomi described the processes that were supposed to produce local leaders in 1882, 
laying out the basic elements that Yamagata would incorporate in his local government 
system at the end of the decade: 
People who have resources and renown (meibō) in agriculture and 
business will, by means of accepting government orders and undertaking 
public business, be respected as honorable by the people of their villages. 
Most of the people with resources and renown in agriculture and business 
that appear in villages, if they are not district heads (kochō) or health 
committee members (eisei iin), are post office managers. Positions like 
district heads, health committee members, and post office managers are all 
low-paying, and what they receive of course does not match their labor. 
Further, they enjoy occupying themselves with this business and, in the 
case of district heads, they want by all means to be chosen when the time 
comes for reelection, whether they have to bribe the villagers or secretly 
buy their votes…They satisfy the three needs of clothing, food, and shelter 
for themselves; the only need that is not satisfied is for honor (eiyo), so 
there is absolutely no difference between the way they want honor and the 
way a thirsty man wants drink or the way a cold man wants clothing.182
 
 
The pervasive village poverty that Maeda saw, however, convinced him that, not 
only was a hunger for honor failing to drive wealthy villagers to local service, more 
prosaic forms of need were not even pushing farmers to act rationally. "If we examine the 
condition of the people closely," Maeda explained,  
those who live by the old traditions of frugality are still in a safe position 
today but very many have turned to luxury and outward show. Now, with 
mountains of debt, they are mortgaging or selling off the real estate, etc. 
handed down by their ancestors with the result that they can no longer 
maintain even the standard of living they once had. In extreme cases, we 
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see the pitiful spectacle of people gathering grass and roots for food. 
Apparently this is the result of people not advancing their individual 
standard of living in line with their real capacities, but putting on an empty 
show of following the latest fashion.183
 
 
A lack of sense and an unnatural hunger for luxury not only accounted for the 
desperate straits in which marginal farmers found themselves, it also dispossessed 
landowning farmers who might otherwise have risen to become village leaders. These 
problems lay behind the novel aspects of Maeda's idea of willingness. While it was an 
innate trait of farmers, willingness nonetheless required cultivation and activation. The 
self-motivation that Iwakura and other planners counted on to fill local offices and spur 
village development would neither appear on its own, nor could it accomplish its purpose 
without laws to support it. The assistance of government was necessary.  
Ultimately, Kōgyō iken failed to become the guiding document for a new phase in 
Japanese industrial policy. It faced an implacable adversary in the person of Matsukata 
Masayoshi, who, in addition to taking offence at its criticisms of his deflationary 
measures, had plans of his own to establish an industrial promotion bank attached to his 
own Finance Ministry. As a similar bank run by the Agriculture and Commerce Ministry 
was central to Maeda's proposal, the rewrites that Matsukata forced upon the proposal 
removed much of the purpose of Kōgyō iken and left it without clear conclusions.184 But 
while it failed to dictate the course of policy, it did provide hints of what was to come. 
The 1880s and 1890s saw government planners move toward closer coordination with 
rōnō meibōka and the village leaders who followed their examples, creating a favorable 
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legal context for their efforts and cultivating their willingness through increasingly 
substantial offers of material aid. Central to both of these intiatives were the agricultural 
associations (nōkai) and other farmers' groups that were instrumental in the transmission 
of the knowledge of rōnō meibōka. 
While rōnō meibōka stood out for their knowledge and practical innovation in 
improving farming, they relied on wider networks of interested farmers to spread the 
word about their techniques, purchase and share their publications, and host them on their 
speaking and educational tours. Over the last decades of the nineteenth century, both the 
groups and their memberships underwent transformative changes. Beginning as 
independent local groups peopled by older elite farmers connected to one another through 
personal bonds, farming organizations evolved into nationally organized and officially 
recognized associations gathering rising meibōka and presenting them with the means to 
achieve their political and economic objectives.  
The earliest roots of the farming groups that worked with rōnō to spread improved 
agricultural practices lay in the first years after the establishment of the Meiji 
government. Much as they had led residents in Shinainuma and Babayachi to organize, 
the power vacuums left by the collapse of the Tokugawa bakufu provided both space and 
impetus for farmers to form cooperative bonds. Both autonomously and with the 
encouragement of the new central government, farmers assembled on a regional basis to 
exchange seeds and discuss agricultural matters. Appearing first in Kansai in 1875, 
gatherings of this type quickly became common across the country, reaching Miyagi and 
other far-flung regions by the decade's end.185 Bringing together landowning farmers 
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spurred by their own initiative to pursue the development of agriculture, the organizers of 
these meetings represented local incarnations of the rōnō type who made up in 
enthusiasm and activity what they lacked in advanced technical knowledge.  
The success of these early meetings and their evolution into local agricultural 
associations were marked from the beginning by the cooperation between rōnō and the 
local elites inherited from the Tokugawa era. The first nōkai (agricultural association) is 
said to have been established by an Aichi district head and rōnō named Furuhashi 
Genrokurō.186 Son of a man ranked among the "three exceptional farmers" (santokunō) of 
the Edo period, Furuhashi organized meetings of the rōnō in his district every spring and 
fall to share and spread their accumulated agricultural wisdom. He moved toward more 
concrete efforts at organization in the 1880s, taking advantage of changes in local 
administrative structure to establish agricultural discussion groups in each village of the 
district. His successes in these efforts earned him the attention of prefectural authorities, 
who seized on his model and encouraged the formation of similar groups in each of 
Aichi's districts.187 Furuhashi's activities were far from unique. In similar patterns, rōnō 
meibōka across Japan leveraged their positions in local government to promote meetings 
of farmers and lay down the foundations for lasting agricultural organizations.188  
These meetings and groups of local farmers proved even more interesting to officials 
than even the rōnō who organized them and who were becoming integral to agricultural 
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policy by the mid-1880s. Aiming at the cultivation of willingness in much the same way 
as Maeda had suggested, central officials took early note of rōnō organizational success 
and attempted to replicate their efforts on a larger scale. As Aichi officials had done with 
Furuhashi's groups, the central government often piggybacked on such autonomous 
organizing. In the 1880s, agricultural officials followed a policy of promoting the 
establishment of local agricultural discussion meetings, competitive fairs, and similar 
events in order to demonstrate to farmers the benefits of the Western agricultural 
techniques upon which they hung their hopes.189 The cooperative activities of officials 
and rōnō derived in part from the concerns shared by both groups. They each saw village 
poverty as a dire threat and held a common interest in minimizing the local difficulties 
arising from the commercialization of agriculture, which included the spread of absentee 
landlordism in economically advanced regions. At this stage, the confluence between 
landowners and officials moved toward the same goal of the well-being of rural society 
writ large. This unity fell apart, however, in the particular means that each envisioned for 
the goal, as well as in the specifics of what "well-being" meant. 
 The commercialization of farming and the expansion of agricultural capitalism 
created challenges that attracted the attention of officials and rōnō alike and demonstrated 
the interests shared by the two groups. The change to the payment of land taxes in cash 
tied producers to markets more profoundly than ever before and combined with the 
disintegration of systemic controls on rice production. The maximization of production 
became the governing preoccupation of rice farmers everywhere. The new tax laws were 
nakedly exploitative, but the freshly-opened markets served the purpose of firing the 
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ambitions of the most economically marginalized elements of society and sending them 
rushing off to work in pursuit of an imagined windfall. The exclusive focus on increasing 
production that resulted took an immediate toll on quality. In Miyagi, perennial 
difficulties with the drying and storage of rice worsened the downward trend, and by 
1877 grain from the prefecture had fallen to the lowest grading on the Tokyo Rice 
Exchange. Quality continued to fall thereafter, and Miyagi farmers soon faced the very 
real possibility that their rice would be dropped from the exchange altogether. 
The response to the looming rice crisis in Miyagi exposed both the shared interests 
of the prefectural government and landowning farmers, and the gulf that separated the 
practical concerns of prefectural officials from the grand plans of their counterparts in 
Tokyo. Matsudaira Masanao, then at the beginning of what would be remembered as an 
assertive and effective term as Miyagi's governor, issued a set of compulsory regulations 
for the threshing and grading of rice in 1878.190 Ostensibly targeting "gangs of dishonest 
merchants" (kanshō furyō no to) who soaked rice in water or added chaff to filled sacks 
to increase their weight, the rules represented the first direct application of punitive legal 
force to the production of rice.191 They required that all rice shipments leaving the 
prefecture be subject to official inspection and imposed legal penalties for non-
compliance, stipulating that police reports be immediately filed and legal action proceed 
with haste.192 The measures quickly proved effective. The quality of rice leaving the 
prefecture improved, securing its place on the Tokyo exchange. In spite of its explicit 
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condemnation of the practices of rice merchants (a role that many a landlord-farmer still 
filled at this point), the lack of protest or resistance toward the regulations attested to the 
harmony of government goals and landlord interests.  
Government stewardship over the quality of rice in Miyagi was short-lived. Pointing 
to clauses in the regulations that referred to farmers as "peasants" (hyakkushōdomo), 
central officials condemned the regulations as "feudal" and in 1881 ordered the prefecture 
to rescind them and return to the earlier system of unregulated rice.193 The charge of 
"feudalism" seems suspect (or at least ironic) in the face of both the Meiji government's 
exploitation of the countryside for tax income and the directions that agricultural policy 
would take at the end of the century. The Ministry's refusal of a proposal from a Tokyo 
rice producers union to establish similar regulations the same year point to a general 
unwillingness to risk the public ire that direct involvement in private production might 
provoke.194 As it was, the abolition of the regulations ended the brief recovery of Miyagi 
rice. The collapse of rice prices in the early 1880s joined the ongoing pressures generated 
by encroaching market forces in encouraging Miyagi landlords to again turn a blind eye 
to quality as they struggled for their livelihood. The progress made while the regulations 
were in effect and the universality of the difficulties facing rice farmers nationwide 
ensured that Miyagi grain held onto its place on the Tokyo exchange, but the quality 
problems persisted and cast a shadow stretching into the new century. 
While its immediate significance was limited, the attempt to regulate rice quality in 
Miyagi provides a revealing glimpse of the relationships between government policy, 
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agricultural capitalism, and farming populations, and hints at the future course of the 
central government's administration of agriculture. It was, in essence, an attempt by the 
prefectural government to mediate capitalism and its effects on rice production. At the 
same time, it was a response to an earlier intervention in the operation of capitalist 
markets on segments of the farming population. The jealous guarding on the part of large 
landowners and rice merchants (sometimes a single individual) of the profits that the 
ending of Edo-era restrictions and the advance of new markets made possible altered the 
shape of economic relations at the village level. Tenants and smallholders, concerned 
only with meeting (if possible, exceeding) rents, did not in the kind of market that 
provided greater rewards for higher quality products. They were trapped in a survival-
based economic system that resembled the simplified interpretation of Iwakura more than 
the comparatively complex model of Maeda. Cut off from the potential for profit, less 
affluent farmers focused solely on maximizing quantity in order to cover rent, debt, or 
taxes and to provide a surplus that could be exchanged locally or stored away against 
future misfortune. It was a very limited participation in capitalism, representing more a 
desperate attempt to manage the collateral damage from market wars conducted far afield 
than the pursuit of profit in the new market environment.  
The Miyagi rice regulations were aimed squarely at these marginal producers, whose 
response to the predatory monopolies of landlords and rice merchants threatened the 
interests of those who had forced their hands. The exploitative opportunism of these 
economically dominant figures shielded smaller producers from the imperatives of 
quality that would have been a function of raw capitalism, and the prefectural rules 




allowing access to the profits that would normally accrue from doing so. They attempted 
to project the appearance of capitalist production on a system that functioned (or did not) 
quite differently. In effect, tenants and smallholders were suffering from serial 
interventions in the functioning of capitalism to their disadvantage, first from landlord 
monopolization of profits, then from government regulations. That the attempted 
regulations failed in Miyagi was a product of the extraordinary economic and political 
conditions at the time. When these conditions changed, so too did the official attitude 
toward intervention in agriculture and private production. 
While central bureaucrats argued over the course of agricultural policy and local 
officials struggled with the practical promotion of agriculture, a new push for 
consolidation and centralization was transforming farming organizations nationwide. 
Figures on the fringes of government in Tokyo reached out to the networks of rōnō and 
local farmers that agricultural policy centered on and built the bases for nationwide 
organizations of farmers. This was the context in which the Dai Nihon nōkai was formed.  
The founding of the Dai Nihon nōkai marked a transition point in the development of 
agricultural organizations in the Meiji period and augured the course of relations between 
official institutions and private groups for the rest of the century. The society's roots lay 
in two earlier organizations that crossed the boundaries between public and private in 
convoluted ways. The Tōyō nōkai (Oriental Agricultural Society) emerged in Chiba in 
1879 around the government-run Shimofusa Sheep Ranch (Shimafusa bokuyōjō), 
founded in the same year. Organized by the first class of graduates from the facility's 
educational program, the society was led by ranch head Iwayama Keigi and counted 




among its members.195 As the Tōyō nōkai was meeting in Chiba, the Tōkyō dannōkai 
(Tokyo Agricultural Discussion Association) brought agriculturalists together in the 
capital. In a pattern closely reflecting that of the Chiba organization, the Dannōkai was 
centered on the semi-official Mita Crop Nursery and drew on figures associated with the 
facility, as well as other bureaucrats, for the bulk of its membership.196
 
Both the Tōyō nōkai and the Tōkyō dannōkai were products of their time, but in their 
structure and membership, they pointed to a new direction in agricultural organization. 
Attached to officially sponsored agricultural testing centers, the groups shared links to the 
adoption of Western agricultural methods that formed the basis for government policy at 
the time. It was the ways in which they diverged from the official philosophy, however, 
that aligned them with the emerging thought of progressive bureaucrats like Maeda 
Masana and set them upon the path toward the foundation of the Dai Nihon nōkai.  
While central bureaucrats held prominent positions in both the Tokyo and Chiba 
groups, a striking common feature was their inclusion of rōnō and other farmers in their 
ranks. In addition to the notable farmers who had been employed as educators at the 
Shimofusa ranch, the Tōyō nōkai's membership also included ranchers and farmers from 
the surrounding area.197 Private farmers had an even more foundational place in the 
Tōkyō dannōkai. The group had evolved from weekly discussion meetings of local 
farmers held at the home of seed-dealer and agriculture booster Ozawa Kihei and the 
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periodic seed exchange meetings and rōnō conferences that grew from these.198 In 
including farmers who had no formal affiliation with the central government and existing 
as voluntary groups divorced from official business, both organizations established a 
model for membership based on practical experience and set a precedent for meaningful 
cooperation between officials and non-officials in agricultural development.199 These 
ideas formed a cornerstone of Maeda Masana's thought in Kōgyō iken and played a key 
role in the efforts that Maeda later put into the formation and development of a central 
agricultural organization that would coordinate the efforts of similar local groups 
throughout the country. 
The Second National Industrial Promotion Exposition (Dai-2 kai naikoku kangyō 
hakurankai) (March 1 – June 30, 1881) in Tokyo provided the setting for the 
transformation of the two smaller groups into the Dai Nihon nōkai. The immediate 
stimulus for the formation of the new organization was a discussion meeting set up by the 
Agriculture and Commerce Ministry Agricultural Bureau Head Nagaoka Shōsuke to 
which he had invited up to three rōnō from each prefecture.200 The purpose of the event, 
according to Nagaoka, was "to discuss (kenron) the practices of each region and the 
opinions of each attendant, to investigate (kōkyū) their advantages and disadvantages, and 
to foster a spirit of competitiveness and progress (kyōshin no kisei).”201 Apparently 
impressed with the meeting, the official interest it demonstrated, and the opportunity it 
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offered, leaders from the Tōyō nōkai and Tōkyō dannōkai held discussions of their own 
at the Exposition and agreed to merge their groups. They moved quickly, laying out the 
new association's regulations, electing its officers, soliciting members far and wide, and 
setting up its headquarters at the Mita Crop Nursery before the Exposition had closed its 
gates.202  
The circumstances surrounding the foundation of the Dai Nihon Nōkai highlight the 
key features of the group at its inception. Continuing along the developmental paths of its 
progenitor groups, it represented an evolutionary progression in agricultural thought that 
retained many of the features of the conservative philosophies of bureaucrats even as it 
set out in new directions. From its formation, the association displayed the familiar 
veneer of official endorsement applied to self-motivated and privately funded 
developmental activities. Its establishment by means of a private donation by Agricultural 
Bureau head Nagaoka Shōsuke highlights the group's combination of public and 
private.203 The extensive list of government bureaucrats that held membership outside 
their official capacities ensured that the group remained closely tied to government 
administration, while the ostensibly private nature of the group obviated any claim on 
official funding. It duplicated official policy toward agriculture and rural administration 
in miniature.  
The informal ties that bound the Dai Nihon nōkai to the government ensured that, at 
least in the first decade of its existence, it cleaved closely to the thought guiding 
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government officials. The 1880s saw a continuous stream of interactions between the 
organization and the central government. The Agriculture and Commerce, Finance, 
Home, and Imperial Household Ministries paid the group to undertake a range of testing 
activities, publish official reports, and take over operations at official agricultural 
facilities, bestowing upon it commendations, monetary awards, and even a headquarters 
building.204 The potential for radical innovation in the organization's goals and methods 
was accordingly muted. The Dai Nihon nokai's new focus on the useful knowledge 
among the larger mass of the farming population did not at this point signal as great a 
break with policymakers' top-down approach to farming villages as would come later. 
For all the appreciative words that its organizers spoke about local rōnō and their 
experience-based knowledge, the association was initially intended primarily as an 
instrument to transmit the plans and goals of the Agriculture and Commerce Ministry 
down to local farmers, experienced and otherwise, that comprised its membership on the 
local level.205 Ensconced in government facilities and undertaking official commissions, 
much of the Dai Nihon nōkai's effort went to the program of Western-style modernization 
whose failings were drawing the ire of Maeda and other forward-looking bureaucrats. 
The organization hinted at a new direction in public-private relations concerning 
agriculture in the meaningful autonomy that non-official members of the group exercised. 
This autonomy was evident from the association's earliest roots in the officially-
sponsored meeting of rōnō from all prefectures. The participants were not celebrity 
innovators like Funatsu or Hayashi, whose proselytizing efforts were even then being 
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coopted by officials. They were rather landowning farmers whose fame, if it ever existed, 
was limited to their local area and likely had more to do with the economic success of 
their farms than any efforts to develop and disseminate improved techniques. The 
representatives from Miyagi, two landowners from the Tōda district who left behind no 
evidence of remarkable agricultural achievement, were typical of the attendees.206 Still, it 
was the economic success of these local farmers that made them attractive to agricultural 
officials. The rōnō congress was intended to distill their experiences into a formula that 
could be applied far and wide, a goal enshrined even more clearly in the Agriculture and 
Commerce Ministry's abortive plans the following year to create an official clone to the 
Dai Nihon nōkai in an Industrial Promotion Council (Kangyōin) enlisting "wealthy 
merchants" (gōshō) and "rich farmers" (funō).207 Irrespective of the Nōkai's subsequent 
efforts to toe the government line in reproducing foreign agricultural techniques, the 
importance of rōnō to organizers both official and otherwise was in the association of 
prosperity with practical expertise in farming. 
The local rōnō meibōka who attended the 1881 congress and went on to make up the 
wider membership of the Dai Nihon nōkai had reasons of their own for participating. 
While they may not have been the brilliant and selfless agricultural innovators with 
which the term was popularly associated, they did represent a distinctive slice of rural 
society and shared a particular set of interests. From the beginnings of their involvement 
with the Nōkai, these landowning farmers inserted their interests into their agricultural 
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discussions. Along with the more prosaic answers the assembled rōnō offered to the 
scripted questions put to them by the organizers of the 1881 congress, they emphasized 
their acute concern about the negative impact of the inroads of capitalist markets on the 
quality of rice. Echoing the justifications presented earlier by Miyagi in defense of its 
quality regulations, they called for official support for a course of corrective treatment 
that included agricultural discussion groups, production promotion organizations, product 
exhibitions, agricultural unions, and the improvement of landlord-tenant relations.208 
Officials may have seen them as a resource for the betterment of agriculture and Nagaoka 
could talk of fostering their spirit of competitiveness to excite an Iwakuraesque hunger 
for honor, but the landlord-rōnō saw rich opportunities of their own in the Dai Nihon 
nōkai and its official connections.  
Government attention to, recognition of, and eventually active support for 
agricultural groups of rural landlords gave these figures an increasingly effective means 
of exploiting these opportunities. Two additional changes instituted by the central 
government fostered the growing intimacy between government offices and the Dai 
Nihon nōkai to strengthen the position of landlords in the 1880s. The first was a May 
1884 ordinance abolishing elections for the leadership of districts, towns, and villages 
(ku, ko, chō, son) and making them appointed positions. Undeniably a step backwards for 
meaningful local autonomy, the tightness with which it bound the landlords appointed to 
these offices to prefectural and national officials presented them with a new avenue 
through which to interact with higher levels of administration. Further official recognition 
and political opportunity for landlords and rice merchants came in the form of the 
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Industrial Association Standards (Dōgyō kumiai junsoku) and the Rice Dealer 
Association Regulation Standards (Beishō kumiai kisoku junsoku) passed in 1884 and 
1885. Providing official recognition for groups that landlords had begun to organize on 
their own, they opened a doorway for the kind of intervention in market conditions that 
the central government had objected to so strongly when undertaken by the Miyagi 
prefectural government. Only three years after the Agriculture and Commerce Ministry 
dismantled Governor Matsudaira's rice quality regulations, the Neighboring Village 
League Rice Dealer Association (Moyori chōson rengō beishō kumiai), a Miyagi 
organization formed under the provisions of the new laws, imposed their own system of 
rice inspections. Establishing inspection stations at exit points around the prefecture, they 
enforced quality standards on rice bound for outside domestic markets in a pattern that 
differed from the earlier prefectural system only in its official, but indirect, endorsement 
by the central government.209  
In subcontracting the enforcement of quality to landlords, the officials in Tokyo were 
doing more than skirting charges of overly intrusive involvement in local affairs. They 
were making use of the informal, but coercive, power that landlords naturally held over 
their tenants, relying upon them (with a confidence arising from the knowledge that 
landlords shared their interest in improving rice quality) to bring about the ends desired 
by central officials. The bureaucrats involved demonstrated no concern over the 
resemblance between this direct authority of landlords over tenants and the feudalism that 
was the justification for the erasure of Miyagi government's rice regulations. The new 
style of decentralized regulations was as attractive to government officials as they were to 
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the landlords who created and enforced them. The central government was able to avoid 
charges of onerous interference in local matters by leaving the regulation of quality up to 
independent but officially-recognized local groups whose members derived immediate 
benefits from their enforcement. 
Under these favorable administrative conditions, the middle years of the 1880s saw 
an explosion of landlord-led and staffed agricultural organizations. Nōkai branches 
opened in dozens of prefectures, adding to the scores of existing landlord and merchant 
groups. The first appeared in Akita only months after the formation of the central group 
in December of 1881, followed by branches in Kyōto, Yamanashi, Gifu, Tokushima, and 
Gunma the following year.210 At first organized independently, the groups soon found 
themselves the objects of intrusive attention from local governments. The Miyagi 
government locked the rapidly expanding agricultural associations in the prefecture under 
its authority in 1883, assigning responsibility for the establishment and supervision of 
agricultural promotion associations to each district, city, town, and village in the 
prefecture.211 The form that the authorities imposed at that time anticipated the later shape 
of the fully realized Dai Nihon nōkai of the 1890s, with a cell-like arrangement of two or 
three representatives of each village group collectively comprising the membership of the 
district group, each of which then contributed similar numbers to make up the prefectural 
version of the organization.212
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Despite their initially rapid spread, fortunes soon turned for the new crop of 
agricultural associations. The most obvious challenge was economic. The fiscal austerity 
policies of the Matsukata Deflation and their devastating effects on rice prices drove rural 
communities deeper into poverty, and support for nōkai, production unions, and similar 
organizations faded as members no longer had the money to pay their dues. In the case of 
the Dai Nihon nōkai, the group's continuing commitment to the officially-promoted but 
unimplementable techniques and technologies of Western Europe and North America and 
its failure to follow through on its early promise to refocus agricultural development 
toward practical, native farming compounded the difficulties presented by the 
recession.213 The success that the group's early organizing efforts enjoyed quickly 
dissipated in the latter half of the 1880s as branch after local branch suspended 
operations. 1886 alone saw the collapse of five regional nōkai and the withdrawal of the 
commission to run the operations at the Mita Nursery, the crest of similar developments 
that greatly limited the local penetration of the organization by the decade's end.214 By 
1891 (when, in fact, the worst was over and the associations were beginning to come 
back into prominence) former Finance Ministry official Shibusawa Kisaku bemoaned the 
state of agricultural associations and their experimental stations in five prefectures. "In all 
these places, even though the experimental stations and kumiai management offices 
seemed to have had some effect when they were first set up, for one reason or another as 
days passed they eventually took on a degraded form. Today, it has come to the point 
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where their effectiveness has all but disappeared. "215 Tamari Kizō, reminiscing a decade 
later, issued an even broader damnation. The deterioration by the close of the 1880s, he 
claimed, was such that "the efforts of bureaucrats and the people ended in failure and it 
became a time when the idea of agricultural improvement was completely abandoned."216
 
The hardships that agricultural organization and general improvement efforts 
suffered proved short-lived. The new decade brought with it an end to recession and a 
resurgence in rice prices that galvanized the hard-nosed group of landlords who had 
survived the bloodletting of the 1880s with their landholdings intact and the newly risen 
landlords who had found opportunity in adversity. The return to prosperity brought new 
life to agricultural associations; but not a simple return to the fold of delinquent members. 
Rising landlords emerged as leaders shaping what was, for all intents and purposes, a new 
movement for agricultural organization. Their economic strength bolstered, they turned to 
dispense with two threats that had come to the fore as landlord power waned under the 
trying conditions of the late 1880s. The first of these came from the increasingly large 
number of tenants and the implications of the market economy for their place in rural 
society. The commercialization of rice imposed stresses on villages and tied the price of 
grain to distant market forces, but this could also be an opportunity for tenants, who 
could respond to price jumps faster than their rents could be raised. Producers' 
associations represented means both of opposing the empowerment of tenants by market 
opportunities and of organizing landlords in preemptive opposition to potential tenant 
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conflicts and the development of tenants' movements.217 The second threat felt by 
landlords came from grain merchants. Before the shocks of the Matsukata Deflation, 
agricultural associations brought together producers and marketers of grain, two strata 
with overlapping but not necessarily complementary interests. The hierarchical structure 
of these groups reflected the monopoly over rice sales that dealers gained with the rise of 
the speculative rice markets.218 Merchants assumed positions of power in the associations, 
forcing landlords to acquiesce when conflicts arose and consigning the interests of 
smallholders and tenants to a distant third place.219 The newly formed groups of the 1890s 
aimed to redress the imbalances of their predecessors. Landlords provided aggressive 
leadership, creating producer-centered groups that aimed for increased production (rather 
than increased prices) and pushed to the periphery the merchants who were even then 
completing their wresting of control over grain marketing from landlords. 
The first indications of this new kind of organization in Miyagi appeared in 1890. A 
coalition of large landlords (defined by landholdings of over 50 hectares (chō), a class 
newly born in Miyagi but growing at a notable rate) crafted plans for a prefecture-wide 
Agricultural Improvement Union (Nōji kairyō kumiai) to be composed of farmers owning 
twenty or more hectares of land as compulsory members and open to willing participants 
holding five or more hectares.220 The group experienced rapid success in rehabilitating 
the prefecture's poor reputation, its formation leading to an increase in confidence in 
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Miyagi grain on the Tokyo Rice Exchange and earning praise from the Agriculture and 
Commerce Ministry as a unique and effective organization.221 Similar groups soon 
formed in regions across the country. The first of a new brand of hierarchically-structured 
nōkai (keitō nōkai) appeared in Kyoto in 1891. Closely resembling the Miyagi 
government's consolidation of agricultural associations in the 1880s, the Kyoto group 
installed nōkai in villages across the prefecture, subordinated them to district nōkai, and 
set a prefectural nōkai at the top of the entire structure.222 Farmers in other regions took 
Kyoto's organization as their model and these hierarchies of local, district, and prefectural 
associations began to appear across the country. 
Initially, the new landlord-led associations surged past the lethargic Dai Nihon 
Nōkai, but the older organization soon took note of their success and reoriented itself to 
work in tandem with them. Until 1892, the activities of the Dai Nihon nōkai were limited 
to the publication of its monthly journal and the holding of semi-annual product fairs.223 
Recognizing the direction the new nōkai were taking, the associations became cognizant 
of the need for fundamental restructuring in order to become the centrally coordinating 
group for the rapidly spreading local organizations. To accomplish this transformation, 
the Dai Nihon nōkai appointed as its secretary-general Maeda Masana, who had retired 
from official service in frustration to become a "one-man alternative to the Ministry of 
Agriculture and Commerce," and assigned him the task of heading up an aggressive 
campaign for the nationwide establishment of hierarchically-structured nōkai linked to 
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itself at the apex.224 By 1893, the Dai Nihon nōkai had made up the ground lost during its 
period of decline and inactivity and stood at the top of a structure incorporating 26 
prefectural, 212 district, and 1,824 village nōkai.225 It built on this early success, 
developing an aggressive program to promote the establishment of affiliate organizations 
in every region. From 1893-1894, association councilors Ikeda Kenzō, Tamari Kizō, 
Yokoi Toshiyoshi, and Sawano Jun, member Hida Rōichi, and special advisor (and 
celebrated rōnō) Ishikawa Rikinosuke travelled around the entire country to aid in the 
formation and linking of groups to the Dai Nihon nōkai and in the dissemination of 
agricultural knowledge and advanced techniques.226 Meeting with success, the 
organization distributed guidelines for attaching existing associations to itself and 
distributed them across the country in the summer of 1894. By the middle of the decade, 
its reach extended into every corner of Japan and nōkai, like many other mid-Meiji local 
organizations, were becoming locked into a nationwide hierarchical organization. 
Reaching out and bringing together regional agricultural organizations under its 
central leadership was only one aspect of the reinvigorated Dai Nihon nōkai's activities in 
the 1890s. As important was a parallel thrust to gain recognition, funding, and 
sympathetic legislation from the the central government. This represented a reversal in 
the location of initiative. In contrast to the pattern of the 1880s in which Maeda and other 
officials organized events and helped plan for the formation of agricultural groups, in the 
1890s the leaders of the Dai Nihon nōkai (many of whom had been officials during the 
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prior phase) embarked on an aggressive program of lobbying the government for legal 
changes and recognition. They were aided in this quest by the newly created Imperial 
Diet. Filled with the same rural landlords and independent farmers who were the 
backbone of the nōkai movement, the Lower House played host to the debates and 
conflicts that surrounded the perennial submission of proposals for an Agricultural 
Association Law (Nōkaihō). The contents of these proposals remained relatively 
consistent and reflected the key interests of the Dai Nihon nōkai. As outlined in the first 
proposal of 1891, they included official support for local agricultural events, official 
mediation in the sharing and exchange of key farm inputs like seeds and fertilizer, official 
support for agricultural testing stations, government publication and dissemination of 
nōkai farming reports, and regular communications between officials and nōkai 
leaders.227 Although success eluded these efforts until 1899, some figures in the central 
government quickly proved receptive to the appeals for recognition and support. Taking 
issue with Shibusawa Kisaku's condemnation of agricultural organizations as useless in 
1891, Agriculture and Commerce official Sakō Tsuneaki voiced his own opinion the 
following year that the Dai Nihon nōkai and its affiliated local groups served an 
important purpose and that the government should support them and enact laws to aid in 
their work.228
 
In advocating official support for the Dai Nihon nōkai and its local affiliates, 
officials were responding to the changing political circumstances of the times and 
continuing the strategy that had guided the central administration of the countryside since 
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the abolition of the Tokugawa-era domains. Central to both aims were rural landlords and 
their involvement in nōkai. Landlords formed the core of the new agricultural 
organizations, taking positions that promised both to contribute to the ongoing 
government mission of agricultural improvement on the cheap and to replace their 
political combativeness – on clear and disturbing display in the Freedom and Popular 
Rights Movement of the 1870s and 1880s – with the central concern of profiting from 
agricultural development. Revisions to the Land Tax and the convening of the Imperial 
Diet had worked toward the latter goal, purchasing a degree of political quietude by the 
early 1890s.229 In pursuit of the former goal, officials extended new consideration for the 
concerns of landlords and support for their organizations. An early nod toward the 
interests informing the new associations came with the 1890 National Industrial 
Promotion Exposition, which signaled a change in official policy away from the heavily-
criticized drive to impose technologically advanced models of Western farming toward 
the fostering and spread of native techniques.230 Officials also busied themselves with 
promoting the further spread and organization of the farmers groups that popped up 
autonomously in the early 1890s. Along with the commendations offered by the 
Agriculture and Commerce Ministry for the organizational efforts of landlords in Miyagi 
and elsewhere, prefectural governments threw their weight behind nōkai. As had the 
administrations of Kyoto and Miyagi, the governor of Niigata began an official push in 
1892 to encourage the formation of groups of large landlords and induce them to apply 
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their substantial resources toward the establishment of a prefectural keitō nōkai in a move 
that became increasingly common.231
 
Nōkai also attracted the attentions of officials with their promise as a means of 
depoliticizing rural areas. The political activism that had characterized the Freedom and 
Popular Rights Movement in the previous decades prompted an extensive course of 
government countermeasures to quell the political passions of rural landlords and ensure 
that they would not boil over again. Reform of the land tax and land registry systems and 
the promulgation of the Meiji constitution, with its qualified nod to the suffrage of rural 
landlords, all represented successful attempts by government leaders to drain energy from 
disruptive political opposition. The nōkai presented another means to deal with the new 
forms of political contrariness that arose with the convening of the Diet. For the leaders 
of the government-backed "bureaucratic parties" (ritō) in the Lower House, a centrally-
administered agricultural association could be an effective tool for binding the assertive 
landlords who challenged them as members of the so-called "people's parties" (mintō) to 
an organization tied in various ways to the central government.232 The Dai Nihon nōkai 
seemed to be just what many were looking for. 
Evolving to keep pace with the changes unfolding below it in local areas and above it 
in the halls of the central government, Maeda's active leadership took the group in a new 
direction in 1894 that brought a fracture into two parts and expelled its conservative 
elements in a move to press for dramatic changes in the pervading order. The first turning 
point came in the summer. At a special assembly on the fifteenth of June, the disposition 
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of sixteen key issues concerning agriculture was identified as the overriding mission of 
the Dai Nihon nōkai. Reiterating earlier calls for solutions to rural debt; institutions to 
facilitate the purchase and exchange of seeds, tools and fertilizer; and means of 
encouraging farmers to save their earnings, this new program added items that reflected 
the centrality of landlord-meibōka in the organization and represented an aggressive 
defense of their interests. Among the goals that the group now dedicated itself to were the 
domestic replacement of imported secondary agricultural products like cotton, soy beans, 
and sugar (as well as encouragement of underemployed tenants and smallholders to take 
up this secondary production), incentives for wealthy farmers to undertake agricultural 
improvements, and unspecified mechanisms to compel smaller farmers and tenants to 
move from over- to underpopulated regions "without complaint" (naigai o ronzezu).233 
These initiatives highlighted the new concerns that directed the Dai Nihon nōkai. 
Alongside a nationalistic, and potentially profitable, opposition to the importation of 
foreign agricultural products were calls for laws compelling economically vulnerable 
farmers to adopt methods of production favored by the group, and for official funds and 
other benefits to encourage landlords to pursue improvement. In its 1894 meeting, the 
Dai Nihon nōkai announced its position as the advocate of landlord interests and its 
mission to lobby for official support for them. 
The course-change of the summer led to a rupture at the year's end. Not everyone in 
the association stood behind Maeda's new direction and discontent deepened through the 
autumn in those who resented the abandonment of the organization's original goals and 
methods. Tensions between the discontented and the authors of their unhappiness came to 
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a head during the All-Japan Agricultural Conference (Zenkoku nōji taikai) in Tokyo in 
1894. Seeing close cooperation with the government in the creation of centrally-
coordinated hierarchical keitō nōkai as a reduction of the Dai Nihon nōkai to a tool of 
central bureaucrats, a faction in the leadership council around Yokoi Tokiyoshi claimed 
the group's name and remade themselves as a research-oriented organization tied to the 
Komaba Agricultural School.234 Maeda and the other leaders retained leadership over the 
rest of the members, who comprised most of the association, and continued with the plans 
they had crafted for a nationwide network of nōkai. At a general meeting in April of 
1894, their group adopted the name of Zenkoku nōji shokai chūō honbu (National 
Headquarters of Agricultural Associations), simplified in 1900 to the enduring Zenkoku 
nōjikai (National Agricultural Association).235 
Geopolitical conflict and the shattering of the longstanding Sinocentric Asian 
international order by Japan's victory in the Sino-Japanese War of 1894-1895 provided 
the opportunity for the new organization to advance its agenda. The costs that the war 
imposed on villages and the heightened sense of crisis and responsibility that officials felt 
in its wake strengthened the attention paid to the Zenkoku nōjikai and made its plans 
more attractive to central planners. Lamentations concerning "distressed villages" 
(nanson) became a common refrain in the halls of government, the troubled communities 
presenting a spectrum of potential threats ranging from the stalling of economic 
development to the incubation of rebellion. The sources of these difficulties exposed the 
flaws in the thinking at the basis of government policy and gave new credence to the 
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ideas that Maeda Masana had first voiced over a decade earlier. The connection of food 
production to markets both national and international and the ties of the rural economy to 
financial centers in Tokyo and other capitals around the world demonstrated the 
impossibility of the self-sufficient and depoliticized villages dreamt of by officials. 
Market forces affected by war and exploitative tax expropriations drove farmers who had 
been producing enough to feed themselves into poverty and starvation.  
Not all the challenges to village prosperity after the war grew out of macroeconomic 
forces. Rates of absentee landlordism jumped in the late 1890s, adding urgency to a 
problem that had long been lamented by officials.236 Non-resident landlords presented a 
dual threat to village prosperity and development. Their relations to the villages in which 
they owned land were limited to economic extraction, and they removed scarce local 
resources that were needed for farming improvement and local administration. At the 
same time, they occupied the economic position of landlords, but, as non-residents, they 
took on none of the social, administrative, or developmental responsibilities that officials 
attached to meibōka and that villages required to achieve self-sufficiency. Absentee 
landlords were in effect anti-meibōka, and their spread turned the attention of government 
to the resident landlords in the Zenkoku nōjikai and the local nōkai with which it was 
affiliated. 
With attention in the capital focused on agricultural villages and official coffers flush 
with reparations from the defeated Qing rulers of China, the Zenkoku nōjikai intensified 
its efforts toward the reform of agricultural policy. It continued upon the course that had 
led to the rupture in the Dai Nihon nōkai and, informed by the increasingly important 
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influence of the landlord-meibōka that made up its membership base, pushed off in new 
directions. The resolutions passed at the 1896 All-Japan Agricultural Conference picked 
up the themes voiced two years earlier and added to them a call for the central 
government to fund the agricultural awards that had been a defining feature of the Dai 
Nihon nōkai since the 1880s.237 A minor concession requesting little more than the 
coverage of the minimal financial costs associated with the product shows and awards 
that were becoming popular among nōkai, this demand in fact represented an attempt to 
abdicate financial responsibility for what was then a central aspect of agricultural 
improvement and a defining function of the earlier incarnation of the association. The list 
of attendees of the meeting at which this new call was made exposed the roots of the 
change. Breaking from the trend shown in previous conferences, the 1896 event saw 
landlord-meibōka representatives from local nōkai, a group defined by their economic 
interests and one that was reluctant to direct private resources toward village 
development in the abstract, replace the random collection of agriculturally-minded 
individuals that had peopled the earlier meetings.238  
The general meeting of the following year stated even more explicitly the 
commitment of the Zenkoku nōjikai to this new direction. The pursuit of government 
funding for local agricultural lecture halls and experimentation stations and a reduction in 
the tax for registering paddyland took precedence over matters of actual farming 
improvement, clear hallmarks of the influence of local landlords.239 Calls for legal change 
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also came to the fore. Along with the annual push for an Agricultural Association Law, 
the meeting produced a resolution to pursue an Arable Land Reorganization Law (Kōchi 
seirihō). These twin aims of official support for landlord-led improvement in the forms of 
government funding and legislation defined the Zenkoku nōjikai's activities for the rest of 
the decade. 
Organizationally, the Zenkoku nōjikai tightened its links with local branches and 
firmed up the hierarchical structure linking them together. It redrew the administrative 
map of Japan in 1895, dividing the country into eight major agricultural districts (nōku). 
Meetings of the groups heading up the new districts followed soon after, with Tōhoku's 
Coastal Agricultural District Association (Riku nōku nōkai) gathering for the first time in 
Yamagata in September of 1895, while prefectural nōkai continued their work testing 
new tools and methods, establishing model farms, and spreading information downwards 
through district and village nōkai.240 Vigorous efforts to install nōkai in every corner of 
the country were also ongoing. Noted rōnō and Dai Nihon nōkai/Zenkoku nōjikai 
spokesman Ishikawa Rikinosuke proselytized for the organization in his native Akita, 
extolling the benefits that nōkai offered farmers and nation alike with a utopian formula: 
"when we connect the house and the village to the district and the prefecture, we will 
enrich the state and it won't be difficult to bring our spirits close to paradise."241 The 
image was one that harkened back to Maeda's time as an official and illustrated the 
Zenkoku nōjikai's vision of its place as a bridge connecting the central and the local. In 
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his original critique of industrial policy in the 1880s, Maeda had declared that, "if [we] 
don't build village strength, there will not be enough strength in the district. If there is not 
enough strength in the district, there will not be enough strength in the prefecture. If there 
is not enough strength in the prefecture, national power cannot possibly reach its full 
fruition."242 As the century drew to a close, the Zenkoku nōjikai was poised to take up its 
position at the podium, conducting the orchestra of hierarchic nōkai in the symphony that 
aimed to remake agriculture in Japan. 
While the Zenkoku nōjikai lobbied for support from above and below, the central 
government was embarking on a new program of reaching out to landlords and local 
villages. The depressed economic conditions in the countryside following the war and 
concerns about newly formed tenants' organizations drove the agencies of the central 
government to take a more active stance toward village prosperity.243 At the same time, 
officials were loath to give up their particular vision of local autonomy with its ideals of 
long-distance rural governance and self-powered agricultural improvement. They found a 
means to negotiate between these conflicting concerns in the concerted promotion of 
gunze and chōsonze (district, town, and village plans). The plans were another idea 
prominent in the admonitions of Maeda a decade earlier. Foreseeing a time in the near 
future when Japan's development would crash headlong into barriers of overpopulation 
and insufficient food supply, he presented town and village plans as the means to "bring 
forth the strength of the village" and to ensure that the countryside and the nation that it 
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fed would survive the coming Malthusian challenges.244 By the end of the century, 
officials were prepared to embrace this aspect of Maeda's thought. Encouraging the 
formation of autonomous local groups to draft the policy plans for their towns and 
villages, Home Ministry bureaucrats identified a set of goals that included ending tax 
defaults, shoring up village and school assets, promoting thrift and savings among 
farmers, improving agriculture, spreading social education, and organizing youths and 
women.245 In addition to these stated goals, officials also hoped that involvement in 
planning the policies would cultivate a self-starting spirit (jihatsusei) and a sense of 
identification with the villages created by the local government system less than a decade 
earlier.246 While the particular form of the plans was new, they were in fact just a novel 
iteration of the tried and true guiding philosophy of ideological promotion in place of 
direct government aid or support. The active protection and cultivation of village life 
remained outside the concerns of the state, and the resources and work required to meet 
the government goals of restoring prosperity and increasing production largely continued 
to be the responsibility of villagers and farmers. 
While treading a familiar path with the promotion of town and village plans, 
government officials were also embarking on new forms of direct and substantive 
interaction with local communities. Their programs, however, showed a marked 
predilection for the wants and needs of landlords. In 1898, the Miyagi Agricultural and 
Industrial Bank (Miyagi nōkō ginkō) was established in Sendai as a prefectural subsidiary 
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of the Japan Hypothec and the Japan Agriculture and Industrial banks, founded the 
previous year. Ostensibly intended to ease farmer access to the capital needed to pursue 
improvements, the Miyagi bank displayed a distinctive focus on the interests of landlords. 
It offered loans at lower than half the interest rates charged by Miyagi landlord-
moneylenders, but the conditions disqualified many and worked directly for the benefit of 
large landlords. Loans required the staking of significant landholdings as collateral, 
which were packaged with the debt and sold to large landlords in the case of default, 
concentrating lands in the hands of the wealthiest members of rural society and 
consigning debtors to punishing tenancy terms. Any role for the bank as an engine for 
driving agricultural improvement was eclipsed by its actual function of providing 
landlords a means of expanding their holdings at a cost far below going rates.247
 
The central government made a full expression of its new commitment to the support 
of landlord-meibōka and their work toward the development of farming in a series of 
laws at the turn of the century that marked a fundamental shift in the nature of agriculture 
in Japan. Described collectively as measures for the "protection of the middle class of 
industrial and agricultural producers" (kōnō chūsan hōgō), this legal shift reflected the 
success of the Zenkoku nōjikai in achieving its goals under the leadership of Maeda and 
the increasingly strong influence of its landlord constituents. The major components of 
the legislative blitz were laws granting government funding to arable land reorganization 
(kōchi seiri) and agricultural experimentation stations in 1899; the Agricultural 
Association Law (Nōkaihō) in 1899, which granted both official recognition and a degree 
of authority to local nōkai; and the Industrial Cooperative Law (Sangyō kumiaihō) in 
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1900. The Civil Code of 1897, though not the result of landlord lobbying, provided a 
complementary backdrop for the new legal order, firming up property rights and 
strengthening the positions of landlords relative their tenants. 
In one sense, the new laws followed a familiar pattern, entrusting the solution of 
rural problems to the upper echelon of village society. Changed, however, was the degree 
of government involvement in this process. Decades of failure and ceaseless rural 
difficulties had made the inadequacy of the idea of truly self-sufficient villages clear to 
even the most unreceptive of officials and the ascent of landlord-meibōka drove the point 
home. Just as basic physical needs had not proven capable of ensuring that farmers would 
be productive and prosperous, government leaders now knew that a hunger for honor 
could not be counted on to drive the landlord-meibōka to improve their communities and 
foster the development of farming. The new laws were designed to compensate for this 
second failing, shoring up village landlords to enable them to fulfill the roles of meibōka 
and see to the rehabilitation of their distressed communities.248 They provided for the first 
time a formal basis for the amorphous position of meibōka, giving a legally concrete 
reality to a concept that had, for all its centrality to agricultural and rural policy over the 
previous two decades, been little more than a rhetorical abstraction. 
Along with this enshrining of ideals into law came a refinement in the vision of the 
meibōka who would receive government support in their newly-supported roles as 
intermediaries and local leaders. While Mayor Straw Sandals and other ideal meibōka 
continued to be appreciated for performing their functions as envisioned in the original 
conception of decentralized and self-powered village development, these figures were as 
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notable for their rarity as for their successes. If meibōka-led development were to power 
village development nationwide, it would have to be done through the more numerous, if 
less dedicated, landlord meibōka. These people were the "agricultural middle class" that 
the chūsan hōgō laws aimed to protect. Not a middle class in an economic sense, those 
referred to in the law were instead a stratum defined by their relationship to agricultural 
production and their function as a cushioning agent between the two more problematic 
strata of absentee landlords and tenant farmers. They were resident rural landlords who 
made at least token attempts to farm some part of their landholdings. As such, they 
maintained the connections to agriculture and tenant farmers that their non-resident 
cousins had lost, while retaining the deep personal interest in improvement derived from 
their land ownership that their tenants lacked. Their direct connection to farming was not 
the only feature of the middle class that attracted the interest of lawmakers, nor was it 
what brought wider support from an Imperial Diet with no shortage of absentee landlords. 
Bureaucrats and absentee landlords alike understood this "middle class" to offer a means 
of ensuring social harmony in villages as a "border wall class" (hanpeisō) standing 
between tenants and non-resident landlords (or rather standing in the empty spaces the 
latter group left in villages) and stifling the unrest that might otherwise arise.249
 
The legal changes at the end of the century fortifying this class with direct 
government support only succeeded after overcoming concerted and entrenched 
opposition. Many of the new laws had legacies stretching back a decade or more with 
records of continuous defeat. In the early years of the Diet, the laws often became 
casualties of party politics. Draft proposals for the Agricultural Association Law and for 
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funding for agricultural experimentation stations and rural credit unions were defeated in 
the clashes between the government and the popular political parties in the wake of the 
contentious second general election in 1891.250 Success at the end of the decade was not, 
however, simply a matter of hammering through these same laws. The influence of the 
rising landlords who became increasingly important in the Zenkoku nōjikai at mid-
decade and increasingly assertive in the Diet is clear in the refinements to the proposals 
and the expanding support they enjoyed. Plans to limit local nōkai significance and chain 
them to the operations of agricultural experimentation stations were abandoned, doing 
much to win over recalcitrant Diet members.251 Even as the Zenkoku nōjikai broke free of 
the constraints of the conservative wing of the Dai Nihon nōkai who had authored the 
abandoned plans, concentrating landlord-meibōka in an effective organization and 
moderating opposition from that quarter, the Sino-Japanese War and the village problems 
that followed it muted official opponents. The positive need to address rural poverty in 
the wake of the conflict coincided with the removal of the chronic shortage of funds that 
had long precluded active government commitment to agricultural development. The 
financial windfall of the war probably also played a role in aligning reluctant landlords 
with the cause. Landlords had been burned by the failure of government to follow 
through on its promises to fund development, as seen in the Entō affair in Miyagi, but 
newly flush official coffers likely convinced many that there might be some truth to the 
official commitment promised in the new laws. 
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The new willingness of landlord-politicians in the Diet and their counterparts in the 
Zenkoku Nōjikai to consider legal change did not signal passive acceptance of the plans 
of the organization's leaders and their government allies. The issue of precisely who the 
laws were to benefit brought forth challenge and conflict in the final run-up to the 
seminal legal change. Participants at the sixth All-Japan Agricultural Conference in 1898 
attacked the provisions of the nōkai bill that mandated compulsory membership for all 
landlords, arguing that this would ensconce the growing numbers of absentee landlords in 
the organization and undo its mission of improving agriculture.252 Assurances that the 
residential requirement included in the bill would exclude anyone not present in the 
village placated these fears, but the fact that the landlord members raised them at all 
demonstrated their awareness of the empowerment inherent in the legislation.  
While the residency requirement reflected the fact that officials and Zenkoku Nōjikai 
leaders alike shared concerns about the deleterious effects of absenteeism, the 
fundamental incompatibilities between the interests of landlords as landlords, resident or 
otherwise, and agricultural improvement that gave rise to these concerns went 
unexamined. This lack of attention was especially important to regions like northern 
Miyagi, where landlords had not retreated into absenteeism, but nevertheless moved 
away from farming in ways not entirely unlike their non-resident counterparts. In these 
areas, landlords remained planted in their communities, but put ever-increasing distance 
between themselves and direct participation in agriculture. They were, in effect, pursuing 
the same divorce from agriculture as their absentee cousins, the difference being that they 
kept the family home in the settlement. Although this problem escaped attention at the 
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turn of the century, it would return to influence the course of agricultural policy in the 
decade that followed. 
In the end, opposition to the laws from all quarters was overcome and their passage 
inaugurated a new era in agriculture and a period of unprecedented opportunity for the 
landlords in the agricultural associations. They had completed their apprenticeship as 
rising meibōka, becoming the new breed of landlord meibōka. New legislation protected 
their property, reducing potential threats to prosperity from tenants and providing official 
recognition of the economic power that they had relied upon to that point. The costs of 
key aspects of agricultural improvement had been passed to the central government, and 
local leaders and organizations could now apply their funds in potentially more profitable 
ways. The Land Reorganization law provided just such an opportunity, offering official 
support and legal authority to efforts to consolidate and expand landholdings. And the 
passage of the Agricultural Association Law provided the landlord-meibōka that led local 
nōkai a set of powerful tools to ensure that their interests would be the standard that 
defined the qualitative aspect of agricultural improvement and, in mandating universal 
membership for farmers, yoked their less affluent neighbors to their will. 
The designation of landlord-meibōka as the beneficiaries of government support and 
the coercive power given them over the remainder of the farming population marked the 
triumph of the provincial landlord membership of the Zenkoku nōjikai over its Tokyo 
leadership. Although in many ways the culmination of nearly a decade of Dai Nihon 
nōkai/Zenkoku Nōjikai efforts, the Nōkai Law created power inequalities in farming 
villages of precisely the type that leaders of the central organization had opposed. In 




agricultural associations be limited to people paying at least two yen in annual tax (those 
granted suffrage in national elections) or owning at least four tan (roughly 1 acre) of land, 
the law in its final form dictated membership in the organization to all heads of 
household resident in its area. The groups that resulted took on what scholars have 
described as the character of a military hierarchy, with landlords as the commanders, self-
cultivating smallholders as a class of non-commissioned officers, and tenants as foot 
soldiers.253 The victory of landlord interests also appeared in the financial plans laid out 
in the new laws. Whereas the leaders of the central organization had proposed that local 
nōkai fund their activities completely through mandatory dues from member landowners, 
the final form of the Agricultural Association Law drew funding from the budget of the 
central government to moderate these costs. Initially pegged at the relatively modest sum 
of 150,000 yen annually, the measure nonetheless freed landlords from the full expense 
of membership dues and the threat of increased local taxation.254
 
Landlord-meibōka stood empowered with unprecedented promise at the turn of the 
new century. By 1900, the ground rules of agriculture had been rewritten and the game 
was now more fully rigged in their favor than ever before. A new system of productive 
relations had been imposed on the countryside that presented landlords, in their roles as 
development-leading meibōka, with greatly expanded powers over farming villages. The 
rest of the rural population did not fare so well. Remaining outside the protection of 
government, middling farmers, smallholders and tenants found themselves in positions of 
heightened vulnerability. Drafted into landlord-led organizations and subject to their 
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rules, the unprotected majority of farmers faced the opening of an uncertain new era 
promising change, but little relief. The gulf separating the expectations of meibōka and 
smallholder, landlord and tenant were a reflection of the contradictions that lay at the 
heart of the new agricultural order. The public good had been entrusted to private hands 
and the force of the state stood ready back landlord-meibōka as they prepared to impose 







Fighting the Farmers for National Wealth: Landlord Meibōka and 
the New Agricultural Order 
 
 The February 1, 1907 issue of the Heimin shinbun, a socialist newspaper out of 
Tokyo, featured an alarming story about the difficulties faced by Miyagi farmers.255 
Entitled "Landlords and tenant farmers," (Jinushi to kosakunin), it reported the ongoing 
exodus of tenant farmers from Miyagi to Hokkaidō in the face of the worst crop failures 
to hit the region in nearly a century. The brief article was divided into three parts, "Flood 
of emigrants" (ijūsha zokushutsu), "Decay of arable land" (kōchi kōhai), and "Nighttime 
flight of tenants" (kosakunin no yonige), each focusing on conditions in a different part of 
the prefecture. The readers of the newssheet learned how tenants in the district of Kami, 
faced with impossibly high rents, abandoned the disabled, the elderly, and even their own 
children in their desperate flight to the north. They read of landlords in Kurokawa 
villages, long unused to farming, forced to take up plows in an attempt to cultivate fields 
left empty by fleeing tenants. And they were told about tenants in Iwanuma, forced to sell 
everything they owned before using the cover of night to steal past sentries posted by 
landlords to prevent the abandonment of their fields. These were tales of misery and 
desperation, painting a portrait of tenant farmers crushed between unsympathetic 
landlords on one side and merciless nature on the other. 
While clothed in the breathless prose of proletarian proselytism, the reality of the 
situation in Miyagi was indeed dire. Described as the worst food crisis since the Great 
Tempō Famine of the 1830s, the devastation that crop failures of 1905 and 1906 wrought 
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upon villages across the prefecture reduced thousands of farming families to poverty and 
hunger.256 The scope of the damage left the continued viability of even the most basic of 
rural institutions in doubt. The toll that the collapse of rural incomes took on tax 
collection prompted the chief of the General Education Office in the Ministry of 
Education to publish an editorial in the Miyagi Education Association journal reassuring 
readers that elementary schools would stay open and reasserting the importance of 
elementary education.257 The progress that agriculture was supposed to have made over 
the course of decades of modernization had amounted to nothing in the face of the 
vicissitudes of nature. 
Yet underdeveloped crops, untended fields, and unfed farmers aside, the middle 
years of the first decade of the twentieth century were, by all other accounts, a period of 
triumph for agricultural improvement in Japan. The alliance between central bureaucrats 
and landlord-meibōka forged at the end of the 1890s led to stabilized and expanded 
agricultural production and increased profits across the country, making tangible progress 
toward the improvement goals of both planners in the capital and meibōka on the ground. 
Using the trust and interest of the government in their work, landlord-meibōka had taken 
the first steps toward revolutionizing agriculture. They began to sweep away old ways of 
farming, bringing in new and more efficient technology and techniques, and altered the 
very layout of the land. Their efforts moved farming toward the concrete improvements 
that officials had envisioned at the turn of the century. Agricultural yields were up and 
the groundwork was being laid for further increases in the future. Wasteful practices of 
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the past were under attack by the legal system, with punishments designed to force their 
abandonment. And increased productivity was married to a bolstering of the local 
government system, as the consolidation of paddyland attacked the final remnants of the 
administratively defunct, but socially persistent, hamlets. 
The ambitions of the authors of this improvement were not limited to the 
rationalization and expansion of agricultural production. Landlord-meibōka found in the 
privileged status accorded them as the agents of agricultural development the means to 
monopolize the profits of farming, to absolve themselves of its costs, and to mobilize the 
coercive power of the established authorities in the tightening of their economic control 
over the countryside. From within the agricultural associations that had experienced such 
dramatic growth over the previous decade, landlord-meibōka exploited the interest of 
prefectural and central government officials to remake the rural order. They forged a 
system presaging the colonial orders that would soon prevail in Japan's overseas 
territories, one in which the property, labor, and even the persons of tenants and 
smallholders were left vulnerable to the predations of landlords. This internal 
colonization saw sword-wielding police dispatched to force the lower classes of village 
society to adopt the agricultural methods dictated by landlord-meibōka, to assume the 
costs of agricultural improvement, and to devote ever-increasing amounts of effort and 
money to farming. This exploitation completed the equation for improvement of which 
technology and rationalization were only a part. Agriculture was pushed into a process of 
imposed involution, in which tenants and smallholding farmers were compelled to 
intensify the use of their own economic and physical resources to complete 




revolution, which, for all its lack of a technological sheen, remained as essential as 
official visions of rationalization and modernization to the transformation of farming. 
The first years of the twentieth century marked the triumph of landlord-meibōka and 
their vision of agricultural development. Securely ensconced at the top of village society, 
they profited from the fruits of agricultural labor and enjoyed an unprecedented period of 
prosperity. Their efforts were transforming not just agriculture, but the balance of forces 
that lay behind its development. The government now stood more firmly behind 
agricultural improvement and rural development than ever before. The original 
conception of meibōka development had been stood on its head. Government money 
underwrote the efforts of meibōka, funding a remaking of agriculture designed to further 
the interests of rural landlords while meeting the production goals of officials in the 
Home and Agriculture and Commerce Ministries. But the Tōhoku crop failures and 
famine at mid-decade introduced a disturbing element to the triumph of landlords, 
revealing the tenuous nature of the system they had created and hinting at the troubles to 
come. 
The new century opened in an atmosphere of hope for the future of agriculture, as 
landlord-meibōka stood poised to use the legal powers and government support that they 
had earned to solve problems of agricultural development and village poverty. They 
dedicated their first efforts to firming up their local organizations. A new day had dawned 
for nōkai (agricultural associations), now officially recognized and bolstered by 
government funds, and the meibōka who led them moved quickly to consolidate their 
control and steer the groups toward particular kinds of agricultural improvement. From 




the means to extend the entrenched power of landlords. At both the district and village 
levels, the rosters of association offices reflected the membership of the local elected 
assemblies, reinforcing the power wielded by landlords and extending their authority in 
new directions.258 The crossover between nōkai leadership and local government was 
open and obvious. Village mayors held the headships of local nōkai, as provided for in 
the 1899 national law, village assemblymen monopolized nōkai offices, and most 
associations established their headquarters in village administrative offices.259 Power 
reinforced power on the village level, placing control over the decision-making 
concerning village administration and that concerning agriculture in the same group of 
elites. 
Further embodying the break between landowning elites and poorer farmers were 
landlord associations (jinushikai), groups dedicated to the interests of landlords that 
spread rapidly at the beginning of the century. Landlord associations had roots going 
back into the previous century, but the newly-accommodating legal context of the early 
1900s prompted landlords and officials alike to apply new energies to their formation and 
development. While bureaucrats saw the groups as another means of promoting the 
improvement of farming, for landlord-meibōka, the associations offered the opportunity 
to drop the pretense of pan-agricultural community inherent in the nōkai and focus on 
their particular interests as economic elites. Freed from the need to couch their goals in 
terms of universal benefits to the farming community as a whole, landlord association 
members could forge a united front against the masses of tenant farmers and smaller 
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landowners. Rather than working at cross purposes with the nōkai, however, landlord 
associations lobbied to cement the nōkai initiatives that best served their interests. By 
1906, landlord associations in all parts of Miyagi had thrown their weight behind nōkai 
calls for the prohibition of fallow land and regulations for the drying of rice.260 That the 
same individuals were often making the calls from both groups presumably didn't detract 
from the added weight given by the more exclusive landlord organization's enthusiastic 
support. 
Landlord associations appeared earliest and most prominently in the northern 
prefectures where the largest landlords dominated. The first groups were organized on the 
prefectural level. In 1891, an Agriculture and Commerce Ministry report on the 
improvement of rice commended Miyagi for having the only ōjinushikai (association of 
large landlords) of the six prefectures it had examined.261 According to the impressed 
officials, the association met regularly and discussed means of improving agriculture, 
activities that they suggested were linked to the successful raising of rice yields in the 
prefecture. Seeing the same promise in the groups as central officials, prefectural 
administrators also began to promote ōjinushikai as a means of improving farming in the 
1890s. The governor of Niigata prefecture, home to the densest concentration of large 
landlords, called the landholding elite to a meeting in the prefectural capital in 1892 and 
gave them explicit instructions to form an association.262 The organizations became 
ubiquitous at the start of the twentieth century, stacked in a hierarchical architecture 
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mirroring that of nōkai. Beginning with northeastern Kurihara district in 1902, landlord 
associations formed in all Miyagi districts by 1906, where they offered active support to 
nōkai and their improvement initiatives.263 
Just as the landlords had their own motives in organizing themselves into landlord 
associations, so too did officials see potential in organizing landlords that went beyond 
their role in farming. Early proposals for the nōkai bill called for membership 
qualifications that would exclude all farmers with land worth less than 400 yen. The 
purpose of the group they sketched out was not limited to farming improvement and the 
empowerment of local elites. Among the chief motivations of the drafters of the early 
proposal was the desire to concentrate quarrelsome landlords into a centrally-
administered organization as a means of smothering their political disruptiveness.264 But 
landlords were not the foremost threat to social order; landlord associations were also 
envisioned as a means of suppressing the perennial threat of rebellious tenant farmers. In 
a 1900 editorial in the official journal of the Chūō (central) nōkai, former Home Ministry 
agricultural official Hida Rōichi outlined the safeguarding function of the 
organizations.265 Alluding to vague historical precedents for tendencies of peasants 
(hyakushō) to abandon rented lands (which Hida apparently believed put landlords in a 
position of weakness) and to vandalize landlord property, Hida argued for the need for 
landlord associations to break these destructive cycles. Peasant protests had roots going 
back hundreds of years, explained Hida, meaning they were free from dangerous 
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associations with the modern evils of socialism and labor organization, but they did 
represent an insidious threat to the countryside.266 Landlord associations would serve as 
an ideal mechanism to mediate between landlords and tenants, defusing the destructive 
habits of hotheaded tenant farmers before they exploded. Untroubled by the implications 
of assigning responsibility for mediation to one of the two contesting sides, Hida 
predicted benefits ranging from economic growth to the elimination of wasteful habits. 
Making peace between landlords and tenants, landlord associations would both 
encourage compliance with nōkai plans for improvement and reform the debased morals 
of farming populations. 
While Hida and others saw promise in the meibōka leaders of the landlord 
associations and nōkai, some among the central leaders who had fought so hard to 
promote the groups ten years earlier were developing doubts. While they had overcome 
the reluctance of bureaucrats and lawmakers to provide official support and recognition 
to nōkai by presenting them as units composed of local agriculturalists sharing an interest 
in improving farming, Tamari Kizō and other leaders of the nōkai movement soon voiced 
their concerns about the gulf between the ideal and the realities. Speaking at the 1901 
general meeting of the Chūō nōkai, Tamari presented a pointed call for attendees to 
increase the readership of the association's journal (Chūō nōkaihō) in their local areas. He 
lamented the lack of a farming focus among large landlords (ōjinushi), stressing that the 
organization's top priorities at the moment were to "get people like large landlords to 
know the current thought in agriculture" and somehow to make them "passionate about 
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agriculture."267 Presented to a group defined by their estrangement from the core of the 
nōkai movement, the objectivity of the criticism may be in question, but it soon found 
echoes in the concerns of central nōkai leaders and government officials with less 
ambiguous connections to nōkai and agricultural policy. 
At the turn of the century, discordant voices like Tamari's had been drowned out by a 
general enthusiasm among officials and agricultural leaders for the meibōka-led 
agricultural order. Hopes for the transformative potential of the national network of nōkai 
and the new system built around them were high. Alongside their imagined function as 
pressure valves for social discord, boosters envisioned agricultural associations as the key 
to three major aspects of agricultural improvement. First, they would be the means to 
accomplish the long sought-after mission of the reordering of farmland (kōchi seiri), 
using the direct ties between landlords in the local organizations to build the necessary 
consensus that officials had found impossible. Next, they would institute fundamental 
improvements to the practices of agriculture, eliminating outdated and wasteful modes of 
farming and replacing them with modern techniques. Finally, they would regulate the 
quality of farming output, leveraging the social position of their members to enforce 
standards that the compromised market forces at work at the level of agricultural 
production could not. Behind these explicit goals, however, lay a less-publicized agenda. 
Planners and officials envisioned a more nakedly political purpose in the work of 
meibōka and the nōkai they led. The redrawing of the agricultural map, expansion of 
agricultural production, and raising of the quality of farming products were also the tools 
with which central authority could be extended into the local area, finally erasing the 
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persistent bases of hamlet autonomy and completing the project of local government 
begun in the late 1880s. 
The problem of landholding patterns and their implications for agricultural 
improvement had been foremost amongst the concerns of nōkai from their earliest 
incarnations. Miniscule and irregularly shaped paddies and fields had long been a bane to 
everyone concerned with farming. They imposed artificial limits on production levels that 
were often already borderline, preventing efficient means of planting and spacing and 
wasting fertile land with their geometric eccentricity.  They played havoc with irrigation 
and water control, thwarting efforts to improve waterways, preventing the shift from wet 
paddy to the more stable and productive dry paddy production, and exacerbating the sort 
of intra- and inter-community tensions that led to the Monō-Tōda conflict of the early 
1890s. They prevented the use of draught animals, limiting the depth to which fields 
could be plowed and increasing the physical demands put upon farmers. And they 
hampered the rational application of labor in agriculture, scattering the holdings worked 
by individual farmers into irregular sets of widely spaced plots. 
What ages of erratic settlement, sporadic reclamation, periodic division, and chaotic 
swings in economic fortunes had wrought, however, human industry could now set right. 
The first nōkai had placed the reordering of arable land at the forefront of their goals. It 
was the first order of business for Miyagi's prefectural nōkai after its formation in 1895, 
and the group's publication of guides to reordering the land in 1900 and 1905 attest to its 
continuing importance to the organization.268 The early interest in Miyagi reflected 
similar concerns across the country. In one sense, land reordering represented a 
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continuation, or at least a relic, of the vaguely outlined and ultimately impractical early 
Meiji vision of a Westernization of Japanese agriculture. Concerns about consolidating 
scattered plots of land into large farms were central to this proposed transformation, 
which paired the work with short-lived ideas of the abandonment of rice cultivation and 
the massive expansion of livestock.269 Where the less practicable elements of early 
agricultural plans were abandoned, however, land consolidation itself survived the 
changing trends in agricultural thought. Its persistence was due, in part, to the continuing 
influence of foreign agricultural scientists on central planners in Japan. First disseminated 
by the foreigners who taught at the Komaba Agricultural School, the idea of the 
consolidation of arable land in Japan found fresh purchase in the 1890s with the Japanese 
translation of German agronomist and Tokyo University Professor Udo Eggert's volume 
Land Reform in Japan in 1891.270 The goal was no longer the recreation of Euro-
American farming in Japan. Land consolidation now was part of an integrated program to 
improve native modes of Japanese agriculture. 
The legal changes that marked the institution of the new agricultural order at the end 
of the nineteenth century cemented the importance of land consolidation. The Farmland 
Consolidation Law (Kōchi seirihō) of March, 1899 declared its purpose in its first article 
as being to increase the productivity of land through facilitating "the exchange of land or 
its reshaping by combining or dividing up (bungō kukaku) and the alteration or removal 
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of roads, paddy ridges, or ditches."271 While providing official recognition and limited 
compensation for privately undertaken consolidation, the law focused as much of its 
attention on ensuring that such undertakings actually got done. The Farmland 
Consolidation Law and the official bodies that stood behind it took aim at obstructionist 
elements in rural society. Article 20 dictated forced cooperation with consolidation work 
by all residents in areas where two thirds of landowners (by number, size of holdings, and 
value of holdings) had agreed to undertake it.272 Other official pressures added their force 
to the text of the law. Beginning in 1900, the Home Ministry issued directives to local 
nōkai to begin work on kōchi seiri, prompting the Zenkoku nōkai to issue their own 
orders along the same lines. Prefectural governments also directed their attentions to the 
promotion of land consolidation, offering various forms of official and semi-official 
support for the work. In Miyagi, the prefectural nōkai served as the conduit for 
government direction and support. It collected funds from the prefectural government, 
funneling the money toward land surveys and the drafting of detailed reordering plans 
and maintaining a staff of planners and technicians to advise when needed.273 Behind the 
prefectural commitment to the work lay the same doubts concerning the reliability of 
local landlords seen in the legal provision compelling holdouts to cooperate. Miyagi 
officials believed landlords to be a naturally disunited group, crippled by short-
sightedness and parochial self-interest, a viewpoint displayed clearly in prefectural kōchi 
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seiri guidelines instructing farmers to plan for the long term so as to prevent early work 
from impeding later efforts and to owners of scattered plots to arrange amicable trades 
with one another.274 
Official promotion of kōchi seiri grew in intensity over the first decade of the new 
century. War once again provided the impetus for government interest in agricultural 
improvement. Just as the promotion of nōkai had become a vogue among officials after 
the Sino-Japanese War a decade earlier, the conclusion of the Russo-Japanese War in 
1905 prompted bureaucrats to double down on their commitment to the reordering of 
farmland.275 At the request of the Home Ministry, the Dai Nihon nōkai began offering 
annual land consolidation training sessions at its agricultural college in 1905, attracting 
1,534 participants and laying the foundations for an event that continued for two 
decades.276 The following year, the Home Ministry made an even stronger commitment to 
the work in the form of direct funding. Paying out 300,000 yen in 1906 and 400,000 the 
next year, the ministry's annual investment in kōchi seiri stabilized at over half a million 
yen in 1908 and remained there for the rest of the decade.277 This largesse was not simply 
the work of progressive-minded officials. The Zenkoku nōjikai transferred the passion 
with which it had pursued official recognition and support for nōkai in the 1890s to the 
pursuit of funding for land consolidation in the new century. Funding from the Home 
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Ministry marked a degree of success for the organization, but it didn't put an end to their 
efforts. At its general assembly in 1911, the commitment of the Zenkoku nōjikai to 
strengthening official support for the work was still strong enough to produce resolutions 
for proposals to both the Upper and Lower Houses of the Diet to increase government 
funding for model consolidated land fields.278
 
Bolstered by legal and financial stimuli, land consolidation progressed widely in the 
first decade of the twentieth century. Northern Miyagi led the nation, giving the 
prefecture for the first time the reputation of an "advanced region."279 By 1913, the 
30,000 chō that had been reordered in Miyagi placed it comfortably in first place 
nationally and gained it widespread attention as a model for the work.280 While the pace 
of consolidation slackened after that point, in 1935 Miyagi still enjoyed the third most 
extensive proportion of reordered farmland in the country at 43.7% of its total arable 
land, an accomplishment surpassed only by Tokyo and Kanagawa, whose farming 
acreages amounted to only a fraction of Miyagi's.281 The success in consolidation had a 
profound impact on the nature of agriculture in the prefecture. It eventually made 
possible both animal plowing and a shift from wet field to dry field rice farming, 
allowing for the cultivation of higher quality seeds, increasing yields, and bringing the 
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prefecture into conformity with the methods of farming known as "Meiji agriculture" 
(Meiji nōhō) in the 1920s and 1930s.282 In the first decade of the twentieth century, 
however, this development was still in its infancy and the advantages of land 
consolidation remained an abstract conception floating above the concrete daily concerns 
of farmers. 
Despite the benefits it bestowed over the long term, the early progress of kōchi seiri 
in Miyagi failed to progress in the autonomous and self-funded way that the drafters of 
the Farmland Consolidation Law envisioned. The prefecture often stepped up to provide 
early energy to projects that excited no more than lukewarm responses from landowners. 
The Miyagi Agricultural Improvement Union (Miyagiken nōji kairyō kumiai) led the 
initial charge, establishing a handful of model fields in 1901 and bringing an agricultural 
technician from Shizuoka to demonstrate the viability of consolidation to local farmers 
who were skeptical about the revolutionary nature and expense of the work.283 These 
official efforts continued throughout the decade. In 1905, the number of model fields 
doubled to ten, all of which were funded by the prefecture through the Miyagi nōkai, and 
regulations were put in place providing for two fully-funded model fields for each district 
whose residents paid over 50,000 yen in total land tax, and one in all others.284 These 
official endeavors suggest a notable absence of the "personal initiative" (jihassei) that 
remained at the heart of the philosophy guiding official agricultural policy. 
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The northern Miyagi village of Nangō became the showcase area for land 
consolidation in Miyagi. Between 1903 and 1909 (when the Land Consolidation Law was 
revised), farmers in Nangō reordered over 2,000 hectares of farmland.285 The means by 
which this work was accomplished illustrate the pattern that consolidation assumed in the 
north of the prefecture. As the planners of model fields hoped, landlords followed up on 
official efforts and set themselves to the task of reordering. The largest landholders in the 
village took the lead, bringing residents together, laying the plans for consolidation, and 
putting forward the funds to make it possible. The extensive reordering accomplished in 
the Watadanuma area of the village beginning in 1905 was funded by the three largest 
landlord families of Itō, Ueno, and Azumi, the last the same house that had played a 
central role in the Entō conflict. In a cash-poor region beset by chronic water problems, it 
was loans of up to 10,000 yen from these families that enabled less affluent families to 
take part and make wider consolidation successful.286
 
The characteristics of Miyagi's natural and human environments exacerbated the 
problems of disunity and atomization among its landlord-meibōka. Problematic 
hydrological systems combined with perennial drainage problems and irregularly-shaped 
and undersized farm plots to present an array of challenges. At the most basic level, 
topographic irregularities produced small and misshapen fields, making the government-
mandated minimum of a 1000 square meter (1 tanbu) rectangle impossible for many 
minor landowners to meet.287 The unruly waterways of the north presented more serious 
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challenges. The poor early progress of land consolidation in northern Miyagi attests to the 
savagery of the Kitakami River and the obstacle it presented to human efforts to tame it. 
Such progress as consolidation enjoyed was limited to those areas at a comfortable 
remove from the river, where farmers whose profits were not drained regularly by violent 
flooding could undertake work with reasonable confidence that it would not be washed 
away. Accordingly, while the districts of Tōda and Shida accounted for much of the 
success with consolidation in the prefecture, Monō, through which the lower reaches of 
the river cut, took much longer to make any progress.288 The destructiveness of the 
Kitakami reinforced the inherent difficulties of consolidation in the prefecture and 
highlighted the gulf separating the ideals of central planners and conditions on the 
ground. The river eliminated even the limited potential for landlord unity and cooperation 
that existed in neighboring regions. The threat of flooding and problems with the water 
supply had imposed increased costs on farmers for generations, setting survival above 
ideals of cooperation and community even as it undercut financial stability and limited 
the funds available for improvement works. Landowners bordering the river assumed 
exaggerated caricatures of the traits that impeded farmland consolidation elsewhere in the 
region and across the country. Preoccupied with the chronic struggles to keep their 
paddies dry and lacking the wherewithal to think beyond the next harvest, any surplus 
money and energy went into petty attempts to increase profitability by buying up tiny 
parcels of land.289 Land consolidation was for those with reliable water control measures 
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and stable incomes and would not enjoy significant progress in the Kitakami area until 
massive public works projects began to tame the river in the 1920s.290
 
But in regions free from the threat of the Kitakami, the reliance upon local initiative 
to drive land reordering still impeded its accomplishment. This was true even in Nangō, 
known nationwide for its success. While the work of Nangō landlords displayed hints of 
the initiative that central planners sought, the precise manner in which they undertook 
land consolidation failed to demonstrate the wider cooperative spirit called for by the 
Land Consolidation Law. Expressions of unity appeared in the landlord leagues (jinushi 
rengō) that brought neighboring landowners together and, along with numerous 
individual efforts, reordered nearly all of the farmland in the village. Yet the modest 
geographic extent of these cooperative efforts fell short of official hopes. The hamlets 
officially rendered defunct by the local government system could still impose strict limits 
on landlord collaboration and cooperation. In Nangō consolidation projects never 
extended beyond hamlet borders, making the farmland consolidation in the village more a 
collection of neighboring hamlet works.291 While efforts within these limits accomplished 
the consolidation goals in Nangō, they had negative implications for more ambitious 
projects. Neither hamlet cooperatives nor individual efforts were sufficient to complete 
consolidation on a larger scale; nor could they tackle projects whose links to problematic 
waterways crossed village boundaries. These shortcomings left holes that only increased 
investment and involvement from the prefectural and central governments could fill. 
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While problems with cooperation among landlords tempered success in Nangō, their 
influence was more deleterious in less well known areas of Miyagi. The concentration of 
land ownership in the northern prefecture partly accounted for this failure. In the Monō 
villages of Ōshio and Akai, free from the threat of the Kitakami River, high tenancy rates 
and apathetic absentee landlords delayed consolidation efforts until the 1910s and limited 
them even then to a fraction of what had been accomplished in Nangō.292 The same 
conflicting water interests that had ignited the Entō conflict a decade earlier continued to 
set landowners at odds with one another, exacting a further toll on the progress of 
consolidation. The land reclamation and drainage of wetlands that were part of 
consolidation in Nangō reduced water levels in Monō and caused land to subside, 
destabilizing water supplies to already thirsty villages.293 Even in areas free of these 
problems, where landlords engaged in at least limited cooperative work, geography and 
topography conspired against them. Consolidated plots rarely exceeded 50 hectares, 
making the hoped-for improvements to irrigation and water control difficult and greatly 
limiting their efficacy.294 These problems reflected the predominance of small-scale 
landlords in the north of the prefecture, whose numbers themselves complicated 
consolidation efforts. A 1910 consolidation effort planned in response to damaging floods 
in Nangō required organizers to obtain the agreement of 226 separate landowners to 
undertake work on a mere 416 hectares of arable land.295
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Nangō's success, and the gulf that separated it from other Senboku regions that 
lagged behind, exposed the fallacy of central planners' belief in landlord-meibōka as the 
engines driving farmland consolidation. Government investment, not the private initiative 
of landlords, brought progress. Where consolidation was completed, it began after model 
areas established and run by officials demonstrated the promise of the work and 
government funding lightened or eliminated costs. Official enthusiasm for consolidation 
went beyond simply demonstration, even funneling official resources in directions that 
had been anathema in earlier years. The Miyagi government financed four new sluices for 
Nangō between 1899 and 1907, reducing the costs and difficulties associated with 
consolidation even as they eased the responsibility for waterways that had been borne by 
local landlords after the end of the Entō conflict.296 It was this unusual level of official 
support that made possible Nangō's rapid progress in consolidating its farms, and the 
absence of comparable developments elsewhere can be explained by the lack of similar 
government aid. Even with its advantages, Nangō residents found it impossible to fund 
the fraction of the costs that remained to them. The initial loans to their fellow villages by 
the handful of leading large landlords in the village made the work possible, but the 
nature of these funds as private debt set them apart from the more charitable work of 
Mayor Straw Sandals in neighboring Shida at the same time. The government again 
found it necessary to assume part of these costs and the collective debtors of the village 
were only able to repay their wealthy neighbors when the Hypothec Bank (Kangyō 
ginkō) granted them a low-interest loan in 1908.297 Both before and after the work was 
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completed, government funds were the primary resource behind the efforts followed by 
money generated by sales of new lands opened up by consolidation, with the private 
resources of landlords being drawn upon only when costs exceeded what these two 
sources offered.298
 
In stepping forward to direct public funds toward land consolidation, the prefectural 
and national governments were responding to both natural and governmental pressures. 
Yet here again the stimuli exposed the gulf that separated the ideal of personal initiative 
and actual conditions on the ground. Crop failures were the single most powerful force 
driving the progress of consolidation in Miyagi. Officials identified the work as a means 
of relief for the poor, incorporating aid in the works they oversaw directly and arranging 
systems of compensation for village-level and private projects. Harvest difficulties 
plagued Miyagi in the first decade of the twentieth century and it was in the years of most 
extreme dearth, 1902, 1905, and 1910, that the prefecture made the gains in consolidation 
that put it in the position of leading the nation.299 The prefectural government, reaching 
upward to solicit aid from the Home and Finance Ministries, made its boldest and most 
direct moves to promote and aid land consolidation during these years. These efforts had 
the mutually reinforcing effects of expanding the work at the time official funds were 
released and laying the foundation for increasing government involvement in the future. 
As the years passed, consolidation came to be tinted with an official hue, a situation far 
removed from the self-initiative-powered enterprise enshrined in law at the turn of the 
century. 








The Miyagi government report produced detailing the responses to the 1902 crop 
failures in villages across the prefecture is replete with accounts of landlords quickly 
drafting plans for land consolidation in order to hire their impoverished neighbors as 
laborers and prevent their families from falling victim to hunger. Here again the 
prefectural government took the lead, revising its plans for the development of model 
consolidated fields to employ those affected by the disaster.300  Villages throughout the 
prefecture followed the government's lead, giving consolidation work a place of honor in 
their listings of aid provision. The southern village of Funaoka proudly recorded the 
extensive plan of seven local landlords for consolidation and reclamation that offered 
paid employment to nearly 2000 local residents left nearly destitute from the poor 
harvest.301 Similar forms of relief were common in many southern villages, but the 
northern district of Kurihara reported the most extensive plans. The projects in Kurihara 
villages stand out not only for their scale, employing over 15,000 laborers in some cases, 
but also because of their conspicuous designation as "private relief work" (kojin kyūsai 
jigyō).302 A glance at the section devoted to the district gives the impression of village 
after village rescued from the brink of disaster by individuals whose quick-wittedness and 
altruism were only matched by the formidable personal resources they were able to apply 
to farmland consolidation projects designed to aid their neighbors. The landlords of 
Kurihara appeared the very embodiment of the vision behind the meibōka-led agricultural 
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order, their individual initiative so ubiquitous as to make their work appear systematic in 
its character. 
In fact, the work in Kurihara reflected the efforts of personally motivated landlords 
only in a limited sense. As it did elsewhere, the real initiative came from the district level 
government and the higher agencies and bodies with which it coordinated its efforts. As 
soon as the distress caused by the crop failures of 1902 became clear, the Kurihara 
district administration assembled the rank and file of the district nōkai, laying out broad 
plans for land consolidation as part of a relief program that included calls for donations of 
money and goods, the distribution of seeds purchased with the public purse, and a 
pedagogical program warning against luxury and waste.303 The support offered by the 
district did not end with logistics. It applied for a loan from the Agricultural and 
Industrial Bank, requesting 40,000 yen and receiving 21,800 to be used for relief work. 
The private element of this work came in only after the plans had been laid and the 
money received, when district officials gathered fifty-six local large landlords and 
instructed them to initiate farmland consolidation projects as a means of distributing these 
funds among the tens of thousands of residents whom the crop failures had thrown into 
poverty.304 In comparison with extraordinary individuals like Ogata Yasuhei of the 
southern village of Ōgawara, who donated one hundred yen of his personal funds to 180 
households in need, these versions of personal initiative and private work seemed limited 
indeed. 
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1-1 Kurihara Poor Relief Land Consolidation, 1902-1903305
 
Village Laborers Labor Cost  
(￥/day) 
Cost/Laborer (￥) 
Nagaoka 10520 2104.00 0.20 
Kiyotaki 3606 721.29 0.20 
Tamasawa 3867 912.00 0.24 
Tsukidate 7043 1281.94 0.18 
Shiwahime 4651 837.00 0.18 
Tsukumo 6872 1374.43 0.20 
Kannari 1500 375.00 0.25 
Monji 11223 2805.71 0.25 
Himematsu 15300 3060.70 0.20 
Nagasaki 7549 1358.86 0.18 
Kurikoma 6900 1242.38 0.18 
Tomino 5000 1000.00 0.20 
Ichihasama 12500 2250.11 0.18 
Hanayama 15830 2849.50 0.18 
Omatsu 7450 1516.00 0.20 
Miyano 8239 1483.00 0.18 
Average 8003 1573.25 0.20 
Total 128050 25171.92   
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When famine struck again in 1905, the Miyagi government held the earlier relief 
work in Kurihara up as a model for villages across the prefecture. Noting the important 
role land consolidation had played in ameliorating the effects of crop failures in the 
district, as well as the longer term benefits of reordered farm fields, the prefecture 
declared the work to be among the "most important" (mottomo omoki) countermeasures 
for the crisis.306 In issuing calls for a general spread of kōchi seiri in the face of the 
famine, however, the Miyagi government revealed a continuing lack of the personal 
initiative that was supposed to drive farmland consolidation. Even if skepticism toward 
its efficacy could excuse the reluctance of landlords to engage in the work before 1902, 
the records of that disaster resound with claims that impressive results of consolidation in 
1902 and 1903 – both for short-term relief and longer-term production gains – convinced 
holdout villagers that the work could be beneficial.307 Yet in 1905 the prefectural 
government again had to take the lead, declaring that all its relief efforts would be 
directed toward consolidation and arranging funding from the Home and Finance 
Ministries and the Hypothec Bank to be passed down through district governments down 
to local villages.308 Support payments of five yen per hectare of consolidated land were 
offered to all undertakings that employed the local poor, prompting landlords to draw up 
plans for 12,000 hectares of work specifically designated as relief.309  
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The landlords who answered these calls gained the multiple benefits of preventing 
the flight of their tenants, improving their fields, and maintaining their economic and 
social position, even as the aid the work bestowed upon desperate villagers earned them 
reknown as "philanthropists" (jizenka).310 More problematic for central agricultural 
planners than the initial reluctance of these landowners, however, were the individuals 
who remained unmoved by the official calls. The "philanthropists" came overwhelmingly 
from the middle echelon of the landowning class. These were the landlord-meibōka of the 
nōkai, landlords who both continued to cultivate part of their own lands and remained 
resident in the same villages as their tenants. Larger landlords, who even at this point had 
progressed in economically advanced regions well along the course of displacing their 
more public-spirited neighbors, had not shared their enthusiasm for relief work. Remote 
from the social responsibilities that pressured their resident counterparts and with limited 
knowledge and interest in farming, they chose not to answer the call to initiate land 
consolidation projects as poor relief.311
 
The lackluster response of larger landlords to the call for consolidation as a relief 
measure did not indicate a complete lack of interest in the enterprise or its profitability. 
The interest in improving farming that bureaucrats and landlords had shared since at least 
the last quarter of the nineteenth century made the consolidation of farmland attractive to 
both, with benefits to landowners that were both obvious and immediate. It provided a 
means for raising farming yields and land values, opening up new lands, reducing costs, 
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and raising rents.312 In a single stroke, it satisfied a checklist of landlord interests. 
Government funds to encourage consolidation projects and the opportunities for 
additional support that came with crop failures and famine nudged risk-averse or cash-
poor landlords forward, but they convinced the more cynical larger landlords that a 
greater official fiscal commitment was coming. It appeared worth waiting for. 
The pronounced interest that government officials had in consolidation and the direct 
benefits that it offered to rural landowners highlight the shared interests of the two 
groups. It was this confluence, after all, that formed the very basis of the meibōka-led 
system of agricultural development and colored all aspects of agricultural improvement 
under this system. While government interest in the work was often abstract, relating to 
explicit plans to stabilize the national food supply and improve conditions in "distressed 
villages" or more indirect schemes to tighten central control over local offices and foster 
nationalism in villages, landlords derived benefits that were both concrete and immediate. 
Despite these differences in orientation, the two groups found themselves aligned 
regarding the particular forms of improvement they sought. 
Primary among these shared aims between government officials and landlords was 
the elimination of old, wasteful forms of farming and their replacement with modern 
techniques maximizing production and minimizing waste. The two groups displayed an 
impressive unity of purpose in their efforts to reform practices like plowing, planting, 
seed selection, field use, and fertilization. The consolidation of farmland represented one 
step in this direction, an attempt to eliminate the waste due to customary patterns of 
landholding. Other customs were similarly designated as wasteful and became the targets 
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of reform. Campaigns enjoying firm support from both landlords and agricultural 
officials took aim at seedling nurseries, which established practice planted in inefficient 
configurations and left fallow for the growing season; plowing, which remained a man-
powered exercise in areas with customary injunctions against draught animals; and the 
reliance on green manure and other natural fertilizers, which could not sustain newly-
developed strains of rice seeds.313 It was partly in these conflicts with custom that tenants 
and smallholders, themselves holding solid, if somewhat more limited, interests in 
increasing crop yields and improving the efficiency of agricultural labor, found 
themselves at odds with plans for improvement. To poorer farmers, expensive and 
untested new modes of production that often demanded more work represented a form a 
progress that was doubtful at best. For those aligned against them, however, their 
resistance to change served only to cement the commitment of officials and rural elites to 
cooperation in the imposition of advanced agriculture. The image of the superstitious and 
stubborn farmer, almost indistinguishable from the blockheaded peasants of the earlier 
era, became the enemy against whom officials and landlords united. Only through the 
forceful reform of obstinate farmers, both agreed, could farming be dragged from the 
shadowy wasteland of age-old custom into the light of agricultural modernity. 
The shape of villages themselves and the type of communities with which rural 
residents identified presented another arena in which landlords and officials could 
advance their common goals in the early twentieth century. Even at the opening of the 
new century, the new villages (chōson) established as a part of the Local Government 
System between 1888-1890 had not yet completely displaced and eradicated the early 
                                                     
313
 Tōhoku custom held that plowing by horse or ox in rice farming invited divine punishment. See Miyagi 




"organic" villages, now called "hamlets" (sonraku, buraku) that preceded them. The 
defunct socio-political units survived in collectively-owned property, in shrines that were 
strongly linked to families and life cycles of hamlet residents, and in a range of local 
organizations. These survivals proved problematic to both central government officials 
and landlord-meibōka, who attacked them in ways that were, if not quite coordinated, 
then certainly complementary.  
Prominent in the criticisms of both groups were the common lands (iriaichi) held by 
the hamlets. An example of continuity with the Tokugawa era, village common lands 
assumed their modern form after surviving the challenges mounted against them by the 
first Land Tax Revision of 1973, when hamlets struggled to lay claim to reduced local 
holdings and reserve them for the use of residents.314 Their survival reflected the vital role 
that common lands played for farmers in Miyagi and elsewhere in providing an array of 
supplies for the field and the household, from wood to charcoal to "green manure" 
(ryokuhi, decaying plantlife used as fertilizer), without taxing the fiscal capacities of 
cash-poor residents. Designers of agricultural improvement, however, portrayed them as 
the embodiment of the threats to development that lurked in the backward countryside. 
Commons were seen as a waste of land that could otherwise be producing food and 
wealth. This waste was particularly egregious in Tōhoku, where extensive reliance upon 
commons combined with regular crop failures to paint a clear picture of unmodern 
remnants in the eyes of government planners. In 1904, nōkai leader Tamari Kizō included 
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these lands in the 620,000 hectares that he estimated were unused in Tōhoku, costing the 
region 60 million yen in lost production.315
 
Landlords saw opportunity in this waste. It was in their interests to portray the 
common lands as non-productive and similar to the undeveloped "wastelands" (arechi, 
kōbuchi) that absorbed so much of the blame for Tōhoku's backwardness. The critique of 
common lands opened the opportunity for landlords to add them to their holdings, often 
as a part of larger consolidation projects. Landlords in the southern Miyagi village of 
Kayatani, where the consolidation of land reached a notable level of completeness, were 
able to seize the village commons in a pattern that repeated itself in villages across the 
prefecture.316  
While some degree of sincerity may have informed the criticisms levelled against the 
wastefulness of village commons, political motivations were at least as important to 
officials and landlords. These interests shaped the character of reform efforts. The Home 
Ministry launched a period of concerted assaults on the hamlets in the 1900s as part of a 
program that included the shoring up of town and village finances, the tightening of 
control over local officials, and the elimination of corruption in local administration.317 
1901 saw the beginning of aggressive official promotion of town and village policy plans 
(chōsonze) that were designed to foster identification with the administrative unit as a 
part of a larger effort to excite nationalist fervor on the local level. In that year, the 
Ministry solicited reports on local conditions and plans for village development, 
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specifically calling upon elected village officials to take the leadership.318 The 
nationalistic sentiments that suffuse the introductions of many of the plans drafted at this 
time have been taken as evidence of the Home Ministry's success in inculcating the 
values they sought to spread, but this was not necessarily the case. Where the officials 
behind the plan of a Miyazaki village may describe their work as "peacetime economic 
warfare," the preface of a similar document from the Miyagi village of Oide focuses 
entirely on the legacy of its legendary mayor Nagao Shichirōemon and makes no mention 
of a national mission.319 In the case of Oide, it appears that the fact that the Home 
Ministry had celebrated the work of Nagao obviated the need to appeal to central officials 
with patriotic sentiments, casting doubt on the sincerity of similar exclamations in other 
village plans. Regardless, the initiative served to undercut the hamlets, rendering them 
subject to plans drafted by the landlord-meibōka in town and village offices and 
encouraging measures such as the consolidation of hamlet assets under the ownership of 
the administrative town or village. 
Shrines were another bastion of the hamlets targeted by Home Ministry officials. 
Functioning as a basis for village communities since time immemorial, local shrines 
came in a range of shapes and conditions and served populations of widely varying sizes. 
In 1906, Home Ministry bureaucrats launched the shrine merger movement, portraying 
local shrines alternatively as decrepit wrecks that sheltered immoral activities and sullied 
the imperial honor, or wasteful extravagances for tiny groups of devotees. Rural shrines 
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were abolished by the hundreds and merged into single shrines coterminous with the 
administrative villages.320 Much the same as the elimination of the common lands through 
land consolidation had done, shrine mergers damaged hamlets in multiple ways. Apart 
from erasing a key symbol and point of identification for residents, the loss of shrines 
also removed one of the few remaining bases for the status of hamlet elites. The provision 
of support for shrines, the associations they had with prominent family names, and the 
roles that hamlet elites played in events centered on them had all contributed to the social 
prominence of leading families. Without them, these elites, many of whom had numbered 
among the frontline meibōka in the early agricultural association movement, moved 
further down the path to obscurity. 
The dispossession of hamlet elites was closely related to the political goals pursued 
by the landlord-meibōka in their drive against the defunct villages. Older village elites 
derived much of their local reputation and prominence from their leadership of mutual 
aid societies, credit unions, and irrigation organizations. Their monopoly of hamlet 
offices, as well as their connections to the local shrines, was a magnet for official ire. 
Rich in land but lacking in social capital, the landlord meibōka who had risen during the 
economic dislocations of the mid-Meiji period and became rising meibōka during the 
1890s found in the administrative towns and villages (chōson) a space for translating 
their economic success into local prestige and political authority. Abandoning the minor 
positions some of them had held in hamlet organizations, they shifted their support to the 
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chōson at the turn of the century and took aim at their top offices.321 The attacks launched 
by landlords and officials against hamlet assets enhanced the significance of these offices 
and weakened the older elites. Hamlet lands and property had most often represented 
donations from prominent local families, and it was these that were consolidated under 
the administration of the the new towns and villages. Elimination and consolidation under 
the chōson removed a basis for the status of these earlier elites and worked against the 
wealthier hamlets by redistributing the resources evenly across the new village while 
raising the names of the new local leaders who spread the wealth.322 Just as the Home 
Ministry's crusade against hamlets created political and social opportunities for ambitious 
landlord-meibōka, so too did the work of these local figures enable the realization of 
official plans and accomplish the work of finally eliminating the defunct villages. This 
was not an exercise of teamwork between parties with shared ideals and goals, however. 
It was, at best, a coincidence of overlapping interests that complemented each other for a 
time. 
While the larger mission of improving agriculture involved a more explicit degree of 
cooperation between landlords and officials than did the attack on the hamlets, here too 
disharmony lurked below the surface. The quests for increased yields, rationalized 
production, enhanced quality, and greater integration in the market bound officials and 
landlords together and defined agricultural policy and its legal context from the 1890s. 
For all the common talk of improvement between agricultural officials and landlord-
meibōka, however, there were profound differences in the reasons the work appealed to 
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each and the purpose each was pursuing in the bid to transform agriculture. Government 
planners in the Home and Agricultural Ministries aimed at strengthening the nation. 
Securing the food supply, improving the health of the rural economy, and spreading 
prosperity in farming villages promised the connected but distinct rewards of reducing 
the country's reliance upon foreign imports and ensuring the maintenance of order in rural 
areas. The goals of landlords in their pursuit of agricultural improvement were 
considerably less broad. The stabilization of farm production and expansion of 
agricultural yields promised increased profits, and they intended to reap its rewards. In 
order to do so, they had first to further cement their control over tenant farmers and 
secure places of leadership in local administration. 
The gulf that separated the goals of landlord-meibōka and officials in the work of 
agricultural improvement demonstrated more than different shadings on shared interests; 
it revealed a dissonance about the basic nature of the work. Agricultural improvement 
meant one thing to government officials and something different to the meibōka charged 
with carrying it out. A veneer of agreement concerning seeds, planting styles, and paddy 
use obscured the cracks in the purportedly shared interests between landlords and 
officials, but the irreconcilability between a vision of farming villages that maximized the 
exploitation of tenant farmers on the one hand and that of a stable countryside populated 
with generally content and loyal producers on the other lay below the surface. During the 
early years of the twentieth century, the pseudo-synergy that saw each of the two groups 
accomplishing their immediate goals in the betterment of farming obscured the deeper 
incongruity. Tensions were building, though, and it was becoming increasingly clear that 




Tenants were the group that threatened to break the apparent unity of officials and 
landlords. The two groups agreed superficially on the function and importance of tenant 
farmers to agricultural production. Tenants were the engines driving farming and its 
improvement. They provided essential labor, performing the role of the muscles to the 
brains of planners both local and central. This understanding of the place of tenant 
farmers made their exploitation central to the plans of both groups; what differed was the 
degree to which this exploitation would be pursued and the specific ends to which it 
would be applied. The interest of officials in maintaining order limited the degree to 
which they were willing to squeeze the productive classes. Some portion of the benefits 
from improved production, even if only a small fraction of the total, would have to be 
shared with those whose efforts had brought it about if social stability and a sense of 
membership in the nation were to continue. Landlords were not bound by such concerns. 
They pursued the expansion of profit with single-mindedness, locked in a zero-sum 
struggle with tenant farmers hungry for a bigger slice of the pie. 
Despite the support for land consolidation, central authorities still preferred to 
remain aloof from direct intervention in the villages. They continued to believe that the 
profits from farming improvements would work their way down to every level of village 
society. The laws for the protection of the rural middle class passed in the late 1890s 
reflected this faith even as they represented a necessary compromise of the previous 
hands-off policies. Still, the shape of the laws ensured that government contact would be 
limited to the elites who had been the chief focus of government agricultural policy since 
the 1880s and who, after all, were the group that stood to gain most from the legislation. 




unable, if not unwilling, to meet the government's expectations for the improvement of 
farming. They were designed to tighten up the links between officials and landlords, 
opening a direct channel through which the government could transmit its wishes to the 
meibōka as its local agents, who would proceed to translate them into reality in their 
home regions. Official recognition of agricultural associations and land reordering unions 
were means to this end, offsetting the increased provision of public funding with the 
promise of a greater degree of official control over local improvement efforts. 
Landlord-meibōka saw their reformulated relationship with central authorities in a 
different light. Working in their newly recognized organizations, they reversed the 
direction of effort envisioned in official plans. Rather than acting as conduits transmitting 
government policies to local farmers, nōkai instead became the means of communicating 
landlord interests upwards. Central officials, still reliant upon the local and agricultural 
expertise of meibōka, repeatedly deferred to the advice they received from nōkai leaders, 
shaping legislation to match. In the same way that the lobbying of the Zenkoku nōkai in 
the 1890s had driven the passage of the middle-class protection laws, continuing 
pressures from the central group and its local affiliates pushed for and succeeded in 
getting laws enforcing landlords' visions of improved farming villages. The eleventh 
general meeting of the Zenkoku nōkai in November of 1903 was explicit in its call for 
legal force to ensure that agricultural societies be formed in corners of the country that 
continued to hold out and to compel the payment of membership dues from those 
participants whose enthusiasm for the groups did not extend to their wallets.323 The 
lobbying of nōkai members found sympathetic ears among bureaucrats and informed the 
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expansion of increasingly punitive laws concerning agriculture. Chief Secretary of the 
Zenkoku nōkai Tamari Kizō emphasized the importance of nōkai to legal change at a 
gathering of Tōhoku farmers in Morioka in 1904, explaining how recent laws banning 
charcoal fertilizers in Kagoshima had not originated among prefectural officials, but 
rather came from local nōkai members who had lobbied tirelessly for their passage.324 
Prefectural administrations across the country faced similar pressures, responding with 
new laws that were reproduced widely across administrative boundaries. These laws 
positioned the coercive power of government behind the improvement initiatives of 
landlords, opening the central policy to a range of abuses and undercutting the philosophy 
of bureaucratic disengagement upon which central guidance of agriculture was supposed 
to be based. 
The first forays of the central government into legalizing farming practice came prior 
to its rewriting of the legal order at the end of the nineteenth century. Though lacking the 
explicitly punitive nature of later laws, they laid out a template for which techniques 
would be encouraged and which condemned in the new legislation that followed it. The 
laws passed at the time, which targeted inefficient land use, improper planting techniques 
and other chronic concerns of the Zenkoku nōkai, functioned more as guidelines than 
proscriptions, providing the raw materials from which more forceful prefectural 
regulations were soon crafted. Beginning in 1898, the Agricultural Ministry issued 
directives that criticized the practice of leaving farmlands fallow and provided 
instructions for proper planting techniques, instructions that prefectural administrations 
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picked up quickly and cast in firmer legal form.325 The constant reiterations of these 
directions in Miyagi, issued by the central government and reiterated no fewer than three 
times by the prefectural authorities between 1899 and 1903, attest to the resistance they 
aroused in local farmers.326 Despite the fact that the instructions from the Agricultural 
Ministry were addressed to prefectural nōkai, the landlord-meibōka in these groups were 
not the holdouts against the plans for rationalization. On the contrary, they were often the 
original source for these improved methods, which offered greater yields and higher 
quality that always appealed to landlords. 
Those resisting new agricultural techniques, causing landlords to push the central 
and prefectural governments toward legal compulsion, were the tenants and smallholders 
who would be called upon to actually employ them. The non-elite segments of the 
farming population had good reason to oppose the improvement measures, which 
demanded more work and increased expenditures and often offered only limited benefits 
to productivity. The "narrow-strip" (tanzaku) method of seedbed planting demanded 
rigorous discipline and required spacious and level paddies of a type not common in 
northern Miyagi.327 These limitations applied equally to the "regular-line" (seijō) planting 
prescribed for the growing season, to which were added demands for laborious additional 
weeding.328 Particularly objectionable to smallholders and tenant farmers in Miyagi were 
injunctions against fallow lands. The common practice in northern Miyagi and rice-
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producing regions throughout Tōhoku was to reserve sunny paddylands that were 
protected from the cold for exclusive use as early spring seedbeds, which were left 
flooded and unused for the months following the transfer of seedlings to the summer 
paddies.329 The roughly 5% of paddyland that this practice left idle in Miyagi during the 
summer months enraged landlords and agricultural officials alike, who condemned it as a 
wasteful extravagance of irrational premodern custom. Reason, however, lay behind the 
reluctance of the working farmers to abandon fallow land, as any replanting of the 
seedbeds during the growing season made costly fertilizers and insecticides necessary for 
successful cultivation the following year.330 Promising increased stress on limited 
financial resources and heightened demand for labor, the programs formulated by nōkai 
and handed down through officials looked to poorer farmers less like improvements than 
means of setting a precedent for more intense exploitation. 
Adding weight to tenants' and smallholders' resistance to the landlord-meibōka vision 
of improved agriculture was the doubtful nature of its efficacy. While articles appearing 
in the journal of the Central nōkai and speakers at the various meetings held by the 
Zenkoku nōkai consistently cited the positive results of lab testing of improved 
techniques, these successes often proved difficult to reproduce in the field. Many of the 
practices that landlord-meibōka pressed on lawmakers required improvements to related 
agricultural infrastructure that, for reasons of cost or technical difficulty, had not been 
accomplished. Effective and reliable water control systems were needed for the 
maintenance of dry paddies through the fall and winter seasons, a prerequisite that was 
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unrealized and impossible around the lower reaches of the unruly Kitakami River. Even 
areas free from the scourge of savage waterways had difficulties attaining the degree of 
water control necessary to make improvements effective. This was the reason why the 
remarkable gains in agricultural production in Kashimadai were delayed until after the 
expensive work of draining the flood-prone Shinainuma marshland was completed by 
Kamada Sannosuke and his allies. Where new methods of agriculture were possible, there 
existed some question as to whether they truly represented improvements. Landlords and 
prefectural officials in Miyagi sought to end the cultivation of high-yield Honkokumei 
rice, arguing that the poor reputation of the grain made it unprofitable to cultivators and 
landlords alike. In western Japan, tenant farmers had resisted similar pressures against the 
local Shinriki rice, instead increasing the cultivation of the strain and successfully driving 
up its price on the national market.331
 
In Miyagi, particular aspects of the local experience presented compelling arguments 
against adopting the agricultural techniques advertised as improved. In some cases, 
testing done in situ cast doubt upon the rosy statistics produced in the testing labs of 
Tokyo. Experiments in deep plowing and dry fields conducted in Miyagi and other 
northeastern prefectures produced results suggesting that the practices were in fact 
damaging to production in these less fertile regions.332 Official sanctions against fallow 
land encountered similar difficulties. In the adverse topographic and climactic conditions 
of Miyagi, itself representing the northern limit of the area in which rice cultivation was 
possible, soil fertility was a constant challenge. Despite the laws that passed and the 
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violence with which they were enforced over the early decades of the twentieth century, 
resistance to the forced use of seedbed nurseries as paddyland for mature production 
(which amounted to as close an imitation of double-cropping as was possible in the harsh 
North) never disappeared. In the end it was prefectural authorities who eventually gave 
in, leaving farmers to readopt the practice of leaving seedbeds fallow as though it had 
never been discontinued.333  
The resolve of landlords to force tenants to adopt improvements combined with 
official frustration at the disappointing progress of development to alter the terms of 
production and impose a new system of agricultural administration on the local level. 
While landlords denounced tenants who refused to adopt improvements that demanded 
more labor and money while offering minimal benefits, officials saw a simplified picture 
of tradition-bound peasants hostile to any hint of progress or modernization. Agricultural 
Directive 14 in 1901 was clear in its assignment of blame for the lack of progress, stating 
"It is extremely regrettable that, despite the fact that agricultural testing centers and 
related agencies are making steady progress and there is no lack of results that should be 
adopted, there are not many in the country who are actually enacting these measures and 
demonstrating their effectiveness."334 Prefectural lawmakers built upon directives handed 
down from the Agricultural Ministry, translating instructions to adopt improvements into 
orders backed by punitive force. The Miyagi government introduced its Nursery 
Management Regulations in 1902, dictating fines or prison sentences for cultivators who 
                                                     
333
 Abiko Rin, Miyagiken no hyakunen, 90. 
334




did not adhere to rules for seedbed widths, shapes, and spacing.335 These regulations were 
not aimed at an obstructionist few who were short-circuiting the efforts of the larger body 
of cooperative farmers. Bureaucrats envisioned the legal sanctions as targeting the larger 
mass of rural society, stating their purpose to be "fighting the farmers and executing the 
objectives for the sake of advancing the national wealth."336  
The Nursery Management Regulations and similar legal measures in Miyagi and 
elsewhere instituted a mode of agricultural production that came to be known as the 
"saber farming system" (saaberu nōsei). Named for the swords carried by prefectural 
police dispatched on regular patrols in farming areas, the system saw state violence 
mobilized directly against farmers in the service of agricultural improvement. A 1904 
extension to the regulations of the two years earlier required all cultivators in Miyagi to 
post signboards in their fields displaying their names clearly.337 This enabled police, on 
the lookout for infractions against planting restrictions and other heterodox practices, to 
quickly identify miscreants, even among the scattered farm plots and byzantine networks 
of ownership and tenancy characteristic of northern Miyagi. Significantly, it also ensured 
that official ire landed squarely on cultivating tenant farmers and not the landlords 
registered as owners of the farms in question. Armed with legislative authority, 
prefectural police in Miyagi instituted a reign of terror in the rice paddies of the north, 
forcing non-compliant farmers to rip up and replant seedbeds and paddies at 
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swordpoint.338 The dramatic break that the saber system marked from earlier philosophies 
of non-intervention did not pass without comment. Yet even the Dai Nihon nōkai's Yokoi 
Tokiyoshi, whose animosity toward government involvement in agriculture had led to the 
splitting off of the Zenkoku nōkai in the 1890s, seemed to acknowledge the system as 
necessary, declaring in 1905, "I look at this situation and regret the weakness of the 
people, at the same time I lament the revival of the ideology of government 
intervention."339
 
For all the talk of "fighting the farmers," it was clear that the saber system targeted 
only tenant farmers and smallholders. The paddy signboard system was aimed squarely at 
cultivating farmers, the majority of whom were tenants. In fact, the demand for the 
posting of cultivator names, being a tacit acknowledgement that the individuals listed as 
landowners were very often not the actual cultivators of the land, put the lie to the 
continuing celebration in official statements of the resident landlord as the firm core of 
farming society. The shape of the laws further demonstrated that they targeted tenants in 
a way evocative of the improvements that landlords and nōkai had been promoting for 
years and that they were instituted in response to landlord demands.340 From planting 
styles for nurseries and fields, through seed types and methods of seed selection, to 
injunctions against fallow lands, the saber system cast landlord-style improvement as 
law.  
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As jarring as the sight of police on horseback ordering farmers to rip up their 
seedlings must have been, it paled next to the change to productive relations that the 
saber system marked. Prefectural governments had taken over the role of landlords in 
enforcing the exploitative conditions formerly consigned to tenancy contracts. However 
unbalanced it may have been, standard landlord-tenant relations had been based on a 
negotiated (but often implicit) agreement between the two parties, in which each pursued 
its own interests and adopted an economic strategy in a system of mutual influence. 
Where landlords raised rents, tenants could respond by lowering the costs, both financial 
and otherwise, of their production. Should the landlord desire rent rice of a higher quality 
that demanded increased labor or costly inputs, it became necessary for him to lower 
rents or otherwise alter the terms of production and tenancy in order to make it both 
possible and desirable for tenants to meet their expectations. The saber system removed 
the reciprocal aspect of this relationship. Cold and unresponsive laws replaced negotiated 
settlements in dictating the mode of agricultural production, leaving landlords secure to 
collect the profits from intensified labor and higher costs while consigning tenant farmers 
to a state resembling unfree labor.  
The gap between official rhetoric and actual conditions should not be taken as a 
reflection of ignorance or blindness among bureaucrats and policymakers. Laudatory 
comments about virtuous landlords aside, officials in the central and prefectural 
governments were aware that there were parasitic members of the landlord class who 
were, through their uncompromising pursuit of self-interest, obviating the work of 
agricultural testing centers.341 Tenants and smallholders, however, were both closer to the 
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actual work of farming and more vulnerable to the exercise of legal and government 
power, making them a better object for bureaucratic encouragement. In this way, the 
saber system marked the completion of the official movement away from the fears of 
overly intrusive government interference that had shaped policy in the 1880s. The 
exercise of official power over the less vulnerable and potentially combative landlord 
class remained taboo, but the ongoing impoverishment of the countryside and 
development of an agricultural underclass had opened the path to direct interference. For 
officials, the saber system was a pragmatic solution to a frustrating problem.  
In 1904, events unfolding in the capital showed that the threat of legal and physical 
force had not brought about the desired results in Miyagi. The directors of the Tokyo 
Rice Exchange (Tōkyō beikoku torihikijo) sent official word that it would soon drop the 
prefecture's signature Honkokumai rice from its product listing, sending landlords and 
local officials alike into a panic. At issue was the quality of the rice, which had fallen 
continuously over recent years. Though enjoying a reputation as a fine product during the 
Edo period, Honkokumai had not fared well in the transition to modernity. The pressures 
of capitalist forces on cash-poor Miyagi had forced down the quality of the crop, earning 
it a listing of "inferior product" on the Tokyo Exchange in 1877. While this may have 
hurt the pride of some farmers, it did not spell disaster. Honkokumai found a comfortable 
place in the national market during the last years of the nineteenth century as a low priced 
grain for the urban working classes and as an ingredient for cheap saké and other 
secondary products.342 A continuing descent in quality, combined with the arrival of rice 
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from Korea, compromised the suitability of the rice for even these uses, bringing the 
situation to a head in 1904 and presenting Miyagi marketers with the ultimatum of 
improve or be removed.343
 
The response in Miyagi to the threat of being cut out of the Tokyo exchange was to 
institute quality standards for rice and back them with the force of law. Following 
vigorous lobbying by landlords, the prefectural government passed the Rules for Testing 
Export Rice (Yushutu kome kensa kisoku) in 1905, designed to ensure that any rice 
leaving the prefecture meet a strict set of quality standards. The regulations marked a 
dramatic change to rice production in Miyagi, but they were not the first time that the 
prefectural government had made attempts along these lines. After the newly-opened 
Agriculture and Commerce Ministry shut down the prefecture's first attempt at quality 
regulations in 1881, Miyagi officials devised another quality testing system in 1897, but 
the absence of immediate pressure for change led to apathy toward it and it was shelved 
without being implemented. In 1905, however, the context had changed and landlords 
and officials alike stood in solidarity behind the new regulations.344  
The details of the quality regulations revealed the landlord interests that had shaped 
them. In their weeding out of inferior rice damaged by improper drying or packaging, or 
harvested before reaching full maturity, the new rules echoed the earlier regulations, but 
they applied responsibility for meeting the standards in a new way. The use of the word 
"export rice" (yushutsu kome) in the title of the regulations was doubly deceptive. First, it 
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did not refer to grain that was destined for trading abroad, rather it targeted any rice 
leaving the prefecture. More important, landlord pressure had ensured that the need to 
pass quality standards was moved as close to the point of production as possible, making 
them closer to regulations on rent rice than rules for export rice.345 The original plans for 
the system stipulated that quality tests would be conducted at a central facility, to which 
landlords and others seeking to send their rice outside the prefecture were required to 
bring the rice they had collected through harvests or rents. A failure to meet the official 
standards would then require the individual who brought the grain in to assume the costs 
for its rebagging, adjusting weights, retransportation, or whatever other measures were 
necessary. Landlord petitions resulted in extensive revisions to this plan, reorienting the 
system to work in favor of their interests. Testing under the final form of the regulations 
was to be conducted at the level of the village, with landlords themselves overseeing the 
tests on rice that now had to be packaged and transported by tenants, who were also 
assigned responsibility for the costs associated with failure.346 All rice proffered as rent 
was required to meet the quality standards, which were revised to stipulate improved 
storage bags and drying styles designed to make Miyagi rice more attractive to 
consumers in the capital.347 The system was designed to give landlords and officials the 
improvements they sought and have tenants and independent farmers pay for them. 
The factors driving down the quality of Miyagi rice, which included the penetration 
of market forces and the changes in the productive relations in farming villages, suggest 
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that government administration was both appropriate and necessary. While the expansion 
of the money economy and the pressures of market forces in the last quarter of the 
nineteenth century pushed rice farmers to minimize their own costs in order to maintain a 
degree of profitability, the position of landlords between tenants and the market 
prevented those same forces from exerting a positive influence to reward quality.348 
Tenancy contracts syphoned off profits to landlords, leaving producers will little 
incentive to improve quality for higher profits they would never see. Instead, they applied 
their efforts to producing the largest yields for the lowest costs in inputs and labor, 
ensuring that they could pay rent and supply their own needs.349 The efforts of the rōnō 
meibōka in the 1880s to promote agricultural discussion societies, product fairs, and 
producers associations were attempts to reverse these trends, but they were unable to 
rectify the problems caused by the disconnect between tenant producers and the market. 
The application of law in both the saber system and the rice quality regulations were 
more aggressive means of plastering over this gap and introducing artificial coercive 
forces to fulfill the function that the market was prevented from performing. This was 
hothouse capitalism, artificial legal compulsion taking the place of market forces to 
incubate higher quality agricultural products. 
The measures produced the results for which they were designed, but problems 
lurked not far beneath the surface. While landlords sat comfortably secure in national 
markets, tenant farmers continued to be isolated from the potential for profit inherent in 
improved rice and were now forced to abandon their strategies to limit their own costs in 
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labor and money. The problems inherent in this arrangement found form in a series of 
emblematic images from contemporary farming that stood in contrast to the claims of 
successful modernization. The saber system projected visions of armed policemen 
forcing desperate farmers to work at swordpoint. Rice quality systems presented scenes 
of tenants forced to subsist on inferior grains and marginal foodstuffs while they reserved 
what quality rice they could produce for landlords. These images seemed far removed 
from the national narrative of progress and modernity that enlightened government and 
capital market forces were supposed to have brought about. Rather, they drew easy 
associations with the Tokugawa period, revealing farming populations who, in their 
quality of life and economic relations, bore a strong resemblance to the "feudal" peasants 
whose mere mention had been taboo in official language only a few years before. As 
disturbing as the contrasts between ideals and actual conditions were the inequalities in 
rural society that accompanied them. The deepening poverty of tenant farmers and 
smallholders was thrown into stark relief by the growing wealth and luxury of the 
landlords who had forced this system upon them. As landlords geared up at mid-decade 
for the institution of the rice inspection system, they rested easy in anticipation of the new 
age of ease and profit that lay before them, which, however, was not to be fulfilled in 
fact. 
As it happened, both the implementation of the rice inspection system and its effects 
were delayed by crop failures and famine in 1905 and 1906. Nature's answer to the 
efforts of bureaucrats and landlord-meibōka to modernize agriculture and stabilize 
production at the turn of the century was years of recurrently punishing weather. The first 




farmers. Cold and damp summers brought about crop failures in 1902, 1905, 1906, 1910, 
and 1913. The worst of these struck just as landlords presided over the institution of the 
legal order that established their dominance over agricultural production. Summer began 
with fine weather in 1905, promising a growing season in Miyagi to suit the celebrations 
of victory in the Russo-Japanese War that were sweeping across the prefecture. But, 
temperatures dropped at mid-summer, and the cold weather continued through August, 
stunting the growth of the rice plants at a critical moment in their maturation. Unusual 
degrees of insect damage worsened conditions and, when continuing cold weather was 
joined by damaging rains in September, it was clear that the losses would be extreme. 
Autumn yields reached no higher than 12.5% of average prefecturewide, recovering to 
only 76.7% the following year in an exponential widening of the damage to farming 
villages.350 With little to no production, desperation struck farmers across Miyagi, leading 
to official designation of fully 52% of agricultural families at poverty level (kyūmin).351 
The situation became so dire that Miyagi officials arranged for the import of rice from 
Southeast Asia, which they distributed to a third of the prefecture's farmers with 
instructions to garnish the grain with boiled radish leaves.352
 
The severity of the crop failures exposed serious weaknesses in the agricultural 
development that had taken place. The improvements that landlords and officials 
introduced over the previous decades appeared to have even exacerbated the difficulties 
caused by weather. Fields fully treated with expensive fertilizers produced crops that 
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appeared not to have not been fertilized at all, giving rise the belief that they worsened 
the problem.353 Although officials characterized this as a "misbelief" (goshin), it 
contained more truth than fiction. Landlords had been halfhearted in their adoption of 
improved strains of rice that could better withstand inclement conditions, failing to 
provide for the deep plowing and extensive application of chemical fertilizers required by 
the advanced seeds they forced on their tenants.354 Without the conditions they needed, 
these rice strains displayed increased, rather than decreased, vulnerability to weather and 
water. To tenants already bruised by the saber system and facing further distress in the 
upcoming quality regulations, the crop failures suggested that their experiences with 
agricultural improvement were not just painful, but futile. 
As reported in the Heimin shinbun, many tenant farmers responded to the disaster by 
fleeing the prefecture for Hokkaidō and other regions of the country. The experiences of 
Kami, Kurokawa, and Iwanuma mentioned at the start of this chapter were part of a 
larger pattern of migration that saw 13,312 farmers leave for Hokkaidō in 1906 and 
16,211 the following year.355 Outbound tenants would first apply to their landlords for 
permission to quit their paddies, then would most often leave surreptitiously when their 
requests were denied. In an effort to stem the abandonment of their lands, some landlords 
offered rent remissions and forgiveness. The Azumi family in the Tōda village of Nangō 
cancelled 71.4% of the rents they were owed in 1905 and 25.9% in 1906, sacrificing 
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claims on short-term profits in a tried-and-true traditional form.356 The same family also 
employed destitute tenant farmers as labor and paid them with imported rice, an activity 
in which other Nangō landlords also engaged.357 Others took similar measures, providing 
enough relief to enable farmers and landlords alike to withstand pressures until harvests 
returned to normalcy in 1907. 
While pragmatism forced concessions like rent remissions in some cases, the general 
landlord response to tenant difficulties in northern Miyagi was less than sympathetic. 
Rents across the region had been on the rise for over a decade, a trend that the crop 
failures did not halt. Rents in Nangō were representative of the wider region and 
continued to climb throughout the crisis to a high point in 1907, when other factors acted 
to check the upward momentum.358  
Rather than considering a reduction in the profits they derived from their tenants, 
Miyagi landlords instead organized themselves to squeeze them harder. The landlord 
response to tenant hardship in Monō and Oshika was to form a landlord association 
(jinushikai) in February of 1906 and lay plans to promote tenant compliance with the 
upcoming rice quality regulations.359 The prefectural jinushikai, which had been formed 
under the auspices of the Miyagi government to deal with tensions between landlords and 
tenants after the Russo-Japanese War, adopted similar priorities. The organization cited 
its concern for the hardships facing Miyagi farmers in its policy plan of 1907 and 
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produced a number of resolutions that failed to offer solutions to them.360 Displaying 
either an ignorance of both the sources of the problems and the basic principles of 
economics or an impressive callousness, especially in the context of plans ostensibly 
designed to ease suffering, the jinushikai proposed the strategy of staying the course. 
Familiar methods like product exhibitions, encouragement of the production of rice 
strains favored by landlords, and the establishment of productive associations were joined 
with a paradoxical strengthening of the commitment to rice-quality inspections, now 
flavored with vague reference to the possibility of rewards to tenants who produced crops 
of superior quality. 
Nor was the general elite response in general much more sympathetic than that of 
landlord associations. Lamenting in the December, 1905 issue of the Miyagi Education 
Association Journal that the crop failures and famine threatened the plans to spread 
general education after the Russo-Japanese War, Ōshō Shigeru of the northern district of 
Kurihara went on to suggest that the situation had a silver lining.361 Despite their baleful 
influence on formal education, the crop failures provided children with valuable 
experience with hunger and poverty that would make them better prepared for the next 
famine than their parents had been for this one. 
While landlords panicked in the face of tenant flights to Hokkaidō and the thought of 
resuming cultivation themselves, the crop failures of 1905 and 1906 also provided some 
with unusual opportunities. The crisis situation served as a means to mobilize official 
power behind reforms and improvements that landlords had long pursued. Nōkai had 
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been pushing to replace Honkokumai rice with Kame no o, an early harvest strain 
produced in Yamagata prefecture and tested in Akita prefecture that served as a lower-
yield but more reliable producer. The crop failures brought Miyagi officials on board 
with the plan, and brought about legal imperatives to force the changeover in the years 
that followed.362 The crop failures also provided a means for some landlord families to 
advance their personal fortunes. The Noda family of Nangō, then in the middle of its rise 
to supremacy among local landlords, took advantage of its relative financial stability 
during the crisis to borrow money from a local credit association in order to lend it out at 
higher rates of interest to poorer farmers in need.363
 
Even discounting some of the crasser forms of opportunism, the situation at mid-
decade did not cast landlord-meibōka in the best light.  The crop failures of 1905 and 
1906 and the punishing conditions they brought about for farmers stood as an 
unanswerable indictment of the results of meibōka-led agricultural development. The 
levels of hardship in rural Miyagi drew easy and damning comparisons with the Great 
Tenmei and Great Tenpō Famines of the Tokugawa period.364 The lauded technological 
development spearheaded by landlords and government officials had failed to make 
farming more stable and productive than it had been in the times of their grandparents 
and great-grandparents. The thin veneer of modernity that improvement efforts had 
applied to agriculture and rural villages was stripped bare. Tenant farmers, now the 
majority of cultivators in northern Miyagi, were indistinguishable from the "feudal" 
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peasants who were supposed to have disappeared in the newly modern countryside. 
Powerless against the lords of the land and state and the vagaries of nature alike, tenant 
farmers stood in mute contradiction to the progress claimed by meibōka, officials, and the 
nation as a whole. 
Despite the severity of the famine and its implications for the success of their 
stewardship of agricultural development, landlord-meibōka did not feel a sense of crisis 
in the middle of the first decade of the twentieth century. In fact, they had a great deal to 
feel happy about. The first years of the new century had seen remarkable developments in 
the control of Miyagi landlords over the countryside. Laws now backed up their interests 
as the owners of arable land, ensuring that the tenants who rented the land would 
maximize their profits and assigning government the responsibility for enforcing the 
terms of exploitative contracts. Also comforting was the immanent institution of rice 
quality regulations, which promised to end once and for all the uncertainty of Miyagi rice 
on the national market. Secure in their economic positions, progressing in their political 
control over the villages, and backed by a government that appeared committed to 
advancing their interests, meibōka had cause for satisfaction. Regrettable crop failures 
aside, the decade had clearly gone their way. 
But things were not going as smoothly as they liked to believe. Miyagi landlords 
may have weathered the crop failures and famine with their fortunes intact, in some ways 
even strengthening their economic and political positions in villages, but they exposed 
troubling contradictions in the process. The danger to them was not in the families who 
stole past the guards to abandon their rented plots, it was in the tenant farmers that 




landlord conception of improvement in the saber system and the rice quality regulations 
were advancing the modernization of agriculture, but the pressures they applied were 
pushing tenants to their limits. Concern with the situation was also growing among 
officials in the capital. The gulf between their ideals of a developing and stable 
countryside and the actuality of vulnerable and dependent villages emerging from the 
agricultural leadership of landlords disturbed many, whose vocal displeasure would soon 
make itself evident. Landlord-meibōka stood confident at the middle of the first decade of 
the twentieth century, but the twin forces of tenants below and bureaucrats above were 
converging behind the scenes in a pattern that threatened to change the nature of 





The Spirit of the Times Has Changed: The End of Meibōka 
Agricultural Development 
 
 In early March of 1908, the largest landowner in Miyagi was furious. Saitō 
Zen'uemon, whose extensive landholdings were second in Japan only to the Honma 
family of neighboring Yamagata, had been driven to distraction by developments in an 
ongoing dispute between landlords and tenant farmers in northern Miyagi. Recent weeks 
had seen public opinion rally behind the tenant organization that initiated the conflict, and 
in the last few days one landlord after another gave in and agreed to the group's demands. 
Saitō's exasperated response to these capitulations appeared in an article in the March 10 
issue of the regional newspaper, the Kahoku shinpō.365 He entreated his fellow landlords 
to persevere, telling them, "There is no need to go recklessly changing contracts; we can 
only wait until tenants everywhere realize that their labor is their own profit." He went on 
to vent his spleen at the editors and readers of the newspaper, whom he accused of 
naively falling victim to the manipulations of wily and media-savvy tenants. He accused 
his opponents of cynically trading on their public image as the unlettered and victimized 
peasants of the feudal past. In fact, he explained, the recent spate of anti-landlord 
editorials in the newspaper stood as proof of their adroitness in shaping an unfair public 
campaign against landlords, whose treatment of tenants was only rational and natural. 
"Landlords," he explained, "have no duty to tenants beyond what is written in the 
mutually agreed upon contracts" (jinushi ni ha sōgo keiyaku ijō no gimu nashi). Tenant 
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claims of hardship were exaggerated – making a mountain out of a molehill (shinshō 
bōdai) – and their charges of injustice paradoxically threatened to revive the feudalistic 
practices of the backward past. 
Saitō's frustration reflected the dramatic changes in the situation of landlords in 
northern Miyagi. Only two years earlier, landlords had been secure in their positions on 
the cusp of unprecedented prosperity. Laws were oriented firmly in their favor; profits 
from agriculture were on the rise, with tenancy contracts ensuring they flowed directly to 
landlords; and government policy on both the prefectural and national levels was 
committed to maintaining and advancing these realities. In Miyagi the promise of the 
period appeared bright. The return to stable yields after the crop failures not only brought 
the local economy back to normality, it also meant that the rice-quality inspection system 
could finally be implemented, opening a new period of landlord profitability and control 
over village society. 
Now, however, Saitō and his fellow landlords were facing defeat at the hands of 
formerly powerless tenant farmers. Only months after the announcement that the rice-
quality inspection system was back on the agenda, before it was instituted in practice, 
tenants began to move against landlords. Beginning early in 1907, they formed 
organizations across the prefecture, pressing for revisions to tenancy contracts and 
threatening to abandon cultivation. The end of the year brought new cooperation and 
coordination between groups in the rice-producing north, where Saitō made his home, 
and the reversals that drove the landlord to voice his anger to reporters and the news-




As disturbing as landlord weakness was the absence of support for Saitō and his 
fellow landlords from the government. Saitō could be forgiven for his exasperation at the 
failure of Miyagi's administrative elite to intervene. The same officials had, after all, 
spent the better part of the decade transforming the terms of landlord-written tenancy 
contracts into the law of land. The saber system that sent sword-wielding police to 
enforce tenant compliance and the rice quality inspections stood as evidence of the 
solidarity of both the Miyagi and the national government with landlords and their vision 
of agricultural improvement. Now, however, those same authorities stood to the side and 
allowed tenants to force contract revisions. While the justice of Saitō's claims regarding 
proper relations between producer and landowner was open to debate, his shock was not 
unreasonable in the face of what appeared to be profound change in the official approach 
to the management of rural society and agricultural development. 
The defeat of northern Miyagi landlords in the spring of 1908 was a hint of the 
transformations to come. The victory of tenants was only partly due to the canniness and 
confidence they displayed in the conflict. As Saitō lamented, an equally important factor 
was the evaporation of the official support for landlords that he and his peers had 
expected to resolve the conflict in their favor. As tenants celebrated their victories, a 
more profound threat to the landlord-meibōka system of agricultural development had 
taken shape in the ministries of the central government. The dissonance between the 
official understanding of improvement and that of landlords had grown too disruptive for 
government leaders. The Home and Agriculture Ministries launched new initiatives in the 
last years of the decade, attacking the positions of landlords in village leadership and 




government to rural Japan. The new course that these leaders charted recast the idea of 
meibōka, challenging the direction taken by landlord-meibōka, and instituted a new 
period in agricultural development. 
As harvests returned to normal after the damage of the crop failures of 1905 and 
1906, these dramatic changes still lay in the future. Landlord-meibōka in Miyagi were 
confident of growing fortune. Among the first orders of prefectural business when the 
worst of the crop failures had passed was the delayed implementation of the rice-quality 
inspection system. The Tokyo Rice Exchange made allowances for the climatic 
difficulties in Miyagi, but the return to normalcy brought with it the renewed threat of the 
exclusion of Miyagi rice from the national market. Fortunately for landlords, the basics of 
the new system had already been established before the crisis, and it stood ready to be 
implemented. In January of 1907, the prefecture reaffirmed its commitment to the quality 
inspection initiative and announced the location of testing stations throughout Miyagi.
366
 
Landlords responded to the potential for increased costs under the system with petitions 
that eventually led to revisions demanding compliance at the point of production under 
their supervision.
367
 Thus assured both that Miyagi rice would continue to have a place 
on the national market and that tenant farmers would bear the costs of making it so, 
landlords stood in a good position. The return of crops to normal yields and the ongoing 
production increases from gradually effective improvement efforts promised greater 
prosperity in the future. 
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Yet, official criticism of landlord-meibōka and their involvement in agricultural 
development was growing. Concern among bureaucrats in the central government about 
the costs and benefits of landlord-led development was intensifying and some began to 
question fundamental aspects of the rural order. Although a minority had voiced similar 
doubts in the past, the economic and social problems that followed the Russo-Japanese 
War (1904-05) prompted a reworking of priorities. Official fears of pervasive village 
poverty and disquiet in the wake of the Sino-Japanese War of 1894-95 had become fact. 
The Home and Agriculture and Commerce Ministries scrambled to find ways to repair 
the economic and ideological damage wrought by the war. Attention turned to the health 
of rural society and the effects landlord leadership had wrought upon it. 
The earliest criticisms of landlord-led agricultural development stretched back to the 
1890s, appearing among the same leaders who were urging government support for 
landlords and their activities. Speaking at the 1900 annual meeting of the Zenkoku 
nōjikai, Tamari Kizō castigated landlords for abandoning their focus on agriculture to 
concentrate on personal profits.
368
 To correct their failures, he prescribed a dual program 
that combined training societies to point landlords back toward farming and the formation 
of village economic cooperatives that would balance their power on a local scale. The 
following year, Tamari laid out a range of charges suggesting that the disconnect between 
landlords and farming had been a motivation in the original organization of nōkai. While 
expressing his hopes that the journal of the Central nōkai could reform dissolute 
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landlords, he issued a withering litany of their failings. "Today's ōjinushi (large 
landlords)," he explained,  
put on the airs of a lord and give no thought toward agriculture. On the 
contrary, they consider agriculture beneath their station. Taking on these 
lordly pretenses, they focus in other directions and only a small number of 
them are thinking about farming. They think extracting large rents from 
tenant farmers is agricultural thinking. They pay attention only to other 
matters, even selling their land for high prices and buying stock 
certificates. You could say that the business of ōjinushi today is 
commerce…ōjinushi gōnō (large landlords/wealthy farmers) think this 
way and really cannot be trusted…when [nōkai] were established, I 
thought the next important work to undertake was to make ōjinushi gōnō 
subscribe to the ideology of agriculture (nōgyō no shisō)369 
 
The crafters of village plans at the turn of the century echoed Tamari's concerns. The 
plans often included indictments of both absentee and resident landlords, condemning 
both the predatory activities of the former and the inequality and conflict resulting from 
the latter.
370
 If allowed to continue, these groups threatened the very survival of farming 
villages and the future viability of agriculture. Along with worries of these types came 
efforts to reform landlords and correct their excesses. A 1901 meeting of prefectural 
industry promotion chiefs sponsored by the Ministry of Agriculture included a panel on 
"how to get large landlords (ōjinushi) to apply their energies to the improvement of 
agriculture" and the annual meeting of the Zenkoku nōkai the following year raised the 
topic of "means to cultivate a spirit of agricultural improvement in ōjinushi."371 To 
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awaken this public spirit, the latter meeting proposed compulsory classes, new 
organizations, and the promotion of landlord participation in fairs and exhibitions in a 
curious inversion of the solutions landlords normally offered to correct the failings of 
tenant farmers.
372 
Officials in the central government also saw problems with landlord leadership over 
agricultural improvement in the early 1900s, but they identified it explicitly with the evils 
of absenteeism. A year before Tamari issued his indictment of landlords, Yamagata 
Aritomo, the chief architect of the local government system and an early proponent of 
meibōka-led development, looked back on the decade since the enactment of the system 
and counted absentee landlords among the causes of its shortcomings. While continuing 
to believe that local notables were necessary as the principal engines of agricultural 
development and local administration, he noted that "as the spirit of the time has 
changed, it is not necessarily true that ōjinushi are what we call meibōka."373 The official 
focus of blame upon absentee landlords allowed faith in their resident counterparts as the 
stewards of farming to persist, preventing deeper criticism of the fundamentals of the 
meibōka-led system of agricultural development. Celebrated folklorist, Yanagida Kunio, 
an official in the Ministry of Agriculture in 1902, saw in the "middle class" of resident 
landlords a potential replacement for their delinquent cousins:  
Landowning families who have lived in their villages for hundreds of 
years with land passed down from one generation to the next and who, 
past, present and future, do and will continue to make up the backbone of 
the people…taxpaying landowners who, even as they gather bags of rent 
rice in their storehouses and use it to feed their families, watch over the 
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house, and are constantly active in service of the country or the prefecture, 
still never forget their task of advancing agriculture.
374 
 
Although his adulation of resident landlords would soon change, as would similar 
sentiments among other officials, the idea at the heart of it continued to shape official 
policy for years to come. The solid middle core of village landowners (chūnō or chūken 
jinbutsu), characterized like Mayor Straw Sandals both by residence in the villages in 
which they held land and by their initiative in pursuing agricultural improvement, 
continued to be the key element to rural development and to hold a corresponding place 
in official plans to promote it. Yanagida and others were restating the functional 
definition for meibōka that Yamata had built into his system of local government that 
required a display of initiative and an interest in the active pursuit of farming 
improvement. This functional definition, and the concerns that prompted it, exposed the 
contradictions at the heart of the official approach to agricultural villages and explained 
the continuing reliance upon the disappointing landlords in the first years of the century. 
Attacks on landlords, inevitably couched as a failure of duty toward tenants and 
community, had at least as much to do with agricultural improvement as with neglected 
social responsibilities. Absentee landlords disappointed bureaucrats because they failed to 
impose the improved forms of farming that their resident colleagues did. The fact that 
forcing tenants to employ these farming techniques, which invariably imposed greater 
labor and costs on them, was a major source of the village disharmony lamented by 
officials was irrelevant. Agricultural development was what was important, and the 
failure to accomplish it is what opened up non-resident landlords to criticism. 
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The realities of rural Miyagi were different from the village situations that raised the 
ire of Yanagida and other officials. Absenteeism, as the bureaucrats of the Home and 
Agriculture Ministries understood it, was in fact a phenomenon limited to the 
economically advanced areas of the country. There, landlords had leveraged multiple 
opportunities for profit to diversify their interests, moving to local cities or national 
centers to manage their businesses. Landholding and tenant management were only one 
source of their income and not one that required excessive attention or additional 
investment. This was not the case in northern Miyagi. In the early twentieth century, the 
prefecture, along with the Tōhoku region as a whole, retained a well-deserved reputation 
for economic backwardness. Facing an incompletely developed money economy and 
with landowning as the sole industry with a potential for profit, Miyagi landlords stayed 
in the countryside. Cut off from other opportunities, the successful among them devoted 
themselves to the acquisition of land, assembling extensive holdings that put them in the 
class of large landlords.
375
 They were not absentee in the sense that drew official 
criticism. 
The most common means by which Miyagi landlords accumulated land had 
important implications for social and economic relations. Farmland in northern Miyagi 
was most often forfeited, rather than sold. Landlords tended to be moneylenders, whose 
control over land grew when they seized the lands of delinquent debtors. In this context, 
the annual payments made to them by the farming families who remained on forfeited 
lands took the form, not of rent, but of maintenance of their debt. This situation left 
tenants in a more precarious situation than elsewhere, without customary protections and 
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vulnerable to eviction at any time.
376
 The landlords that held this threat over their heads 
had not left their native places, thus avoiding the label of absentee, but it was not always 
true that they lived in the villages or regions where they owned land. As individual 
landholdings grew, more tenant farmers found control of their fields in the hands of 
landlords in other villages or districts. Entire villages could be owned by remote 
landlords, leaving these communities without the economic resources that provided for 
the emergence of local leaders or the improvement of agriculture elsewhere. This 
situation was a reflection both of the growing wealth of successful landowners and the 
extreme lack of capital in the north of the prefecture. Loans from wealthy landlords, 
wherever they might make their homes, were the only source of funds for fertilizer, 
seeds, and improvements to farmland, a circumstance that placed even independent 
landowning farmers under the control of landlords.
377 
Saitō Zen'uemon stood as the consummate example of a northern Miyagi landlord. A 
moneylender first, he was nonetheless celebrated as the second largest landlord in the 
country, a role in which he served as a model for others in the region with ambition, 
wealth, and land. Although he came from a background of rural privilege, his rise to great 
wealth was a recent development. A legendary deal to buy the land owned by the failed 
Kawasaki Bank in 1890 more than doubled the total holdings of his house and propelled 
him to the forefront of landowners nationally.
378
 By the turn of the century, the Saitō 
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house controlled over 1,100 hectares of farmland, and it was said that it was possible to 
walk all the way from Iwate prefecture in the north to Fukushima prefecture in the south 
without leaving Saitō's property. 
It was the collapse of rice prices in the late 1880s that made the Kawasaki land 
purchase possible, but Saitō had taken measures early on to insulate himself against the 
vagaries of nature and agriculture. In a pattern that was later reproduced among landlords 
across Tōhoku, Saitō moved his house out of direct involvement in farming. In 1879, just 
one year after taking over management of the family's business from his father, Saitō 
abandoned self-cultivation, devoting his attentions to the house's saké-brewing concerns 
and especially the money-lending business he shaped out of the family's pawn shop. By 
the time of the Kawasaki purchase, saké too had gone by the boards, abandoned like 
many independent brewing operations in the face of strict new laws and taxes levied on 
the industry. The Saitō house completed its movement into pure land ownership and 
moneylending, the roles that would define it through the next half century. 
Saitō was also ahead of his time in his approach to managing tenant farmers. The 
sentiments that he expressed in the Kahoku shinpō article touched on the philosophy 
guiding this approach and reiterated ideas he had first committed to writing nearly two 
decades earlier. In his Land Management Manual (Jisho kanri kokoresho) of 1892, Saitō 
laid out rational business administration as he understood it.
379
 Relations between 
landlords and tenants were like those between industrial labor and capital. Both groups 
entered into business with each other in perfect freedom and in rational pursuit of their 
own interests. If tenants found reason to become unhappy with their arrangements with 
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the landlord, they were welcome to leave and find another type of employment that 
served them better. This rational arrangement of economic interests was not, he 
complained in 1892 as he did in 1908, properly appreciated by the well-meaning but 
misinformed public: 
The public misunderstands this arrangement and claims that tenants are 
mistreated. Then, as a form of relief, they have the opinion that landlords 
should love their tenants like family, while tenants should respect their 
landlords like the heads of their houses and depend upon them. Thus, they 
make arguments that treat today's landlords and tenants the same as lords 
(daimyō) and peasants (hyakushō) in the olden days. But the old lords 
followed the principles of despotism (sensei), while today's landlords 
reject this in favor of the principles of democracy (minshusei), which is 
collaborative in all things.
380 
 
In line with this logic, the only reasonable response to conflict from the landlord's 
point of view was to adhere to the terms of the contract and iron out any disagreements 
through legal means. Saitō advocated the immediate seizure of land in the case of default 
and advised that any disputes should be resolved in court. 
While Saitō's philosophy of landlordism might be considered fair in a ruthless way, 
his particular instructions for day-to-day business operations highlighted the hypocrisies 
that undergirded his view of "rational" landlord tenant relations. Advising his future 
successors on the daily management of tenant-farmed holdings, he outlined a series of 
conditions as "the only circumstances" in which it was acceptable to raise rents beyond 
what was recorded in the tenancy contracts. These situations numbered six and included: 
changes to transport costs, changes to product prices, improvements to land and/or 
irrigation, rises in farmer income relative to labor in other industries, increases in the 
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farming population, and rises in the cost of living in villages that prompted tenants to ask 
for more land to rent in order to meet their costs.
381
 If the contract-based nature of Saitō's 
general approach could be forgiven as a classic conservative understanding of labor and 
capital, all pretense to fairness fell apart with these guidelines. From their positions of 
power, he averred, landlords could and should take advantage of any change in 
circumstances to increase their profits while shifting expenses to tenants, who would then 
have to fight them in court if they objected. 
Saitō was the first Miyagi landlord to abandon direct involvement in cultivation to 
concentrate on the business of tenant administration and moneylending, but it was not 
long before other ōjinushi began to follow his model. Faced with the same backward 
economic circumstances, they found their avenues for profitable investment limited. The 
same tax pressures that drove Saitō and others out of saké brewing killed the small-scale 
soy sauce industry, wiping out two of the industries formerly run by wealthy farmers and 
driving them instead toward investment in land. Also pushing this trend was the 
alienation of landlords from the rice market. By the first decade of the twentieth century, 
dedicated rice merchants took control over the increasingly complicated futures market 
for grains, cutting off the landlords who collected rent rice from active participation in 
the terms of its sale. While Saitō answered these circumstances with his 
uncompromisingly (and selectively) rational approach to tenant management, other 
Miyagi landlords responded with greater subtlety. The Sasaki family of Nangō followed a 
typical path, abandoning soy sauce production in 1897 and reducing the amount of land 
that family members farmed themselves gradually from 3.6 hectares in 1899 to 0.2 
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 Whether early and fast or later and gradually, large landlords in 
Miyagi increasingly distanced themselves from direct involvement in farming from the 
1890s on. This separation made them nearly as remote from agriculture as their non-
resident analogues in other regions, undermining official understandings of the 
differences between absentee and resident landlords. 
The outbreak of the Russo-Japanese War in 1904 and the difficulties it left in its 
wake changed the nature and intensity of official criticisms of the landlord-meibōka 
system of agricultural development. The ending of hostilities in 1905 pushed two 
overarching goals to the forefront of national policy.
383
 The first of these was to establish 
a stable social order befitting Japan's place among the great powers. Victory had earned 
international recognition for Japan, but policymakers were keenly aware of the 
precariousness of the country's position in world geopolitics and hypersensitive to 
troubled domestic conditions that cast doubt on Japan's qualifications as a world power. 
The pursuit of the first goal meant a renewed effort at national self-strengthening that 
went beyond what had been accomplished since the fall of the Tokugawa Shogunate in 
1868. Yamaguchi prefectural bureaucrat Nishimura Yasukichi outlined the basic shape of 
the new imperative in national policy in a series of lectures he gave between February 
and April of 1906. Victory had placed Japan in a period of unprecedented challenges and 
did not mark an end to international conflict. "The Russo-Japanese War," he explained, 
"was simply a war between two countries, but in the coming "peace war" (heiwa sensō), 
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every single country in the world will be our enemy."
384
 In order to survive this battle 
royale, Japan would have to firm up its society and economy by all means possible. 
The second goal, closely related to the first, was to deal with the fallout of poverty 
and discontent that the war had brought to cities and rural areas alike. This dealt more 
directly with landlord-meibōka and agricultural improvement. Symptoms of social 
disintegration during and after the war included the rural poor flooding into urban 
ghettoes and signs of ideological subversion in the mocking replacement of the national 
slogans of "fukoku kyōhei" (rich country, strong military) and "kyokoku itchi" (unity of 
the whole nation) with "hinkoku kyōhei" (poor country, strong military) and "hinpuku 
kakuzetsu" (division of rich and poor).
385
 Tenancy rates across the country passed 40% 
during the war, and officials feared that the economic distress responsible for this 
increase was also the reason for the growing dissatisfaction among rural residents that 
threatened to evolve into open discord.
386
 The search for the causes of these rural 
difficulties once again focused eyes on landlord-meibōka and their leadership of 
agricultural villages. 
If Saitō Zen'uemon was disappointed in officialdom in the wake of the tenant union 
action in 1908, the same disillusionment among officials and central agricultural leaders 
toward landlords had been in evidence for much longer. Paradoxically, despite this 
disillusionment, some aspects of the new government commitment to national strength 
and rural prosperity resembled a strengthening of support for the landlord-meibōka vision 
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of rural improvement. In 1905, the Imperial Diet passed measures relating to a general 
program for "cultivating the foundation of the nation" (kokuhon baiyō).387 This 
cultivation involved a torrent of new national funding for agriculture that included 
outlays for such landlord favorites as seed improvement, animal plowing, and land 
consolidation. Behind these public gestures, however, criticism was continuing to build. 
New doubts were emerging concerning even those resident landlords that stood so high in 
the estimations of Yanagida and others who were critical of absentee landlords. 
A part of these doubts concerned political activities. One of the avowed purposes of 
the system of local government introduced in the late 1880s was the creation and 
maintenance of depoliticized villages that would be insulated from the political intrigues 
and conflicts that plagued Tokyo and other political centers. The actual conditions in 
villages were failing to meet these expectations. Yokoi Tokiyoshi, a Central nōkai leader, 
depicted the evils of political activities in his novel Mohan chōson (Model Village), a 
dramatic portrait of an idealized rural community.
388
 In the story, the father of the main 
character is described as having left his home village in the vain pursuit of a political 
career that ended in backstabbing and failure. He is presented in contrast with the selfless 
and diligent mayor of the village, next to whom he is a contemptible figure who "worked 
unceasingly and diligently chasing fame and fortune [, but] did not contribute a single 
thing to society."
389 
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Prominent meibōka from northern Miyagi had a long history of involvement in 
precisely the sort of party politics that central planners like Yokoi held in such contempt. 
After calls for people's parties resulted in a broad reordering of the landlords elected to 
the prefectural assembly, Endō Ryōkichi, a major figure in the Entō conflict, and Kamada 
Sannosuke, not yet Mayor Straw Sandals, were among the party-affiliated landlords in 
northern Miyagi involved in disruptive political activities at the turn of the century. The 
political discord grew so heated that landlords launched no-confidence movements 
against the Miyagi governor and dispatched repeated missions to the Home Ministry to 
request support for their battles with the prefectural administration.
390
 This was a far cry 
from the depoliticized and self-administering countryside that had been the object of the 
local government system. The embroilment of key members of the feuding factions in 
high-profile corruption cases at the same time only served to highlight the gap between 
vision and reality. Endō stood out as a particularly damning example, drawing concurrent 
accusations of misconduct relating to the disposal of funds for a dysentery outbreak and 
fraud in connection with the sale of a forest owned by an elementary school.
391 
Alongside the doubts raised by political hijinks were growing concerns about the 
separation of resident landlords from farming. Again, questions relating to the problem 
had received limited voice much earlier. As far back as 1894, Tamari Kizō remarked on 
the growing disconnect, observing that "most people with large landholdings are already, 
not farmers, but pure merchants. Rather than working with farmers, they are a species 
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that works with merchants."
392
 Former bureaucrat (and later scholar) Inoue Harumaru 
was even more damning in his 1901 summary of the situation, charging that "landlords 
[had] ceased to be leaders in technological or technical development. Their technical 
focus was in the process of changing from production to the collection and sale of tenant 
rice."
393
 Tamari Kizō singled out landlord-farmers in Tōhoku, a region notably lacking in 
absentee landlords, in 1904, declaring that they were "quick to find fault, but are, when 
compared to the people of other regions, extremely lacking in the spirit to get things 
done. It could be that the reason that the Tōhoku region doesn't bloom, doesn't rise, 
doesn't prosper, and maybe even why it is insignificant in the worlds of politics and 
business, is in the end that they lack a sense of inward motivation, the drive to move 
forward, and a spirit of daring and resolve."
394 
In the postwar environment of uncertainty, active officials joined agricultural 
activists in condemning resident and non-resident landlords alike. Now the positions of 
economic and political dominance that resident landlords had carved out for themselves 
in villages drew fresh criticism. In 1909, Home Ministry secretary Nakagawa Nozomu 
castigated the members of rural elected assemblies for raising local taxes to pay for 
administration and development and ensuring that the burden of paying them fell on the 
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less-affluent segments of village society.
395
 Other officials levelled similar charges 
against resident landlords. Home Ministry local office head Tokonomi Takejirō 
castigated the "men of influence" (yūryokusha) holding honorary local offices as 
incompetents who harmed their villages far more than they helped them, while Oshio 
Shigenosuke, another Home Ministry bureaucrat, claimed that landlords abused their 
local offices and fostered disorder through the neglecting of their duties.
396 
Most strident in his postwar criticisms of the failings of landlords was Yanagida 
Kunio. By 1907 the scales had fallen from his eyes and little evidence remained of his 
former idealization of virtuous landlords. Disillusioned by endemic postwar poverty, he 
came to recognize that the masses of landless tenants populating villages were not a 
transitory phenomenon and that landlords did not fit the portraits of benevolence he had 
celebrated. Predicting that a lack of government support would force independent farmers 
to launch their own, potentially destabilizing, movement for village prosperity and 
economic security, he grew critical of the government administration of villages under 
the local government system. He lamented the intrusion of officials into villages to 
compel production of village plans and force the consolidation of hamlet assets and 
criticized the newly-recognized agrarian Hotoku societies (Hōtokusha) for not working to 
open up flows of capital to middle farmers.
397 
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The official recognition of the exploitative nature of landlord-tenant relations 
brought about a curious inversion of the criticisms that central bureaucrats had leveled at 
Miyagi's first attempts at a rice inspection system in the 1880s. Instead of local officials 
imposing a feudal order on the lower levels of village society, as the central government 
charged that Miyagi administrators had done with their use of the word "peasants" 
(hyakushō) to describe farmers, it was now the lower classes themselves that were 
recreating the debased social system. This system also now offered the only hope for 
rescuing village society. Home secretary Nakagawa Nozomu summed up the situation, 
discussing the continuing existence of "a custom among local tenant farmers to treat their 
landlords as lords (tonosama)." This tendency had to be exploited to quell any potential 
for discontent among tenants and to ensure that the two classes "do not cause hardship" to 
one another.
398
 Here again, officials were recommending a paradoxical retreat from 
modernity in the countryside as a solution to economic and social woes. 
Despite their increasing displeasure with landlords and their failings in agricultural 
villages, however, policymakers could not revoke their positions of local leadership. The 
fact was that the government needed landlords to lead the ongoing improvement of 
farming. Their combination of assets, both financial and otherwise, and persistent 
assumptions concerning their social character made landlords infinitely more capable of 
agricultural improvement than tenants. Yokoi Tokiyoshi agreed with those criticizing the 
failures of landlords as meibōka, but continued to believe that they represented the only 
choice for local leaders and stewards of development, "as things like the improvement of 
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agriculture and farmland [could] not possibly be entrusted to tenants."
399
 This was not a 
matter of tenants simply lacking the economic means for the work. Against the failings of 
landlords, who took advantage of the trust that had been placed in them and enriched 
themselves at the expense of their villages, tenants were criticized for pseudo-biological 
immorality and character deficiencies. Influential social reformer and advocate of the 
Local Improvement Movement (Chihō kairyō undō) Tomeoka Kōsuke presented a 
characteristic understanding of the social basis for failing villages. The laziness and 
immorality of smaller farmers destroyed village unity, while the selfishness and greed of 
landlords made them derelict in their duty to promote development.
400
 Both exercised a 
negative influence, but the former was a fundamental and inalterable aspect of the 
makeup of the poor, while the latter was a choice among a group that was otherwise in 
sole possession of the moral and other assets needed to rebuild shattered villages. 
While bureaucrats and improvement advocates attempted to salvage the ideal of the 
landlord-meibōka, matters were taking their own course in Miyagi. The famine had taken 
a toll on tenant farmers in the prefecture, the seriousness of which was apparent in the 
flood of migration to Hokkaidō. It was the institution of the rice regulations, however, 
that threatened to be the more damaging development. Apart from the absolute increase 
in rents that it represented – demanding rent payments in grains of higher value, both in 
terms of their market value and the labor that went into their production – the quality 
standards also posed a danger in their lack of provision for relaxation in the event of crop 
failures. Despite the return to plentiful harvests in 1907, the looming regulation system 
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created an atmosphere of dread in the north in what Tokyo journalist Nishikawa Tadashi 
called "the sadness of a year of plenty" (hōnen no kanashimi).401 The moves of Miyagi's 
landlords in the wake of the famine did little to assuage tenant fears. They worked 
throughout 1907 and into the following year with rice merchants to lobby the prefectural 
government for the right to conduct the quality inspections at the point of rent payment in 
the villages. Success in spring of 1908 ensured that all costs for meeting the standards, 
including rebagging and adjustments, would be borne by tenants. At the same time, the 
leaders of the Miyagi Landlord Association (Miyagiken jinushikai) publicly addressed the 
troubles of tenants. In the May, 1907 issue of the journal of the Dai Nihon nōkai, they 
expressed their sympathies for the difficulties facing poorer villagers and introduced a 
number of resolutions notable for their failure to address any of them. In answer to the 
suffering of tenants, the landlords offered a renewed commitment to raising the quality of 
rice, holding product exhibition fairs, reordering farmland, and organizing further 
landlord associations.
402
 These measures indeed hit at the heart of the problems of 
tenants, but they promised to strengthen their causes and increase the pressure they 
exerted. 
In response to the adversity they faced, Miyagi tenants fired the first shots against 
landlords in 1907. Their progress toward success was swift. Nishikawa, writing for the 
Shūkan shakai shinbun in December of 1907, reported that the tenant union (kosakunin 
kumiai) in the village of Tagajō had pressed the local large landlord family of Kitsukawa 
                                                     
401
 Nishikawa Tadashi, “Yuzei nikki,” Shūkan shakai shinbun 29, December 15, 1907. 
402
 “Miyagiken ōjinushikai,” Dai Nihon nōkaihō, no. 311 (May 1907): 42. Insensitivity was not 
monopolized by Miyagi landlords. The following article in the journal relates a proposal from landlords in 




into a corner and that the landlord would have to give into the group's demands or face 
the threat of violence.
403
 From that basis, the movement spread and quickly landlords 
across the prefecture found themselves assailed. By the beginning of summer in 1908, 
socialist reporter Hirata Ichirō was able to proclaim with confidence, "in all of Japan, the 
prefecture with the most tenant disturbances (sōdō) must be Miyagi."404 
In fact, the Miyagi tenant unions of the post-famine period were building on 
organizational roots that reached back before the Russo-Japanese War. As they would do 
in 1908, early tenant groups had formed in the north of the prefecture, where landlord 
domination of the local money supply was most concentrated. The first two such 
organizations, reflecting the difficulties caused by this domination, were a credit union 
and a collective purchasing and marketing union, which established the precedent of 
smallholder leadership over a membership of tenant farmers.
405
 Kosaku dōmei (tenant 
alliance) first appeared as a term with the growing assertiveness of tenant organizations 
in the wake of crop failures in 1902. A more aggressive form of tenant organization, and 
one that presaged later developments, the groups presented landlords with the choice 
between remitting and reducing rents or seeing the abandonment of their lands by 
tenants.
406
 A new spate of organizations came with the onset of further crop failures in 
1905.
407
 While the difficulties of two seasons of famine bled strength from the 
movement, the foundation was in place for the explosion of 1907 and 1908. 
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The tenant union movement revived itself in the wake of the famine and approached 
critical mass in 1907. Beginning in the centrally located villages of Rifu and Iwakiri early 
in the year, tenants formed unions along hamlet lines in order to press demands for 
changes in their land use contracts. Over the months that followed, similar organizations 
spread through the north of the prefecture, reaching a total of twenty-three similar groups 
by the end of December.
408
 Enraged by the return of heavy-handed landlordism in the 
wake of the famine and emboldened by newfound collective strength, tenant unions 
throughout Miyagi launched protests. 1907 and 1908 saw significant showdowns in each 
of the rice-producing Senboku districts and the prefecture as a whole had nearly 20% of 
the seventy-three landlord tenant conflicts experienced in Japan between 1907 and 
1911.
409
 While the famine provided the immediate backdrop for tenant activism, it was 
not the main motivating force. As Nishikawa's article made clear, the clashes that the 
unions initiated were linked to longstanding pressures from high rents, imposed 
improvements, and the new threat of the rice quality inspection laws. The actions of the 
Toyosato union in the northern district of Tome in 1908 illustrated the forces moving 
tenants to action. Pressing for the lowering of rents to make up for the loss of common 
lands and citing the impossibility of deriving profits or even maintaining subsistence 
from farming under current conditions, the groups' demands directly addressed the 
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hardships brought about by landlord-meibōka improvement and the hothouse capitalism 
that saw legal compulsion replace profits in encouraging more intensive production.
410
  
Building on the precedent of earlier organizations, the tenant unions in Miyagi at this 
time included the participation of independent farmers and minor resident landlords. 
Though composed chiefly of tenants and pursuing ends ostensibly in their interests, the 
middling classes of villagers who constituted the hamlet elites took on roles of leadership 
in the unions. The unity of these elites and tenant farmers was a particular characteristic 
of Tōhoku and emerged from the patterns of landholding in the region. The outsized 
holdings of Tōhoku large landlords created villages populated by tenants (often farming 
fields owned by landlords from other hamlets) and their minor landlord and smallholder 
neighbors. Pressed in similar, if not equal ways, by the increasingly onerous legal force 
behind the landlord-meibōka vision of improved agriculture, these groups found 
themselves natural allies and banded together to resist those improvements that most 
threatened their interests. In his 1904 diatribe against Tōhoku backwardness, Tamari 
Kizō lamented this alliance and its deleterious influence on his vision of agricultural 
progress. "[Unlike places like Kagoshima,] in Tōhoku even simple things like narrow-
strip planting and salt water (seed) selection are not done, and if one tries to force them, 
men of influence (yūshisha) together with foolish people (gujin) raise a stink (guzuguzu 
iu) or they pass on evil ideas (akuchie) to the ignorant people (gumin)."
411
 Cooperation 
between the two groups made it possible to resist "improvements" that were not in their 
interests. 
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The decisive showdown in the Miyagi landlord-tenant conflicts came in 1908 and 
centered on the cross-district Monō-Oshika Allied Tenant League (Monō-Oshika rengō 
kosakunin dōmeikai). Unfolding over the first half of the year, the clash pitted tenants 
from fourteen villages in both districts in a collective body against two assemblies of 
large local landlords. The league was born of meetings held in a string of Monō villages 
to the north and west of the port of Ishinomaki during the New Year's holidays of 1908. 
Initially composed of eight Monō villages, the group grew across district lines with 
tenants joining from a village in neighboring Oshika when landlords called in the rents 
for the previous year and again expanded by a further five villages in February after the 
league resolved to press demands against landlords. 
The Monō-Oshika League, and the hamlet and village groups comprising it, again 
displayed the influence of Miyagi landholding styles in their pluralistic composition. 
Village mayors were among the most prominent leaders of the groups, with officeholders 
from the Monō villages of Sue, Takagi, and Hirobuchi stepping forward to represent their 
fellow villagers. Fulfilling a crucial organizational role by means of their webs of 
contacts beyond village boundaries, these mayors and the petty landowners that joined 
them in leadership were not acting out of love for their neighbors. When large landlords 
enshrined their exploitative vision of improvement into law and passed the responsibility 
for its enforcement onto the prefecture, farming populations of all varieties found 
themselves under new pressure. The combination of famine and the new system of rice 
quality testing drove both resident elites and tenant farmers to assertive action and victory 




Economic interests were not the only factor prompting independent landowners to 
cooperate with tenant farmers. The positions minor landlords held in village 
administration imparted a sense of responsibility for their communities. In part, this was a 
function of feelings of duty associated with the offices, but it also reflected the practical 
need for local support required for success in these positions. The active involvement of 
figures like Kaga Unosuke, mayor of Hirobuchi and a landless moneylender with no 
direct interest in agriculture, pointed to a sense of community responsibility, a suggestion 
enhanced by the fact that the most active elite leaders came from villages without resident 
large landlords of the type who had advocated for the new rice regulations and the 
benefits their inclusion in the community would bring.
412
 These leaders were continuing 
to perform a function that was associated with their offices in the past. In previous 
spontaneous conflicts between landlords and tenants, resident elites would act as 
intermediaries, relating the tenant demands to landlords and then stepping back to let 
district heads or nōkai officials begin the mediation process. Now, however, faced with 
the intransigence of the large landlords, these elites took on a more active part, casting 
their lot with tenants and aiming to break the control of non-resident landlords over their 
villages.
413 
Under the leadership of hamlet elites, the Monō-Oshika Tenant Union League went 
on the offensive in the first months of 1908. With landlords in Oshika holding an 
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emergency meeting at the end of January to discuss strategies of opposing the 
organization, the league held a planning session on the thirteenth of February. Drawing in 
the unions of five additional villages, it dispatched representatives to meet with the 
landlord associations of Monō and Oshika. The demands reflected the pressures landlord 
improvements placed on tenants, as well as the difficulties experienced during the recent 
famine. They called for relief money for impoverished families; rent remissions when 
circumstances warranted, even if they were not provided for in tenancy contracts; an 
immediate and permanent 10% rent reduction; and the provision of interest-free loans for 
the purchase of fertilizer.
414
 Behind the outward deference of the league representatives 
lay the threat of the abandonment of tenanted lands.
415
  
The landlords of Monō and Oshika responded to the measured demands of the tenant 
league by rejecting them roundly. Landlord associations in both districts convened 
meetings immediately after receiving the ultimatum, producing counter-proposals that 
disregarded the concerns of the Tenant League. In place of rent reductions and assistance 
in improving crops, the landlord-crafted plans called for stricter guidelines for the 
grading of rice quality and a system of rewards for excellence in production.
416
 They 
presented their own demand for a resurveying of all tenanted land in the region, a 
measure they suggested would eliminate unfairly high rents but that tenants feared would 
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have the opposite effect.
417
 The proposal received a promising response from the 
prefectural government, which endorsed its basic elements and raised landlord hopes of 
official intervention on their side. 
The Tenant League responded to the rejection of their demands by attacking the 
economic interests of landlords and exploiting their fear and disunity. Memories of 
absconding tenants during the famine combined with economic self-interest suggested the 
weakness behind the confident refusals of the landlords. Their two-district coalition was 
held together by nothing more than a determination to resist demands for rent reductions 
and a broad desire to resurvey their tenant lands.
418
 In response to the refusal of their 
initial demands, the Tenant League sent out smaller groups the next day to approach 
landlords individually. In addition to announcing the immediate suspension of farming on 
tenanted lands, league members were instructed to express the organization's 
commitment to the type of morality that landlords and officials alike had accused tenants 
of lacking. Members were to explain their devotion to diligence and frugality (kinben 
ken'yaku) and the Tenant League's prohibition of unproductive leisure activities, tobacco, 
and alcohol.
419 
A deadlock followed this second delivery of tenant demands but the brittleness of 
landlord solidarity soon proved decisive. On February 25th, landlords in Oshika, fearing 
that the dispute would prevent planting and destroy an entire year of production, 
acquiesced and agreed en masse to accept the demand for support money and supplies to 
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meet the rice quality standards. In the days that followed, Oshika landlords reached 
agreements individually with all tenant members of the League that reduced rents by 10-
15%.
420
 Shaken by the defeat of their neighbors, landlords in Monō followed suit in early 
March. This was the context in which Saitō Zen'uemon, incensed at the weakness of his 
fellows, incredulous at the lack of support from the prefecture, and intent on giving no 
ground to tenants, took to the press.
421
 In the end, his public outburst brought no results, 
and he was left to join the last of landlord holdouts in signing revised tenancy contracts in 
early April. 
Yet, Saitō was not entirely without basis in his outrage at the failure of the prefecture 
to act. Article 17 of the 1900 Public Order and Police Law (Chian keisatsuhō) gave 
specific attention to issues relating to tenants, laying out fines and imprisonment for the 
employment of violence, coercion, and slander to negotiate rents on farmland. Although 
the Monō-Oshika union didn't engage explicitly in any of these activities, it was hardly 
unknown for the authorities of the time to engage in eyebrow-raising distortions of the 
law in service of the establishment. Yet neither the national nor the Miyagi government 
made any move to come to the defense of Saitō and his compatriots. The closest the 
government came to intervention on behalf of landlords was historical revision after the 
fact. The Ministry of Agriculture's 1909 report on the conflict absolved landlords of 
responsibility for its outbreak, attributing it to the famine, and applied a rewritten ending 
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which, if it did not grant landlords victory in the conflict, at least spared them from 
defeat. What occurred in the spring and summer of 1908 was depicted as nothing more 
than a return to "normalcy" in landlord-tenant relations leaving "nothing that would give 
rise to conflict" (jūrai aete kattō o shōjitaru koto nakari).422 
This lack of official backing for landlords in the Monō-Oshika dispute was the key 
reason for the victory of tenants. The economic power that large landlords wielded was 
not in fact the basis for their dominant position over tenants, as the illegal flights of 
tenants during the 1905-06 famine had revealed. The agricultural order that landlord-
meibōka had created, and that Miyagi landlords were attempting to develop further with 
the rice-quality inspection system, depended upon the commitment of the government to 
apply laws and coercive force to maintain it. When the prefecture refrained from 
intervening in 1908, it removed this commitment and eliminated the basis for the 
landlord-meibōka order. Without the support of laws and the threat of violence or 
punishment, landlords could not respond to tenant pledges to abandon cultivation with 
anything but acquiescence to their demands. 
Regardless of the possible righteousness of Saitō's indignation, the tenants of the 
Monō-Oshika Tenant Union League got the contract revisions they sought with all their 
demands met in full. Landlords had pledged to share the costs of farming improvement 
and production and, in doing so, to share the profits that the accomplished improvements 
were driving up yearly. The victory set off a wave of similar triumphs across the 
                                                     
422
 Nōshōmushō Nōmukyoku, ed., Jinushi to Kosakunin (Tokyo: Sangyō Kumiai Chūōkai, 1909), 194. The 
prefectural report on the conflict assigned landlords even more credit for bringing the conflict to a peaceful 
conclusion, arguing that the efforts of the prefectural nōkai “finally brought about a movement toward 
reconcliliation and friendship between landlords and tenants” (jinushi tai kosakunin kankei mo mata yōyaku 




prefecture. Additional tenant groups formed in the neighboring districts of Shida, Tōda, 
and Tōme and rode the successes of the League to extract contract revisions of their own 
from landlords made newly aware of their own vulnerability. Other unions already 
embroiled in conflicts found their landlord opponents more tractable in the wake of their 
peers' defeat. Disputes in the towns and villages of Matsushima, Takasago, Kitaura, 
Wakuya, and Furukawa all ended in tenant victory in the spring of 1908. The specific 
terms of the new contracts varied and conflicts could stretch on for longer periods (four 
years in one case), but the struggles of 1907 and 1908 produced a new order in tenant 
farming in Miyagi. Contracts in virtually every corner of the prefecture now dictated that 
landlords share in the costs of agricultural improvement and tenants receive a more 
significant share of its rewards.
423
 Tenant farmers seized upon their own economic 
importance to landlords and successfully ended nearly a decade of unrestrained landlord 
dominance. 
If some ambiguity existed as to the significance of government inaction during the 
Miyagi conflict in 1908, events set in motion by the Home Ministry later that year left 
little doubt that official views of landlord-meibōka had changed. The sporadic official 
criticisms of landlord excess, persistent village poverty, and rural social discord had 
grown louder over the course of the decade, prompting changes in the policies of 
agricultural development. Changes in law and government policy came one after another 
in the late 1900s. They began with the Home Ministry's Local Improvement Movement 
(Chihō kairyō undō) in the fall of 1908, which took aim at the local leadership of rural 
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villages in an attempt to improve economic circumstances and impose social stability. 
The Ministry of Agriculture followed soon afterward with the revision of the turn-of-the-
century laws that had set the framework for landlord-meibōka leadership over agricultural 
development, assigning the central government a new active role in the improvement of 
farming. Together, these initiatives helped to bring about a sea change in the direction of 
agriculture and rural villages in Imperial Japan. 
The first part of the attack on the prevailing rural order was launched even as Miyagi 
landlords were coming to terms with their loss in the tenant union conflict. On October 
13, 1908, the central government issued the Boshin Rescript of the Meiji emperor. With a 
message promoting the cultivation of the triple virtues of sincerity, thrift, and diligence, 
the text of the document appeared anything but novel. This official repetition of long-
repeated exhortations toward the rural public, however, marked the launch of the policies, 
programs, and initiatives that came to be known as the Local Improvement Movement 
(Chihō kairyō undō) Designed to develop an enduring solution to the problems that had 
long troubled villages, the movement took aim at many of the bases for the landlord-
meibōka leadership of agricultural development. 
The first rumblings of the Local Improvement Movement dated back to the Saionji 
cabinet of 1906. Policymakers drafted instructions dealing with the problems afflicting 
villages and passed them down to local administrators, signaling a more direct 
intervention of central officials into rural villages. Among the actions they dictated were 
the merger of shrines and hamlet assets under the administrative towns and villages, the 




reordering of police services and health administration.
424
 These measures were a direct 
response to conditions after the Russo-Japanese War. The stability of the villages was 
now central, drawing official policy into a collision course with the brand of 
improvement that landlord-meibōka had crafted with government support. 
The official Local Improvement Movement began after the incoming Katsura cabinet 
strengthened its commitment to these goals with the Boshin rescript in 1908 and the 
dispatch of personnel to train local officials in the summer of the following year. There 
were three main objectives: First, it was necessary for the government to take direct 
action to raise the Japanese economy and society up to a level commensurate with its 
status as a world power. Next, it was necessary to employ local resources in order to 
exploit the productive potential of a harmonious citizenry while avoiding the depletion of 
scarce government assets. Finally, it was necessary to establish the emperor as the central 
ideological force to accomplish the other goals.
425
 Behind these aims lay fears based on 
experiences of other countries. Government leaders were dedicated to avoiding the 
negative consequences of rapid industrialization and the spread of socialism that had 
caused so much discord in the countries of Europe and America.
426
  
As it related to farming villages and agricultural improvement, the Local 
Improvement Movement rejected the narrowness of the approach taken by landlord-
meibōka and sought to correct the damage in rural society. It aimed at reframing the 
notion of village improvement in order to expand it past the narrow focus on production 
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increases and the generation of private wealth. Yokoi Tokiyoshi's introduction to Mohan 
chōson articulated the new vision and its criticism of what it was replacing: 
In towns and villages today, because their evil customs and vulgarity 
persist as of old, however much production grows and whatever utility this 
has, it will mean nothing more than increases in production and will only 
be subject to wasteful extravagance. The results that people have worked 
so hard to achieve will either scatter like the mist or become seasonal 
fodder for insects. If that is the case, the social improvement of towns and 
villages should be the most urgent problem today, but the world does not 
yet seem to have taken notice. Are these not deplorable circumstances?
427 
 
What was needed now, Yokoi explained, was the cultivation of "civilized farmers" 
(bunmeiteki nōmin) with the attributes of "economic security, morality, and aesthetic 
appreciation."
428 
The policies of the Local Improvement Movement were shaped by the characteristic 
thrift of the Meiji government's approach to the countryside, but they were nonetheless 
ambitious in their aims. In line with government policy toward villages up to that point, 
the commitment of official finances to the programs of the movement was limited. In 
1909, its total budget languished at a paltry 43,000 yen for the year, fully 35,000 yen of 
which was earmarked to promote the postal savings system.
429
 Whatever the movement's 
goals for ending rural poverty, it would appear the villages themselves would be 
responsible for paying for the remedy. For the means to accomplish its goals without 
increasing its costs, the Home Ministry turned to the earlier tools of town and village 
plans and model villages, as well as the central Hōtokukai (Hōtoku Association), an 
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umbrella organization bringing together the local agrarian societies (Hōtokusha) 
dedicated to the memory of famed Tokugawa farmer Ninomiya Sontoku that had formed 
over the preceding decades.
430
 The aims of the village plans meshed nicely with those 
informing the new movement. Combining the strengthening of national and local 
administration finances (preventing tax defaults, shoring up village assets), ending 
economic distress in villages (thrift and savings organizations, productive associations), 
the development of agriculture (agricultural associations, plans for agricultural 
improvement), and the firming of ideological bases (moral education and reform), the 
prescriptions presented by the policy plans offered up a laundry list of locally-funded 
means to achieve the Home Ministry's goals.
431 
Also informed by the tight-fistedness of the Home Ministry was the revival of its 
"model village" (mohanson) program. Begun in 1901, the initiative awarded three 
agricultural villages, including the Miyagi village of Oide, the title of "model village" and 
publicized their mayors as ideal local leaders. The work of these leaders had been 
accomplished in the context of an epidemic of "distressed villages" after the Sino-
Japanese War, a situation sharing much in common with the difficulties facing the 
countryside in 1908. With an emphasis on the importance of virtuous local leaders and 
presenting the "superb accomplishments of [their] administration" (yūryō no jiseki), 
model villages fit nicely with the goals of the Local Improvement Movement, and the 
program was revived and expanded.
432
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In fact, the liberties that the Home Ministry took with Tamura Matayoshi of Inatori, 
Shizuoka, the first of the three original model village mayors, illustrated in miniature the 
incongruities that lay at the heart of both the meibōka-led system of agricultural 
development and the Home Ministry's new approach to villages in the early twentieth 
century. The concentration of praise and symbolic value given to model mayors in the 
truth-stretching pedagogic narratives of the model villages introduced problems for the 
Home Ministry that limited the effectiveness of the program. While accomplishing the 
economic and institutional goals that Home Ministry officials held dear, Mayor Tamura 
deviated from the script in two major ways. First, he did not conform to the 
administrative narrative that was assigned to him. By resigning his post as mayor in order 
to take up the task of saving his village, he demonstrated the self-motivation (jihatsu) that 
officials were promoting but undermined their message of loyalty to the village in a tacit 
assertion that formal offices and village improvement were incompatible. Second, his 
conception of what was needed to make a village prosperous stood at odds to the Home 
Ministry's pursuit of national unity and social harmony. In a distorted mirror-image of 
Nishimura Yasukichi's "peace war," Tamura saw villages coexisting under the modern 
capitalist order as being in a state of constant and ruthless economic warfare in which 
only the organization of the village as an "agricultural army" (nōgun) could fend off the 
predatory instincts of landlords and others in outside communities.
433
 Connected to this 
vision of self-sufficiency were criticisms of class structure and capitalism that could not 
have sat well with Home Ministry officials. While his blaming of village ills on the 
predations of absentee landlords was in accord with the new direction that policymakers 
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were taking in the Local Improvement Movement, the solution he offered did not fit so 
comfortably. His answer to the problems of absenteeism was the elimination of economic 
inequality and the raising of the entire village population to an egalitarian state of 
significant landholding farmers (dainō).434 
This radical egalitarianism was in direct conflict with the hopes of the Local 
Improvement Movement to either rehabilitate landlords or find similarly atypical 
individuals to carry out their plans. A major thrust of the movement was a restatement of 
the need for meibōka-like figures to rescue villages. The problem, thought Home 
Ministry planners, was that the real meaning of the word (which their forebears had laid 
out three decades earlier) had been forgotten. The corruption of the landlords and village 
officials who monopolized the title had sullied the name meibōka and divorced it from its 
roots as a marker of selfless public service. Ministry officials leveled constant charges of 
misconduct at local officials generally, contributing to a broad picture of the landlords 
who held local offices as impeding improvement by preventing more capable and public-
spirited villagers from taking up the positions for which they were better suited. 
To remind people of the meaning that had been lost, Home officials and supporters 
of the Local Improvement Movement took up the task of remaking meibōka as tokushika 
(self-sacrificing volunteers). A relatively unknown term before the Russo-Japanese War, 
it took on a central role in the Home Ministry's push for model accomplishments during 
the war.
435
 It represented a change in direction from the earlier terms used to describe the 
roles that officials hoped landlords would fill. In response to the failure of landlords to act 
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as true meibōka and provide the leadership needed for local development, tokushika were 
defined by the desire to engage in public service. Unlike their meibōka predecessors, 
tokushika required neither wealth, nor special skill, nor reputation. A 1915 Local 
Improvement publication highlighted the sole prerequisite of willingness, noting that 
"qualifications are required to be a schoolteacher and are also required to be a temple 
monk or a Shintō priest. Those who have no qualifications can become tokushika."436 
They were the economically ambiguous strong middle core of villages (chūken jinbutsu) 
to whom the legal changes between 1897 and 1901 were purported to be dedicated, 
defined by Kenneth Pyle as 
one who, by the strength of his personality and resources and by the 
sincerity of his devotion to the good of the village, was capable of giving 
patriarchal leadership to the youth groups, industrial cooperatives, and 
soldiers' associations. They were men who because of their local 
responsibilities had risen only halfway up the educational ladder of 
success. They were free of the cosmopolitanism and cultural uncertainties 
of those who had attained the higher reaches of education.
437 
 
Meibōka were recast as tokushika, amounting to a change in label for ideal meibōka 
like Mayor Straw Sandals, but calling for a wholesale replacement of the disappointing 
landlord-meibōka. The implicit criticism of those who had failed to live up to the earlier 
ideal was articulated in 1909 by Yamazaki Nobuyoshi, the head of the Aichi College of 
Agriculture and Forestry. In a speech on Local Improvement, he presented examples of 
local tokushika and their works in Aichi
438
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schools and promoted agriculture, youth organizations (seinendan) that placed as much 
emphasis on morality as farming improvement, and landlords who remained committed 
to agriculture and awarded good farming with their own funds, his speech presented an 
image of tokushika that combined lingering traces of the ideal of landlord-meibōka with 
the new hopes for non-elite men of ability and dedication concerned with moral 
development. Yamazaki's tale also touched on the more general trend of relabeling that 
came along with tokushika. In the new language of local leadership, now purged of 
economic references, gōnō (wealthy farmer), as well as rōnō (experienced farmer), were 
replaced by seinō (hard-working farmer) needing neither wealth nor special skill. This 
came with a commensurate widening of application, as in an Aichi seinendan's ambition 
to transform all local farmers into seinō.439 
The Local Improvement Movement also opened new space and new roles for 
tokushika with the creation and imposition of new semi-governmental village 
organizations. These groups included Seinendan (Youth Associations), Hōtokukai, 
Hahanokai (Mothers associations) and Zaigō gunjinkai (Military reservist associations) 
and were designed to more tightly connect local leaders to the central government and 
provide a reliable conduit for government aid and guidance.
440
 They also represented the 
most direct attack on the failures of landlord-meibōka to achieve officials' goals of stable 
and prosperous villages. An integral part of these groups was the call for tokushika to 
take up positions of leadership that were, in many ways, defined by their distinction from 
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those who had been entrusted with overseeing village development for the last decade. 
What qualified them for as leaders was the tokushi (voluntary spirit) that both defined 
them and distinguished them from the earlier failures. 
In Miyagi, the site of recent and expensive natural disasters, the Local Improvement 
Movement's emphasis on ideas of village self-sufficiency and the local financing of 
development made it attractive to prefectural officials. From the prefecture-organized 
meeting of mayors hastily convened two months after the promulgation of the Boshin 
rescript, through the directives from the prefectural government, and down to programs 
implemented on the village level, the Miyagi iterations of Local Improvement focused on 
lowering costs and increasing tax revenue. Reflecting these priorities, the December 1908 
mayors' meeting identified its goals as the increase and consolidation of local assets and 
the ending of tax defaults.
441
 Government goals for villages remained the same, even if 
their vision of the figures who would accomplish them did not. Directives issued from the 
prefecture to the villages soon thereafter built on these basic aims and called for specific 
means to end farmer idleness and build local funds to finance local administration and 
disaster relief, sentiments that the government doubled down on when severe flooding in 
1910 ruined fields and spread misery
442
 Interestingly, local organizations in Miyagi 
followed the national trend against the use of landlord status as a qualification for 
leadership in agricultural improvement. In Shida, district planners returned to older ways 
of fostering improvement and established an association of rōnō to oversee the creation 
of their district plan (gunze). The charter of the resultant organization listed its purposes 
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as: the management of agriculture and the promotion of agricultural improvement, the 
advising of the district head, and the creation of proposals for policy, all functions 
formerly served by landlord-meibōka.443 
The Home Ministry's assault on the failings of landlord-meibōka in the Local 
Improvement Movement was followed up by a series of dramatic legal changes instituted 
by the Ministry of Agriculture. These changes both rewrote the direction of agricultural 
development and recast its leadership. It removed the final remaining bases for the 
position of landlord-meibōka as the shapers of farming improvement and the 
development of the countryside in Japan. 
Legal revision came fast and furious in the closing years of the first decade of the 
twentieth century. One after another, the Industrial Union Law (Sangyō kumiaihō), the 
Land Consolidation Law (Kōchi seirihō), and the Agricultural Association Law 
(Nōkaihō) were revised between 1909 and 1910. In each case the revisions served to 
bring the activities concerned under the more direct control of the central government and 
to make participation in them compulsory.
444
 The specific changes made to the laws 
showed the new orientation of the Ministry of Agriculture and Commerce and marked a 
transformation to its approach to agricultural development. The 1909 revision of the Land 
Consolidation Law moved the focus of the work from the improvement of individual 
paddies, a scale of work within the means of landlords, to more fundamental 
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improvements of the land relating to waterways and irrigation.
445
 It also made available 
new loan money for the work through the Home Ministry and the Hypothec Bank soon 
after. The changes to the Agricultural Association Law were intended to deal with the 
problems of rural hardship and discontent that persisted from the Russo-Japanese War. It 
too imposed government control over a formerly autonomous group, grafting the Teikoku 
nōkai (Imperial Agricultural Association) above the local groups formerly loosely 
collected under the umbrella of the Zenkoku nōkai.446 More significantly, it made 
membership in the organizations universal and compulsory, bringing tenant farmers and 
smallholders into groups monopolized by landlords and extending a degree of 
government support and protection over them. 
New tenancy contracts, new village organizations and leaders, and new agricultural 
laws and policy directions marked the passing of an era for landlord-meibōka in northern 
Miyagi. For nearly a decade, their vision of agricultural development and the 
improvement of farming villages had been supreme, backed by official support that gave 
it nearly dictatorial force. Production rose and progress was made toward improving the 
stability of farming in the treacherous Miyagi climate, and these accomplishments were 
done in a way that directed profits to landlords while deflecting costs to tenants and 
smallholders. Even famine at mid-decade had failed to bring any significant adversity to 
the landlords of the countryside. The mass flight of tenants during the crisis had caused 
inconvenience, even panic, but the return to full harvests and the implementation of rice 
quality inspections left landlords stronger and more profitable than ever. They had looked 
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forward to another decade or more of agricultural growth on their own terms and in their 
own interests with a feeling of security. 
This prospect proved illusory. The costs of meibōka improvement proved too 
much for villagers and officials alike and drove both groups against them. Tenant farmers 
and smallholders, combining lessons learned from the famine with desperation over the 
looming quality inspections, struck first and forced a rewriting of the productive relations 
of agriculture. The Home and Agriculture Ministries followed with their own assaults. 
Through ideological campaigns and legal revisions they asserted government control over 
village improvement and agricultural development. The accompanying search for new 
local leaders did not necessarily disqualify the landlords that had monopolized the 
positions earlier, but no longer was it to be their exclusive and officially-supported 
domain. Nor would agriculture depend so completely on landlord-meibōka and follow the 
path they dictated. While local agents and resources remained central to development, the 
extension of government authority over agricultural improvement moved the locus of 
control over its direction and goals. Gone forever, for Saitō and landlords everywhere, 
were the peculiar conditions that dedicated government and law to the support of a vision 
of agriculture designed by and working for meibōka. In their place opened up a period of 
new possibilities for farming now backed directly by a national government ready to 







By the end of the Meiji period in 1912, farming was not a problem that the 
Japanese government had solved. Weaknesses in agricultural infrastructure, vagaries of 
climate, the challenges of a growing population, rural inequality, and an exploding 
exodus to the cities only aggravated the perennial concerns of national and prefectural 
politicians and officials. The force behind the drive for development had changed from 
meibōka to the ministries of the national government, but development itself remained a 
goal of economic and social policy. 
There was no doubt that the countryside had changed in the previous thirty years 
of meibōka-led agricultural development. If the rural economy still displayed weakness, 
villages – notably, too, in Miyagi – enjoyed a new level of stability born of increased 
production. If the divide between rich and poor still yawned, those on the losing side 
were no longer as vulnerable as they had been. And if farming remained an uncertain 
struggle with the elements, modern seed, fertilizers, and practices had made it less so. 
The years of improvement efforts were finally beginning to build momentum, offering 
tangible results and promising more in the years to come.  
The increased involvement of government in the countryside heralded positive 
developments of its own. While the Local Improvement Movement of the first decade of 
the twentieth century reiterated the perennial calls for local resources to fund local 
development and imposed new demands on villagers in a host of new associations, 
government funds and expertise now also stood ready to tackle projects that transcended 




paddylands that had been dreamt of for generations now entered a new period of 
possibility, implemented one after another in the interwar years. 
The later histories of Kamada Sannosuke and Saitō Zen'uemon illustrate the 
changing fortunes of the countryside and its elites in the interwar and wartime periods, 
from the 1920s to 1945. While Kamada gained fame as Mayor Straw Sandals and 
continued his programs of thrift, diligence, and moral and economic development in 
Kashimadai, Saitō and his heirs remained at the center of developments concerning 
landlords and tenants in northern Miyagi. Forced out of public activism along with other 
large landlords after the tenant movement of 1907-08, Saitō buried his anger and enjoyed 
the benefits brought about by the large-scale improvements on the Kitakami River and its 
tributaries in the 1910s and 1920s. He and other landlords continued to accumulate land, 
many of them remaining resident in the countryside even as increasing numbers left for 
the cities and became absentee landlords. Tenant disputes flared up elsewhere in the face 
of recession and competition from colonial rice from Korea in the 1910s and 1920s, but 
the tenancy contracts signed in 1908 kept Miyagi peaceful and stable. 
The spread of the proletarian farmers' movement provided the means for Saitō's 
heirs to regain the advantage over their tenants. The spread of the Nihon nōmin kumiai 
(Japan Farmers' Union) and similar organizations raised official fears of revolution and 
once again aligned state interests with those of large landlords. In a series of incidents in 
the late 1920s, the Saitō house was able to replay the conflict of 1908, this time ending 
with victory over the tenants. Landlords regained dominance in the 1930s, while crop 
failures, price declines, and the Depression again ravaged the countryside and prompted 




where villages like Nangō sent half their farming populations to build sister communities 
linked economically to their counterparts in the metropole. The beginning of the war 
against China in 1937 once again focused official attention on the villages, and as 
Kamada toured the country extolling the virtues of asceticism and loyalty, laws and 
policy shifted increasingly to support tenant farmers, whose direct involvement in 
agricultural production gave them strategic importance, against the landlords. 
The stories of Mayor Straw Sandals and the Saitō house, known as the rural 
equivalent of the large financial combines (zaibatsu) that dominated the economy, both 
reached their ends in 1946. The American Occupation, in pursuit of its policy of 
democratization of the countryside, took aim at both local officials and landlords. The 
purge of the leaders of wartime nationalist groups and village mayors forced Kamada and 
a generation of village leaders, some of whom were veterans of the meibōka era, into 
retirement. Having shown little interest in public service, the Saitō house escaped being 
targeted by purges only to fall victim to the Land Reform of 1946, which transferred all 
lands owned by absentee landlords and nearly all of those owned by resident landlords to 
the cultivators who worked them. Still counted as the second largest landlord in the 
country, the house had further to fall than most. As non-cultivating landlords, the family 
was forced to sell nearly all its holdings, dismantling at a stroke the business built up by 
Zen'uemon and his sons. Veterans of a business that was no longer viable, the family 
moved its interests to the cities. An earthquake in 2006 that damaged the storehouse 
holding the documents collected by Zen'uemon served as a reminder of the fall of the 
once powerful family when, for lack of funds to repair the building, the collection was 




The land reform accomplished its objectives, leaving the countryside populated 
by small independent landholders. The categories of landlord and tenant virtually 
disappeared and the idea of meibōka, associated with elevated social status and extensive 
landholdings, became a thing of the past. Economic independence and political 
democratization pushed farmers into new roles, tying most to the Liberal Democratic 
Party, whose farm friendly policies drew easy association with the pork barrel patronage 
politics of the 1910s and 1920s. They became the mainstays of the LDP, recreating the 
relationship between the rural elites and the Rikken Seiyūkai (Friends of Constitutional 
Government) before the war. As the political party took on the role of intermediary 
between farmers and the government, the development of agriculture continued and 
accelerated. The long-prophesied mechanization of farming finally gained momentum in 
the 1950s and 1960s, fundamentally altering the nature of agricultural labor. Buoyed by 
increased production, reduced labor, and the blessings of the LDP, farming reached new 
levels of prosperity and the countryside took on the trappings of wealth and comfort. 
Nowhere was the improvement more evident than in Tōhoku, where increased production 
combined with new security against the natural hazards of farming in the region to spread 
a prosperity rarely seen before. For the first time in many decades, the farming life 
became the good life. 
For all the difference in the context in which they developed, the postwar fortunes 
of agriculture were built upon the work done by meibōka at the end of the nineteenth and 
beginning of the twentieth century. Their efforts implemented the critical early stages of 
modernization, bringing farming into line with the advances made in Meiji-era industry. 




greatest influence on development. In drawing the government, finally, into direct 
oversight of agricultural modernization, meibōka set the course for later rural 
development in a pattern that continues into the present. This, then, is the legacy of 
meibōka, one that is in harmony with the original role in which they were cast and which 
they embraced. Even after having retired from their leadership in agricultural 
development, the ghostlike influence of meibōka remained in the government 
policymakers whom they had drawn into the improvement of farming and rural society, 







Abe Kumaji. Azumi-ō shōden. Wakuya: Yamamoto Kappanjo, 1940. 
Abiko Rin. Miyagiken no hyakunen. Kenmin 100-nenshi 4. Tōkyō: Yamakawa 
Shuppansha, 1999. 
———. “Nōchi kaikaku to buraku: Buraku no tochi kanri kinō o chūshin ni.” Rekishi 
hyōron, no. 435 (1986): 32–45. 
Aichiken Nōkai. Zenkoku tokunōka retsuden. Nagoya: Aichiken Nōkai, 1910. 
http://kindai.ndl.go.jp/info:ndljp/pid/778253. 
Ariizumi Sadao. “Kōgyō iken no seiritsu.” Shigaku zasshi 78, no. 10 (1969): 1–30. 
———. Meiji Seijishi No Kiso Katei: Chiho Seiji Jokyo Shiron. To kyo : 
Yoshikawa Ko bunkan, 1980. 
Baba Akira. Suiri jigyō no tenkai to jinushisei. Kindai tochi seidoshi kenkyū sōsho 7. 
Tokyo: Ochanomizu Shobō, 1965. 
Baerwald, Hans. The Purge of Japanese Leaders under the Occupation. Berkeley: 
University of California Press, 1959. 
Baxter, James C. The Meiji Unification through the Lens of Ishikawa Prefecture. Harvard 
East Asian Monographs 165. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1994. 
Bowen, Roger W. Rebellion and Democracy in Meiji Japan: A Study of Commoners in 
the Popular Rights Movement. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1980. 
Brown, Sidney Devere. “Ōkubo Toshimichi: His Political and Economic Policies in Early 
Meiji Japan.” The Journal of Asian Studies 21, no. 2 (February 1, 1962): 183–97. 
doi:10.2307/2050521. 
Crawcour, Sydney. “Kōgyō Iken: Maeda Masana and His View of Meiji Economic 
Development.” Journal of Japanese Studies 23, no. 1 (January 1, 1997): 69–104. 
doi:10.2307/133124. 
Dai Nihon nōkai. Dai Nihon nōkai seisekisho. Tokyo: Dai Nihon nōkai, 1895. 
http://dl.ndl.go.jp/info:ndljp/pid/901081. 
Dai Nihon nōkai, Dai Nihon sanrinkai, and Dai Nihon suisankai. “Dai Nihon nōkai 
ryakushi.” In Dai Nihon nōkai - Dai Nihon sanrinkai - Dai Nihon suisankai 




Duus, Peter. Party Rivalry and Political Change in Taishō Japan. Harvard East Asian 
Series, 35. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1968. 
Eggert, Udo. Land Reform in Japan, Specially Based on the Development of Credit 
Associations. Tokyo: Tokyo Tsukiji Kwappan Seizosho, 1890. 
———. Nihon shinnōsaku. Tokyo: Hakubunkan, 1891. 
http://kindai.ndl.go.jp/info:ndljp/pid/802414. 
“Entō jiken no kōhan iyoiyo kaitei.” Ōu nichinichi shinbun, June 18, 1893. 
Gluck, Carol. Japan’s Modern Myths: Ideology in the Late Meiji Period. Princeton: 
Princeton University Press, 1985. 
Hackett, Roger F. Yamagata Aritomo in the Rise of Modern Japan, 1838-1922. 
Cambridge, Harvard University Press, 1971. 
Harootunian, Harry D. “The Economic Rehabilitation of the Samurai in the Early Meiji 
Period.” The Journal of Asian Studies 19, no. 4 (August 1, 1960): 433–44. 
doi:10.2307/2943582. 
Hida Namishige. “Hida Roichi shōden.” Ōitaken chihōshi, no. 50 (1968): 27–39. 
Hida Rōichi. “Jinushikai setchi no hitsuyō.” Chūō nōjihō, no. 5 (1900): 3–6. 
Hirata Ichirō. “Miyagiken no kosaku sōdō.” Tōkyō shakai shinbun 11, June 25, 1908. 
Hitotsubashi Daigaku keizai kenkyūjo Nihon keizai tōkei bunken sentaa. Gunze, 
shichōsonze chōsasho shozai mokuroku. Tokyo: Hitotsubashi Daigaku keizai 
kenkyūjo Nihon keizai tōkei bunken sentaa, 1964. 
Honma Rakukan. Waraji sonchō Kamada Sannosuke ō: Yokusan no ijin - Shōwa no 
Sontoku. Tokyo: Jidaisha, 1942. 
Inukai, Ichirou, and Arlon R. Tussing. “‘Kōgyō Iken’: Japan’s Ten Year Plan, 1884.” 
Economic Development and Cultural Change 16, no. 1 (October 1, 1967): 51–71. 
doi:10.2307/1152507. 
Irokawa, Daikichi. The Culture of the Meiji Period. Princeton Library of Asian 
Translations. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1985. 
Ishikawa Hisao. Kindai Nihon No Meiboka to Jichi: Meiyoshoku Seido No 
Hoshakaishiteki Kenkyu. To kyo : Bokutakusha, 1987. 
———. Nihon-teki jichi no tankyū: meibōka jichiron no keifu. Shohan. Nagoya: 




Ishikawaken and Fukushimaken. Ishikawaken Hayashi Enri beisaku kairyō seisekihyō; 
Fukushimaken shikenden tsubogari seiseki. Utsunomiya: Tochigiken Naimubu, 
1891. http://kindai.ndl.go.jp/info:ndljp/pid/838010. 
Ishikawa Rōnō Jiseki Chōsakai. Tenka no rōnō Ishikawa Rikinosuke: denki Ishikawa 
Rikinosuke. Tokyo: Ōzorasha, 2000. 
Itō Seijirō, and Konishi Rihee. Sendai mukashigatari Den Tanuki-ō yawa. Sendai: 
Konishi Rihee, 1925. 
Iwakura Tomomi. Iwakura-kō jikki. Vol. 3. Tōkyō: Iwakura-kō Kyūseki Hozonkai, 1927. 
Kamada Sannosuke. Mekishiko shokumin annai. Tokyo: Seikō Zasshisha, 1908. 
Kanan Chōshi Hensan Iinkai, ed. Kanan chōshi. Vol. 1. 2 vols. Kanan: Kananchō, 1967. 
Kanno Toshimitsu. Shinainuma kantaku shōshi: Shinainuma o hiraita hitobito no kunan 
no rekishi. Sendai: Hōbundō, 1981. 
Kashimadai chōshi hensan iinkai. Kashimadai chōshi. Kashimadai: Kashimadaichō, 
1994. 
Kashimadai shōgakkō. Wa Ga Sonshi. Kashimadai: Kashimadai shōgakkō, 1936. 
Katō Jirō. Saotome ha ima: Me de miru kikaikazen Tōhoku inasaku no kankō to minzoku. 
Sendai: Hōbundō, 1980. 
Kato, Kozaburo. “The Agrarian Origins of Modern Japan.” In Agriculture in the 
Modernization of Japan, 1850-2000, edited by Shuzo Teruoka, translated by 
Sarah Ham Akamine. New Delhi: Manohar, 2008. 
Kelly, William W. Deference and Defiance in Nineteenth-Century Japan. Princeton: 
Princeton University Press, 1985. 
Kenshi Orimono Tōshikki Kyōshūkai, ed. Menshi shūdankai kiji. Tokyo: Yūrindō, 1885. 
http://dl.ndl.go.jp/info:ndljp/pid/847947. 
“Kindai Geiyo shotō ni okeru meibōkazō no shakai keizaiteki seikaku: ‘Kinsei-kindai 
Seto nai Geiyo shotō no keizai to chiiki no henyō’ (Okayama Shōka Daigaku 40 
shūnen kinengō).” Okayama Shōdai ronsō 40, no. 3 (2005): 67–125. 
Kōdō Shinbunsha, ed. Ima Sontoku Kamada Sannosuke. Okayama: Kōdō Shinbunsha, 
1943. 
Koide Kōzō. Kamada Sannosuke ō: Waraji sonchō no shōgai. Tokyo: Nihon 




Ko Kamada Sannosuke ō shōtokukai. Kamada Sannosuke ōden. Kashimadai: Ko Kamada 
Sannosuke Ō Shōtokukai, 1953. 
“Kosaku dōmei.” Shūkan shakai shinbun 22, October 27, 1907. 
“Kosakunin mondai to Saitō gōnō.” Kahoku shinpō, March 10, 1903. 
Kyōitsusei. Meishi kibunroku. Tokyo: Jitsugyō no Nihonsha, 1901. 
Lewis, Michael. Becoming Apart: National Power and Local Politics in Toyama, 1868-
1945. Harvard East Asian Monographs 192. Cambridge: Harvard University Asia 
Center, 2000. 
Maki Takayasu. Nihon suiri shisetsu no kenkyū. Tokyo: Doboku Zasshisha, 1958. 
Matsuda Takeshirō. Waraji sonchō. Tokyo: Naka Shoten, 1942. 
Matsumoto Michiharu. “Kindai chihō meibōka no kenkyū: ‘jo’ ni kaete.” Shakai Kagaku, 
no. 37 (1986): 1–9. 
Matsuzawa Yūsaku. “Daiku shōku sei’ no keisei katei.” Rekishigaku kenkyū, no. 772 
(2003): 17–34. 
———. “Daiku shōku sei’ no kōzō to chihō minkai: Kumagayaken no baai.” Shigaku 
zasshi 112, no. 1 (2003): 1–33. 
Meiji hōshōroku. Vol. 1. Osaka: Naniwa Shoin, 1897. 
http://kindai.ndl.go.jp/info:ndljp/pid/778838. 
Miyachi Masato. Nichiro sengo seijishi no kenkyū: teikokushugi keiseiki no toshi to 
nōson. Tokyo: Tokyo Daigaku Shuppankai, 1973. 
Miyagiken. Meiji sanjūgonen Miyagiken kyōkanshi. Sendai: Miyagiken, 1904. 
———. Meiji sanjūhachinen Miyagiken kyōkōshi. Sendai: Miyagiken, 1916. 
———. “Tōda Monō Oshika sangun funsō chōtei tenmatsusho.” Miyagiken, 1894. 
Miyagiken chiji kanbō bunshogakari. “Miyagiken furei ruisan, Meiji 40 nen 1 gatsu - 
Meiji 40 nen 12 gatsu.” Miyagiken chiji kanbō bunshogakari, 1907. Miyagiken 
kōbunshokan. 
Miyagiken Gikaishi Hensan Iinkai. Miyagiken Gikaishi. Vol. 3. 8 vols. Sendai: 
Miyagiken Gikai, 1975. 
Miyagiken Naimubu Daiyonka. Miyagiken Natorigun Oidemura Sonze Chōsasho. Oide 




Miyagiken Nōkai. Kōchi seiri jisshi benran. Sendai: Miyagiken Nōkai, 1903. 
http://dl.ndl.go.jp/info:ndljp/pid/900566. 
“Miyagiken ōjinushikai.” Dai Nihon nōkaihō, no. 311 (May 1907): 42. 
Miyagiken Shida Gunyakusho, ed. Shidagun enkakushi. Furukawa: Miyagiken Shida 
Gunyakusho, 1912. 
Miyagi Kenshi Kankōkai. Doboku. Miyagi kenshi 8. Sendai: Miyagi Kenshi Kankōkai, 
1960. 
———. Jinbutsushi. Miyagi kenshi 29. Sendai: Miyagi Kenshi Kankōkai, 1986. 
———. Sangyō 1. Miyagi kenshi 9. Sendai: Miyagi Kenshi Kankōkai, 1968. 
Nagasawa Katsuo. Noda Shin’ichi ōden. Sendai: Noda Ken’ichi Okina Kōseki 
Kenshōkai, 1962. 
Nagasawa Norihiko. Mohan jichi mura. Tokyo: Shinkōronsha, 1905. 
Naikaku. “Kōchi seirihō o sadamu,” March 20, 1899. Administrative Records: 
Cabinet/Prime Minister’s Office: Records concerning Dajokan/Cabinet: Category 
No.6 Kobun Ruishu Various Offices: Kobun Ruishu Vol. 23 1899: Kōbun ruiju 
dai-23hen Meiji 32nen dai 33kan chiri tochi shinrin kanshō. National Archives of 
Japan. http://www.digital.archives.go.jp/DAS/meta/MetSearch.cgi. 
———. “Miyagiken Shidagun Kashimadai sonchō Kamada Sannosuke ranju hōshō kashi 
no ken,” December 17, 1927. Kōbun zassan: Shōwa ni-nen: dai hachi ken: 
Naikaku hachi: Naikaku hachi (shōdōkyoku roku). National Archives of Japan. 
Nakagawa Nozomu. “Nōson no kairyō.” In Kanka kyūsai jigyō kōenshū, 989–1015. 
Tokyo: Naimushō Chihōkyoku, 1909. 
http://kindai.ndl.go.jp/info:ndljp/pid/995169. 
Nakamura Kichiji. Miyagiken nōmin undōshi. Vol. 1. 2 vols. Tokyo: Kokusho Kankōkai, 
1982. 
Nakamura Nozomu. “Chihō zaisan no yōkō.” In Chihō kairyō jigyō kōenshū: Shita, 
edited by Naimushō Chihōkyoku. Tokyo: Naimushō Chihōkyoku, 1909. 
Nangōchō. Nangō chōshi. Vol. 1. 2 vols. Nangō: Nangōchō, 1980. 
Nishikawa Tadashi. “Yuzei nikki.” Shūkan shakai shinbun 29, December 15, 1907. 





Nishimura Kōichi. Meiji nōsei to nōkai: Nōkai no hassei kara Teikoku Nōkai no seiritsu 
made. Shiryō 3. Unknown: Nihon Nōgyō Kenkyūjō, 1951. 
Nishimura Taku. “Nihon ni okeru nōgyō kindaika no saikō: Tensei ni hikiiruka, tensei ni 
shitagauka.” Keizaigaku ronsō 44, no. 2 (1992): 34–45. 
Nōgyō Hattatsushi Chōsakai. Nihon nōgyō hattatsushi: Meiji ikō ni okeru. Vol. 4. Tōkyō: 
Chūō Kōronsha, 1954. 
———. Nihon nōgyō hattatsushi: Meiji ikō ni okeru. Vol. 5. Tōkyō: Chūō Kōronsha, 
1954. 
———. Nihon nōgyō hattatsushi: Meiji ikō ni okeru. Vol. 3. Tokyo: Chūō Kōronsha, 
1978. 
Nōgyō Suiri Mondai Kenkyūkai. Nōgyō suiri chitsujo no kenkyū. 2nd ed. Tokyo: 
Ochanomizu Shobō, 1977. 
Nōjikai. Zenkoku nōji taikai hōkoku: Dai hakkai. Tokyo: Nōjikai Honbu, 1901. 
http://kindai.ndl.go.jp/info:ndljp/pid/802341. 
Nōrinshō nōmukyoku. Kaikonchi ijū keiei jirei. Tokyo: Nōrinshō nōmukyoku, 1923. 
Nōshōmushō. Beisaku ni kansuru fukenrei. Tokyo: Nōshōmushō, 1904. 
http://dl.ndl.go.jp/info:ndljp/pid/796421. 
Nōshōmushō Nōmukyoku. Fuken rōnō meibo. Tokyo: Nōshōmushō Nōmukyoku, 1882. 
http://kindai.ndl.go.jp/info:ndljp/pid/900159. 
———. , ed. Jinushi to Kosakunin. Tokyo: Sangyō Kumiai Chūōkai, 1909. 
———. Kaku chihō rōnōka oyobi shubyōko meibo. Tokyo: Nōmukyoku Hōkokuka, 
1882. http://kindai.ndl.go.jp/info:ndljp/pid/780373. 
Obata Atsushi. “Meiji chūki ni okeru suiri o chūshin to shita nōmin funsō no ichirei: 
Iwayuru Entō Jiken ni tsuite.” Chiiki shakai kenkyū, no. 5 (1953). 
Ōgawa Hajime. “Kindai Nihon ni okeru ‘jizen’ to ‘fuon’: 1890-nen no Akitashi ni okeru 
beika tōki e no taiō o chūshin ni.” Rekishigaku kenkyū, no. 804 (2005): 1–19. 
Ōhashi Hiroshi. “Meiji chōsonze to Fukuokaken.” In Chihō sangyō no hatten to 
Fukuokaken, edited by Ōhashi Hiroshishi Ikōshū Kankō Iinkai. Kyōto: Rinsen 
Shoten, 1982. 





Ōkado Masakatsu. “Meibo ka chitsujo no henbo : Tenkeiki in okeru no son shakai.” 
In Gendai shakai e no tenkei:, edited by Yasuda Hiroshi, Banno Junji, Miyaji 
Masato, Takamura Naosuke, and Watanabe Hiroshi, 65–108. Nihon kindaishi 2. 
Tokyo: Iwanami Shoten, 1993. 
Ōshō Shigeru. “Kyōsaku zakkan.” Miyagiken kyōikukai zasshi, no. 112 (1905): 25–27. 
Pratt, Edward E. Japan’s Protoindustrial Elite: The Economic Foundations of the 
Gono. Harvard East Asian Monographs 179. Cambridge: Harvard University 
Asia Center : Distributed by Harvard University Press, 1999. 
Pyle, Kenneth B. “The Technology of Japanese Nationalism: The Local Improvement 
Movement, 1900-1918.” Journal of Asian Studies 33, no. 1 (1973): 51–65. 
“Retsuretsu, hodobashiru tsuchi no koe: jūninin tokunōka ni kiku.” Tōkyō Asahi shinbun, 
June 6, 1941, morning edition. 
Saitō Hōonkai. Saitō Zen’uemon ōden. Tokyo: Saitō Hōonkai, 1928. 
Sanriku Kahoku Shinpōsha. Kitakamigawa monogatari. Ishinomaki: Sanriku Kahoku 
Shinpōsha, 1989. 
Sasaki Toshi. Nangō suirishi. Nangō: Nangōchō, 1972. 
Sasaki Yutaka. “Chihō kairyō undō to chōsonze chōsa.” In Chihō kairyō undōshi shiryō 
shūsei, Vol. 1. Tokyo: Kashiwa Shobō, 1986. 
Satō Tadashi. “Tōhoku chihō Meiji makki no nōmin undō no kōzō: Miyagiken Senboku 
heiya no bunseki (2).” Iwate shigaku kenkyū, no. 45 (1964): 61–72. 
Sawayanagi Masatarō. “Kyōsakuchi kyōiku.” Miyagiken kyōikukai zasshi, no. 111 
(1905): 65–66. 
“Seifu, tokunōka to kondan jūnishi ni shōtaijō: jūyonnichi shushō kantei de kaisai.” 
Tōkyō Asahi shinbun, June 6, 1941, evening edition. 
Sendai Shishi Hensan Iinkai. Sendai shishi: Shimin seikatsu. Sendai shishi: Tokubetsuhen 
4. Sendai: Sendaishi, 1997. 
Senkyo shukusei renmei, ed. Nijūhachinen no waraji sonchō. Tokyo: Senkyo Shukusei 
Renmei, 1936. 
Shinainuma suigai yobō kumiaishi hensan iinkai. Shinainuma suigai yobō kumiaishi. 
Sendai: Shinainuma suigai yobō kumiaishi hensan iinkai, 1954. 
Sippel, Patricia. “Chisui: Creating a Sacred Domain in Early Modern and Modern Japan.” 




of Albert M. Craig, edited by Gail Lee Bernstein, Andrew Gordon, and Kate 
Wildman Nakai. Cambridge: Harvard University Asia Center, 2005. 
Smethurst, Richard J. Agricultural Development and Tenancy Disputes in Japan, 1870-
1940. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1986. 
Smith, Kerry Douglas. A Time of Crisis: Japan, the Great Depression, and Rural 
Revitalization. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2001. 
Smith, Thomas C. Native Sources of Japanese Industrialization, 1750-1920. Berkeley: 
University of California Press, 1988. 
Sumitomo Akifumi. “Kindai chihō jichisei kakuritsuki no chihō gyōsei: Chihō kairyō 
undō to chiiki un’ei chitsujo.” Nihonshi kenkyū, no. 368 (1992): 83–109. 
Sunaga Shigemitsu. Kindai Nihon no jinushi to nōmin: suitō tansaku nōgyō no 
keizaiteki kenkyū, Nangō-mura. Dai 1-han. Tōkyō: Ochanomizu Shobō, 1966. 
Supreme Commander Allied Powers. Government Section. The Political Reorientation of 
Japan, September 1945 to September 1948: Report. Washington: US Gov’t Print. 
Off., 1949. 
Takahashi Tansui. Kashokuden: Nōkai godai ijin. Tokyo: Rakuyōdō, 1917. 
http://kindai.ndl.go.jp/info:ndljp/pid/948504. 
Takaku Reinosuke. Kindai Nihon No Chiiki Shakai to Meiboka. Potentia So sho 45. 
To kyo : Kashiwa Shobo , 1997. 
Tamari Kizō. Tōhoku shinkōsaku: Yamato minzoku no kankoku ni okeru hattensaku. 
Tokyo: Zenkoku Nōjikai, 1904. http://dl.ndl.go.jp/info:ndljp/pid/802390. 
Tanaka Kazuo. “Kindai Nihon no ‘meibōka’ zō: Chihō Kairyō Undō de no ‘tokushika’ to 
minshū.” Shakai Kagaku, no. 37 (1986): 250–82. 
Tanaka Norio. “‘Chihō kairyō’ no rinen danmen: Kansei ‘chihō kairyō’ undō no shūhen.” 
Dōshisha Hōgaku 30, no. 1 (1978): 115–60. 
Tōda Kyōikukai. Tōda Gunshi. Tokyo: Meicho Shuppan, 1972. 
Tōhashi Shiritsu Shōgyō Gakkō. Kaikō nijū shūnen kinen Higashimikawa sangyō 
kōrōshaden. Tōhashi: Tōhashi Shiritsu Shōgyō Gakkō, 1943. 
Tomita Kōji. Inatori bidan: Shinkyōiku ikimohan. Inatori: Tomita Kōji, 1907. 
http://kindai.ndl.go.jp/info:ndljp/pid/784536. 
Tomoda Kiyohiko. “Meiji shoki no nōkai kessha to Dai Nihon Nōkai no sōsetu (1): Tōyō 




———. “Meiji shoki no nōkai kessha to Dai Nihon Nōkai no sōsetu (2): Tōyō Nōkai to 
Tōkyō Dannōkai.” Nōson kenkyū, no. 103 (2006): 25–44. 
Uchida Tsukasa. “Nichiro Sengo keieishita ni okeru chōson shinkō to shizen mura: 
Miyagiken de no Chihō Kairyō Undō no tenkai o jirei to shite (2).” Shakaigaku 
nenpō 7 (1979): 19–33. 
Uenoyama Manabu. “Meijiki ni okeru chihō meibōka no yakuwari to keiei: Shigaken 
Takashimagun Fukui Yaheika o jirei to shite.” Keieigaku ronsō 53, no. 4 (2002): 
1–68. 
Ushiki Yukio. Chihō meibōka no seichō. Tōkyō: Kashiwa Shobō, 2000. 
Vlastos, Stephen. Peasant Protests and Uprisings in Tokugawa Japan. Berkeley: 
University of California Press, 1986. 
Wakuyachō. Wakuya chōshi. Vol. 2. Wakuya: Wakuyachō, 1968. 
“Waraji sonchō.” Tōkyō Asahi shinbun, December 1, 1936. 
Waswo, Ann. Japanese Landlords: The Decline of a Rural Elite. Berkeley: University of 
California Press, 1977. 
Watanabe Takashi. Kindai ikōki no meibōka to chiiki kokka. Tōkyō: Meicho Shuppan, 
2006. 
Waters, Neil L. Japan’s Local Pragmatists: The Transition from Bakumatsu to Meiji in 
the Kawasaki Region. Harvard East Asian Monographs ; 105. Cambridge: 
Council on East Asian Studies, Harvard University, 1983. 
Wigen, Kären. The Making of a Japanese Periphery, 1750-1920. Twentieth-Century 
Japan : The Emergence of a World Power 3. Berkeley: University of California 
Press, 1995. 
Yamagata Aritomo. “Shisei hōshin enzetsu.” In Yamagata Aritomo ikensho, edited by 
Ōyama Azusa. Tokyo: Hara shobō, 1966. 
Yamanaka Einosuke. Kindai Nihon no chihō seido to meibōka. Shohan. Tōkyō: 
Kōbundō, 1990. 
Yamanaka Einosuke et al., ed. Kindai Nihon chihō jichi rippō shiryō shūsei. Tokyo: 
Kōbundō, 1991. 
Yamazaki Nobuyoshi. “Chihō kairyōdan.” In Chihō kairyō jigyō koenshū (ge), edited by 
Naimushō Chihōkyoku. Tokyo: Naimushō Chihōkyoku, 1909. 




Yanagida Kunio. “Inaka to tokai no mondai.” In Jidai to nōsei, 39–83. Tokyo: 
Shu seido , 1910. http://dl.ndl.go.jp/info:ndljp/pid/991509. 
Yokoi Tokiyoshi. Mohan chōson. Tokyo: Yomiuri Shinbunsha, 1907. 
http://dl.ndl.go.jp/info:ndljp/pid/888488. 
